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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTRUMENTS OF RIGHTEOUSNESS: THE INTERSECTIONS OF BLACK 
POWER AND ANTI-VIETNAM WAR ACTIVISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1964-
1972 
 
Instruments of Righteousness investigates the class-, race-, and gender-based 
identities and intersections of women and men in the Black Power movement and their 
various organizing activities to gain certain and defined concessions from federal, state, 
and local governments. It argues that the intersections of Black Power and anti-Vietnam 
War activism created changing definitions of black masculinity and femininity, expressed 
through anti-draft and anti-war work. Black Power and anti-war activism cannot and 
should not be investigated separate from one another. The experiences of Black Power 
soldiers, antiwar members of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), 
the Black Panther Party, and the Third World Women’s Alliance, and exiled black 
Americans highlight the ways the anti-Vietnam War and Black Power activism depended 
on each other for rhetorical, theoretical, and personnel needs. Additionally, it explores the 
ways that Black Power organizations articulated “Third World” mentalities in their anti-
war battles. By espousing a shared identity with people of color throughout the world, 
Black Power organizations placed themselves in a transnational conversation among 
radical, decolonizing nation-states. Black Power’s advocates’ roles as non-governmental 
actors in the Third World strengthened ties with and presented new images of United 
States citizens throughout the decolonizing world.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION: A CHANGE IS GONNA COME 
 
 On August 28, 1963, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
Chairman John Lewis stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial facing tens of 
thousands of people crammed onto the Washington Mall. They were there for the now 
famous “March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom,” and dozens of speeches 
addressed a range of issues. Lewis’ defiant speech about the shortcomings of President 
John F. Kennedy’s Civil Rights Bill has been overshadowed by the elegance of his 
mentor, Dr. Martin Luther King’s, “I Have a Dream” speech. However, it was Lewis and 
SNCC’s short speech that paved the truer road map to the 1960s and beyond.  Though 
tempered to appease conservative leaders within the movement and the Kennedy 
administration, Lewis’ original speech linked jobs, economic mobility, respect, and 
voting rights to a worldwide struggle for democratic participation and freedom. In his 
edited speech, Lewis told the crowd that SNCC came to Washington “with a great deal of 
misgiving,” because: 
In its present form, this bill [Civil Rights Act] will not protect the citizens of 
Danville, Virginia, who must live in constant fear of the police state. It will not 
protect the hundreds and thousands of people that have been arrested on trumped 
up charges. What about the three young men, SNCC field secretaries in Americus, 
Georgia, who face the death penalty for engaging in peaceful protest?... We must 
have legislation that will protect the Mississippi sharecroppers, who have been 
forced to leave their homes because they dared to exercise their right to register to 
vote. We need a bill that will provide for the homeless and starving people of this 
nation. We need a bill that will ensure the equality of a maid who earns five 
dollars a week in the home of a family whose total income is 100,000 dollars a 
year. We must have a good FEPC bill. 
My friends let us not forget that we are involved in a serious social 
revolution. By and large, politicians who build their career on immoral 
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compromise and allow themselves an open forum of political, economic and 
social exploitation dominate American politics.1 
 
  Three years before Stokely Carmichael proclaimed “Black Power” from the 
hood of a car during the Meredith March Against Fear, three years before Huey Newton 
and Bobby Seale wrote the Black Panther Ten Point Program, and three years before 
Julian Bond was denied a seat in the Georgia House of Representatives for standing with 
SNCC’s anti-Vietnam War announcement, John Lewis’ words excited a crowd of 
onlookers to embrace structural changes to the American way of life, beyond the Civil 
Rights Act introduced by the Kennedy administration, beyond Dr. King’s dream, and 
beyond the bounds of the traditionally venerated movement. Although the Vietnam War 
was not explicitly mentioned or alluded to in Lewis’ short speech, he declared allegiance 
with Third World decolonization efforts, exclaiming “We are tired. We are tired of being 
beat by policemen. We are tired of seeing our people locked up in jail over and over 
again, and then you holler ‘Be patient.’ How long can we be patient? We want our 
freedom and we want it now.”2 The War, quietly expanding to include support troops and 
military trainers, would soon become front page news, as the Johnson Administration 
ramped up troop deployment and committed the United States to full-fledged, though 
never declared, war in Southeast Asia.3  Black Americans, many of whom were on the 
Mall that day—including John Lewis and Julian Bond—would highlight the shared 
oppression of American imperial desires.  
                                                     
1 John Lewis, “The March on Washington, Original Draft of SNCC Chairman John Lewis’ Speech to 
March,” <http://www.crmvet.org/info/mowjl.htm>, Accessed July 1, 2013. 
2 Ibid. 
3 George Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York, 
McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2002), 89-129. 
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War was the backdrop upon which Black Power wrote its story. The use of black 
soldiers to fight the Vietnam War, the government’s insistence that the United States was 
fighting a war for freedom—another war for democracy outside the United States, and 
billions of dollars that war took from antipoverty and community redevelopment funds--
led Black Power advocates to vociferously protest American involvement in Vietnam. 
Black Power cannot be separated from the 1960s and the 1960s cannot be understood 
without a frank discussion of American involvement in Vietnam. Thus, Black Power and 
anti-Vietnam war activism are inextricably intertwined. For too long, scholars have 
sought to explain Black Power in a vacuum of domestic issues and in-fighting between 
new organizers like the Black Panther Party and US and the well-established Civil Rights 
groups such as SNCC, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  Pushed to the footnotes or explicitly 
overlooked as a determining factor, the War in Vietnam and Black Americans’ work to 
end it are the phantoms of Black Power scholarship.4  
The Vietnam War has a ubiquitous place in the American psyche of the 21st 
century. It dominated international headlines as a comparison to the Iraq invasion and 
subsequent drawn out War on Terror, a war many Americans felt could not be won. The 
war and its era (1964-1972, for this study’s purpose) are romantically remembered in 
                                                     
4 Indeed, Peniel E. Joseph’s narrative history of Black Power: Waiting ‘til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative 
History of Black Power in America (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), provides no sustained 
discussion of Black Power and Vietnam. Instead, short discussions, usually involving Stokely Carmichael’s 
personal beliefs against the war, are all the evidence Joseph investigates (pgs. 156-159, 165-167, 179-181). 
Joseph’s review essay of Black Power scholarship (“Rethinking the Black Power Era,” Journal of Southern 
History 75, no. 3 (August 2009): 707-716) spends no time discussing the war or scholarship associated with 
Black Power’s antiwar activism. Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr’s Black Against Empire: The 
History and Politics of the Black Panther Party (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), discusses 
antiwar protest, but provides a general, top-down overview (focusing on President Johnson’s reactions to 
protest, not the protesters themselves); though the book is about the Black Panther Party, it fails to connect 
Black Panther anti-imperial rhetoric with anti-draft and anti-war protesters in the United States (pgs. 204-
206).   
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some circles as a time of expanding personal freedoms, while for others, the 1960s and 
1970s were the end of “traditional America.” Yet, for all its contradictions, the Vietnam 
era United States remains in the forefront of our cultural ethos drawing comparisons, 
lustful wishes for the past, and ire at the idealism of a bygone time. And still, the Vietnam 
era, like most, is misunderstood and manipulated to serve the needs of whatever pundit is 
inciting it at the time.  
 This dissertation grew out of an absence within the popular memory of the war 
and particularly its detractors. The Vietnam anti-war and anti-draft protests that engulfed 
college campuses and major cities in the summers and falls of the latter half of the 1960s 
and early 1970s are signposts in American liberal history. The students, almost always 
white, male, and middle or upper-class, are the heroes of modern liberalism or the 
enemies of modern conservatism. Coming on the heels of the Civil Rights Movement and 
at the same time as Black Power emerged into the mainstream, anti-Vietnam protest has 
been constructed as a white issue. Notwithstanding the work of Simon Hall, few scholars 
of either Civil Rights or Vietnam have connected the movements, resulting in an eraser in 
the history of progressive protest and a denial of African American agency in the 
movement.5  
                                                     
5 Vietnam antiwar historiography is dominated by participants, participant-observers, and those who came 
of age at the time. The leading synthesis, Charles de Benedetti with Charles Chatfield’s An American 
Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), spends 
fewer than 10 pages on African American involvement, and only focuses on the Black Panther Party. 
Joseph A. Fry’s “Unpopular Messengers: Student Opposition to the Vietnam War” (219-244) and Terry H. 
Anderson’s “Vietnam is Here: The Antiwar Movement,” (245-264) both in The War Never Ends: New 
Perspectives on the Vietnam War ed. by David L. Anderson and John Ernst (Lexington: University Press of 
Kentucky, 2007), construct the antiwar movement as white, middle class, humanities and social sciences 
majors on the campuses of leading white institutions. Each author briefly mentions black Americans 
contributions to antiwar activism (Anderson touches on the Kings’ participation in anti-war activities in 
1967, while Fry signposts the Jackson State University killings following Kent State), but neither considers 
black participants sustained involvement in ending the Vietnam War. Terry H. Anderson’s The Movement 
and the 1960s: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) argued that the Movement (every bit of social activism in the sixties, according to Anderson) was 
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The eraser continues in popular memory, as anti-war protesters, now some of the 
leading intellectuals in the American academy “remember” no black protests or 
protesters. On more than one occasion during the research and writing of this project, I 
had conversations with white men and women who were college students or draft-eligible 
at the time. After informing them of my research, some version of the following soliloquy 
occurred. “I protested the war in college. It was such a tragedy. I lost friends who were 
drafted for no reason. We used to march on the student union and burn our draft cards. I 
knew a guy who failed his senior English class so he’d keep his deferment. But there 
weren’t any black people that did that. I never saw an African American at the protests. 
Are you sure black people protested the war?” More often than not, the scholars and 
participants I encountered sought to define the antiwar movement as their own, 
something separate from Civil Rights and Black Power. This eraser serves multiple 
purposes in the minds of white antiwar participants. First, middle class, middle aged 
white protesters sought to place themselves in the midst of the protest movement to 
legitimate their intellectual and political backgrounds. Trained as the cultural turn took 
root in American historiography, many middle aged, white intellectuals embraced the 
liberal educator label and continue to maintain active, progressive lives in various social 
and political organizations. Furthermore, white protesters forgot or ignored protesters of 
color as a way to lay claim to the antiwar movement as their own. While black men and 
women who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s can claim their activism as a badge of 
honor, many white liberals did not participate in desegregation efforts and voter 
                                                                                                                                                              
“fluid and its participants diverse,” and attempted to bring together all facets of the 1960s into one, large 
synthesis. While this is admirable, the resulting monograph was a collection of generalizations and 
perpetuated the myth of a break between the pre-1968 Civil Rights protests and the later Black Power 
Movement (xvi).  
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registration campaigns, or were denied the ability to work within some groups because of 
their skin color.6 Participation in antiwar activities served as white, middle class, liberal 
activists’ markers of radical status. In short, by denying African American participation 
in antiwar activities, history has been whitewashed by the very people who helped create 
the cultural turn, bringing more diverse voices and stories to our understanding of the 
American past.7  
 The irony of the conversations with white protesters coupled with the lack of 
African American voices in most anti-war literature led to the questions that frame the 
following chapters: Were black Americans really not interested in the war or were their 
protests different from those currently celebrated?  How did Black Power protest 
                                                     
6 Stokely Carmichael’s “expulsion” of whites from SNCC is grossly misunderstood. While Carmichael did 
tell white members they could no longer serve in leadership roles and were unwelcome at some SNCC led 
affiliate groups, his more important message is often overlooked. Carmichael encouraged white members to 
work within their own communities to create change. This equally hard, but less rewarding work, was not 
embraced in mass by many white SNCC members, leading to the mass desertion of whites and some black 
members from SNCC after Carmichael’s rise to Chairmanship. Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and 
The Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 236-242. 
7 Fry, “Unpopular Messengers” 219-244. Fry asserts, “antiwar students were more likely to have been from 
middle- or upper-middle-class than from working- or lower-middle-class households; to have been 
majoring in the humanities or social sciences than in business, engineering, or the sciences; and to have 
been political independents or Democrats than Republicans. Most antiwar students were liberal or moderate 
politically rather than conservative or radical, and they viewed U.S. intervention in Vietnam as a 
correctable foreign policy mistake rather than the result of a irreparably flawed capitalistic system that 
should be overthrown. Few protesters belonged to an official or national antiwar organization since most 
dissident activity was essentially local in its origins and organizations” (222-223); Terry H. Anderson, 
“Vietnam is Here: The Antiwar Movement,” in The War Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam 
War ed. by David L. Anderson and John Ernst (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007):245-264; 
Joella Straley, “What Do we Forget when we Remember History?” National Public Radio, August 28, 
2013 < http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2013/08/28/216410432/what-do-we-forget-when-we-
remember-history?ft=1&f=1001&sc=tw&utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter>. James V. 
Werstch, Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); John Bodnar, 
Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002); George Lipsitz, Time Passages: Collective Memory and American 
Popular Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Pierre Nora translated by Marc 
Roudebush, “Between History and Memory: Les Liuex de Memoire,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 7-
24; Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History 
(New York: Beacon Press, 1997); Jonathan Scott Holloway, Jim Crow Wisdom: Memory and Identity in 
Black America since 1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Paul Ricoer, Memory, 
History, Forgetting, trans. Kantleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004); Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The Presence of the Past: Popular Use of History in American 
Life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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Vietnam in different ways than the mainstream, white movement? What about black 
soldiers and their anti-war organizing? How did the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee address the war and why? How did gendered notions of race and class affect 
Black Power’s anti-draft and anti-war organizing? How did international travel, 
connections to decolonizing nations, and correspondence with revolutionary leaders 
abroad affect Black Power’s antiwar protests?    
In order to answer those questions engagement with antiwar, Civil Rights, and 
Black Power scholarship was necessary. The late twentieth and early twenty-first century 
has seen a proliferation of scholarship dealing with the social upheaval of the 1960s, as 
baby boomers and their children enter the academy and seek to understand the United 
States’ place in an increasingly globalized world.  While the diversity of these studies 
cannot be overstated, all seek to understand the political and social contexts of the 1960s 
that allowed for the rise, expansion, and eventual collapse of a myriad of social 
movements which challenged American political, economic, and social practices and 
reshaped our everyday interactions with fellow citizens.  
Antiwar scholarship remains dominated by participant/observer accounts, 
focusing particularly on the experience of white, college student males and anti-draft 
organizing. Charles De Benedetti’s An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the 
Vietnam Era provides the most comprehensive overview of the movement, but spends 
little time exploring the ways African Americans organized separately from 
predominantly white organizations like the Students for a Democratic Society. Melvin 
Small’s Antiwarriors and Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves also take a holistic approach to 
American antiwar organizations, but fail to engage with other movements during the 
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1960s. Instead, his tunnel vision on antiwar protest creates a narrative dominated by 
popular media outlets and antiwar leaders’ words, particularly the members of the 
National Mobilizing Committee Against the War (MOBE), SDS, and the reactions to 
protesters in the Johnson and Nixon White Houses. Other scholars focused on specific 
antiwar organizations like Vietnam Veterans Against the War, using memoirs, oral 
histories, and testimony before Senate and House investigative panels.  
Simon Hall’s Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements in 
the 1960s, explores the connections between the antiwar and Civil Rights movements 
throughout the 1960s. Hall argues that sustained, combined antiwar organizing did not 
exist across racial lines because black and white organizers could not agree on platform, 
action, or message responses. While some groups, especially SNCC and SDS did 
collaborate on antiwar activities and members of Civil Rights and Black Power 
organizations also joined antiwar groups like MOBE, Hall found that most antiwar 
protests remained segregated. Because Peace and Freedom investigated cross 
organizational collaboration, Hall’s analysis lacked a sustained discussion of black 
antiwar protests, instead highlighting movement infighting and the lack of a cohesive 
message from black and white New Left organizations. Additionally, Hall adds to the 
misconception that Black Power antiwar activists were only along for the ride and not 
committed to ending the war and that the coalitions were not actually working groups, 
but instead were created as fronts for claims to “legitimacy” on both sides.8 
Taken together, these volumes reinforce the popularly held belief that the antiwar 
movement was populated almost entirely by white males on college campuses and in the 
                                                     
8 Hall, Peace and Freedom: The Civil Rights and Antiwar Movement in the 1960s (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2005). 
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military who sought to avoid service through anti-draft demonstrations or soldiers who 
returned from service disillusioned with the American military’s actions in Southeast 
Asia. These men were vocal members of an antiwar movement, but they were not the 
only protesters of American imperial expansion in the 1960s. Literature on the antiwar 
movement also focuses heavily on the failures of organizations and the media campaigns 
against them. Again, like the Black Power scholarship, many who write about the antiwar 
movement were participants, observers, or sympathizers and use their scholarship to 
assuage guilt, explain shortcomings, or blame other sources (i.e. Melvin Small 
continually blames the media for the failure of the antiwar movement, because the media 
only focused on the negative aspects and did not accurately report the happenings).9   
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Bronson P. Clark, Not By Might: A Viet Nam Memoir (Blastonbury, CT: Chapel Rock Publishers, 1997); G. 
David Curry, Sunshine Patriot: Punishment and the Vietnam Offender (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 1985); James K. Davis, Assault on the Left: The FBI and the Sixties Antiwar Movement 
(Westport: Praeger, 1997); Charles de Benedetti with Charles Chatfield’s An American Ordeal: The 
Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990); David Dellinger, From 
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Viking, 1991); Fred Halstead, Out Now! A Participant’s Account of the American Movement Against the 
Vietnam War (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1991); David Harris, Our War: What We did in Vietnam and 
What it did to Us (New York: Times Books, 1996); Kenneth J. Heineman, Campus Wars: The Peace 
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Most monograph length studies of the Black Power era have been completed by 
non-academic participants or academics with an activist agenda/connection to their 
subjects.  As Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams argue in relation to the Black Panther 
Party, “the locus of that writing is not among professional historians at all, and 
correspondingly, it suffers from a lack of precisely that detachment that gives history its 
disciplinary power.”10 This argument can be expanded to more than just the Black 
Panther Party, as a plethora of memoirs and scholarship written by former participants 
dominates the study of Black Power and the Vietnam antiwar movements. Even Joshua 
Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr.’s 2013 publication Black Against Empire, which sought 
“to uncover the history of the Black Panther Party…to analyze the Party’s political 
                                                                                                                                                              
Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era (New York: New York University Press, 
1993) and Put Your Bodies Upon the Wheels: Student Revolt in the 1960s (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001); 
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(New York: Doubleday, 1984). 
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Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement, ed. Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006): 1-14. 
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history,” was as much hagiography as a new interpretation of the politics of one of Black 
Power’s most prolific groups.11  
Academic study of the Black Power era is beginning to proliferate with new 
works published since 2008. Many recent works, including Donna Murch’s Living for the 
City (Oakland) and Jakobi Williams’ From the Bullet to the Ballot (Chicago), are local 
studies modeled after John Dittmer’s Local People and William Chafe’s Civilities and 
Civil Rights, and attempt to understand Black Power’s manifestation in one area. Local 
studies of the Black Panthers and other cities’ experiences with radical black organizing 
add to our understanding of the variety of organizing, theory, and radicalism of the Black 
Power era in the United States. Articles, edited volumes, and shorter pieces organized 
around location or type of activism (i.e. the Panther’s Breakfast for Children Program or 
the Deacon’s of Defense in Alabama) also add to the depth of scholarship being produced 
by Black Power scholars. However, because much of this work remains focused on 
individuals or specific locations, a national perspective of Black Power remains missing 
in the historiography.12  
While these recent works have added depth to historians’ understanding of the 
era, Black Power is still generally overlooked or misunderstood by both the academy and 
the general public. Black Power is still most often discussed as the antithesis of the Civil 
                                                     
11 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr., Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black 
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(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Jeanne F. Theoharis and Komozi Woodard, 
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2003) and Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America (New York: New York University 
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Rights Movement, a foil of the fair minded and peaceful demonstrations of black 
Americans for expanded rights between 1954 and 1965.  For example, Charles Payne’s 
I’ve Got the Light of Freedom focused almost entirely on the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee’s (SNCC) pre-1965 life in Mississippi.  When Payne accounted 
for the post-1965 era of SNCC, he wrote dejectedly about the betrayal of the local 
community activities that made SNCC and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party so 
revolutionary. Payne wrote:  
If the movement’s formally radical phase achieved less than it might have, the 
erosion of community is at least partly responsible for that. However unwittingly, 
however compelling the reasons, the activist tradition in the Black community lost 
touch with the kinds of questions raised by the organizing experience in 
Mississippi, a loss that has certainly contributed to the impoverishment of 
political discussions in that community for the last two decades.13 
 
In Payne’s view, “Black Power was and is an unsettling idea,” and cost the Movement 
more than it provided in rhetoric, organizing, or financial support.14 
Most scholars date the emergence of Black Power to 1966 with the founding of 
the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Oakland and Stokely Carmichael’s calls for Black 
Power in Greenwood, Mississippi during the Meredith March Against Fear.  Yet, Peniel 
Joseph and Timothy B. Tyson astutely show that Black Power ran concurrent with the 
Civil Rights Movement and often influenced the direction the mainstream movement 
proceeded in.  For example, Tyson’s biography of Robert F. Williams, a NAACP chapter 
president in North Carolina, argues that Williams’ activism in the late 1950s and early 
1960s was the first sustained Black Power organizing in the country.  Williams met with 
international leaders, lunched with Malcolm X, and was eventually expelled from the 
                                                     
13 Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi 
Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 390. 
14 Payne, I’ve Got the Light of Freedom, 389. 
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NAACP for his radical politics.  Williams’ early activism led to his exile in Cuba and 
China, though he eventually returned to the United States. According to the dominate 
narrative, Williams activism and exile is an aberration of the Civil Rights Movement, 
even though Joseph’s more recent book, Waiting til the Midnight Hour shows that many 
Black Power or radical black organizers were active before 1966.15   
The correlation between Black Power and masculinity is a particularly popular 
angle for many historians, and continues to be the main focus of much scholarly research 
on the era.  Political Scientist Judson L. Jefferies, in the introduction to Black Power in 
the Belly of the Beast spends most of the essay focused on Black Power’s inherent 
violence.  Jefferies accepts at face value the popular notion that Black Power activists 
were not interested in bettering themselves or their communities, but were instead 
focused on gratuitous and often nonsensical violence in order to gain followers.  The 
focus on violence goes hand-in-hand with the focus on men and masculinity that has 
dominated Black Power scholarship.  These scholars seem to assume that women could 
not be violent and wield a gun in self-defense, or that men’s violence was synonymous 
with violence against women, thus women were not involved in leadership positions or 
Black Power advocacy.  While physical and verbal abuse of women did occur in Black 
Power groups and sexism was definitely an issue, these actions were not only perpetrated 
by Black Power advocates. Additionally, even though these incidents did occur, this does 
                                                     
15 Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America (New 
York: Henry Holt and Company, 2007); Timothy B. Tyson, Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the 
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not automatically mean that women did not have leadership roles or provide important 
backing in Black Power organizations and at Black power events.16 
Kimberly Springer’s Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 
1968-1980 is a refreshing supplement to these masculine focused narratives.  Springer 
traces the development of early Black Feminist organizations and argues that black 
feminist activism did not emerge after the white feminist movement, but actually 
happened alongside it. Moreover, Springer’s work is a successful model of the use of 
intersectionality in understanding divergent movements.  Springer connects black 
women’s groups such as the Combahee River Collective and the Third World Women’s 
Alliance through membership, organizational statements on agendas, and party platforms 
to complicate the idea of a single black womanhood or black feminism.17   
Springer’s book is joined by the 2009 anthology, Want to Start a Revolution: 
Radical Women in the Black Freedom Struggle as another example of powerful women’s 
activism in the Black Power and Civil Rights era.  The collection includes essays on 
women in the Black Panther Party, Shirley Chisholm, and Rosa Parks, and highlights the 
contributions of women in welfare politics, education, and revolutionary movements for 
societal change.  While the anthology is excellent, no monograph length study is 
currently published that explores the ways these women’s lives intersected across social 
                                                     
16  Judson L. Jefferies, “Introduction: A Retrospective Look at the Black Power Movement,” in Black 
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movement groups and agendas.  Additionally, both Springer and the editors of Want to 
Start a Revolution ignore the role the Vietnam Antiwar Movement played in 1960s and 
1970s activism.18 
Just as discussions of the Vietnam War and antiwar activism are left out of most 
Black Power and Civil Rights historiography, periodization and categorization of the 
Black Freedom Struggle is also highly contested among historians. Jacquelyn Dowd 
Hall’s “The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past,” Tyson’s 
and Joseph’s monographs, as well as Manning Marable’s Malcolm X have shown how 
Black Power and Civil Rights activism emerged in similar ways around the same time. 
Because history, especially the more recent past, is constructed through memory, Hall 
argues “remembrance is always a form of forgetting and the dominant narrative of the 
civil rights movement—distilled from history and memory, twisted by ideology and 
political contestation, and embedded in heritage tours, museums, public rituals, 
textbooks, and various artifacts of mass culture—distorts and suppresses as much as it 
reveals.”19 Instead of a master narrative, where the Civil Rights Movement only existed 
from 1954-1965 (or from the Brown v. the Board decision to the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act), Hall proposes a Long Civil Rights Movement, “that took root in the liberal 
and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was intimately tied to the ‘rise and fall of the New 
Deal Order,’ accelerated during World War II, stretched far beyond the South, was 
continuously and ferociously contested, and in the late 1960s and 1970s inspired a 
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‘movement of movements’ that ‘def[ies] any narrative of collapse.’”20 By expanding the 
Civil Rights Movement timeline from twelve short years to five decades of activism in 
the twentieth century, Hall’s Long Civil Rights Movement encompasses black economic, 
social, gendered, and political activism, instead of a narrow master narrative focused on 
male leaders and political victories. 
While Hall’s reinterpretation of the Civil Rights timeline has been well received 
by many historians and has influenced a number of works, Sudiata Keita Cha-Jua and 
Clarence Lang argue that the Long Civil Rights Movement is a “vampire,” “rootless and 
wandering,” and lacks periodization, clear definitions of Civil Rights and Black Power, 
and a discussion of distinct geographical differences. By collapsing the North and South 
into a larger movement and not identifying the ruptures in a “continuous movement” for 
black freedom in the United States, the Long Movement thesis actually further distorts 
our understanding of the dramatic changes the Civil Rights era brought to the United 
States.21  Although Cha-Jua and Lang present a cogent argument, they are not convincing 
in describing the Long Movement thesis as a “vampire.” They assume that scholars who 
subscribe to the Long Movement thesis see Civil Rights and Black Power activism as a 
single, continuous movement with exactly the same participants, organizations, and 
tactics. Instead, the Long Movement illustrates the way the Civil Rights and Black Power 
movements changed over time, learning from the failures of previous activities to achieve 
change in their time. Moreover, the Long Movement’s interest in more than citizenship 
rights highlights the intersecting nature of Rights movements in the United States and the 
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important work black activists undertook to expand economic, social, and gendered 
rights.22  
Intersectionality is the guiding theoretical framework for this dissertation.  A 
foundational angle in Feminist Theory, intersectionality seeks to understand the way 
individuals use their intersecting identities in strategic ways throughout their everyday 
lives.  In the study of history, particularly the history of minority groups, intersectionality 
allows the historian to uncover various identities and motivations in the actors’ lives to 
understand their life choices. Because these movements and the lives of those who 
participated in them did not occur in a vacuum, where only one motivating factor lead to 
activism, it is imperative to study the era of Black Power and Vietnam antiwar protest 
together.  Looking at each movement individually only provides a slice of the story, one 
that is not fully understood nor sufficiently rich without the others.23   
                                                     
22 Steven F. Lawson also finds the Long Movement concept troubling. He argues “the concept of the long 
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As a work situated in the Long Movement scholarship, this dissertation uses a 
number of terms to address Black Power and Civil Rights organizing. Throughout, I use 
Black Power, the Black Freedom Struggle, and the Movement interchangeably. While 
this may appear problematic, it is my assertion that Black Power was part of the Civil 
Rights continuum and should not be viewed as inherently separate and different than 
earlier protest. Moreover, the Black Freedom Struggle encompasses African American 
activism from their encounter with the United States through today, thus the use of the 
term places this dissertation in a long line of scholarship that explores the experiences of 
black Americans in the United States. When discussing the master narrative of the Civil 
Rights Movement, I use the term Civil Rights. The movements are inter-related and 
intersecting. One cannot be divorced from the other, without seeing the ways that Civil 
Rights activism influenced Black Power advocates and vice versa—to do so, is to return 
to the master narrative that privileges certain men over others.  
Black and white protesters, as Simon Hall has shown, worked together, though 
tenuously at times, to create a vibrant and powerful antiwar movement. I seek to 
understand how Black Power engaged with the Vietnam War, regardless of where or with 
whom those actions took place. Most importantly, this study does not concern itself with 
the accomplishments or failures of Black Power’s antiwar activities. An inevitable 
criticism of all popular movements is to highlight the lack of change participants were 
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able to create in the society they sought to critique. A failure to end the war in an 
expedient manner or to reduce the number of soldiers sent to Vietnam in a given year 
does not undermine the legitimacy of the work antiwar protesters felt they were doing. 
Indeed, antiwar work, especially within Black Power organizations, focused as much on 
political education as on avoiding draft calls and increasing War on Poverty funding to 
black communities.  
 Instead, at the center of this study is the understanding that Black Power 
advocates were vital participants in anti-Vietnam War organizing, voiced opposition to 
the War early on, and presented race-based reasons against American involvement in 
Vietnam. Utilizing oral histories, Black Power newspapers, memoirs, and archival 
holdings from around the country, this dissertation explores Black Power’s engagement 
with Vietnam through the experiences of black soldiers, SNCC members, women, and 
international travel.  
 Chapter two traces Black Power activism from the end of the World War I 
through the end of the master narrative of Civil Rights. The roots of Black Power can be 
found in the broken promises of the federal government to black soldiers following 
World War I and II, as well as the poverty many Black Power leaders experienced in 
their early lives. Poverty, either their own or seeing others, helped radicalize members of 
Black Power organizations to work to be able to afford the sandwich at a lunch counter, 
not just to be able to sit at it.  
 Building on the second chapter, the third chapter explores the experiences of 
black soldiers serving in Vietnam and on domestic bases in the post-integration American 
military. The military was traditionally a path to a middle class life and an acceptable 
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display of black manhood, but that changed during Vietnam. Instead, for some soldiers, 
service in Vietnam and at home served as radicalizing moments, where soldiers sought to 
redefine manhood and patriotism to include pacificism, protection of their own 
communities, and a desire to receive equal treatment inside and out of the military.  
 The draft led to a large increase in the number of African American males serving 
in the United States Army and it was a symbol of the government authority run amok in 
the black community for some individuals. Using the Student Non-Violent Coordinating 
Committee as a lens for understanding antiwar activism at home, chapter four argues that 
Black Power advocates also sought to include draft evasion and exemption in the 
definition of black manhood. Moreover, SNCC’s draft resistance activities continued well 
into the late 1960s and show that the organization, though limited, remained active in the 
black freedom struggle after the passage of the Voting Rights Act and Stokely 
Carmichael’s Black Power chant. Instead of ending after the Meredith March Against 
Fear, SNCC worked to connect poverty, corruption, and America’s involvement in 
Vietnam and to end the use of black troops in a war they viewed as white, colonial 
aggression. 
 Antiwar activism and Black Power scholarship often focuses on the lives and 
work of males. Chapter five shows the dual nature of protest, as Black Power women 
were active in antiwar organizing and used the Vietnam War and the experiences of 
Vietnamese women to influence their own activism. Moreover, working on antiwar 
platforms gave black women a place to explore and help define black masculinity, as well 
as a new black femininity, separate from and unrelated to the Moynihan Report, which 
argued that black women were domineering matriarchs who emasculated black men. 
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Black women’s participation in antiwar work underscored the importance of gender in 
Black Power’s opposition to the Vietnam War and gave black women space to explore 
their own gendered, classed, and racialized questions. In fact, antiwar activism served as 
fertile recruiting ground for many new black feminist organizations that sprang up in the 
early 1970s. 
 Finally, in chapter six, I explore the ways international travel, exile, and 
interactions with revolutionary governments influenced the spread and development of 
Black Power antiwar activism. By interacting with other people of color from around the 
world, but especially in Latin America and Asia, Black Power advocates developed a 
shared, Third World mentality with other colonial subjects. Through an imagined 
community of colonial repression, Black Power antiwar activists came to see themselves 
as members of a Third World community in the United States and presented antiwar 
arguments based on the shared experience of oppression. A Third World mentality was 
evident in Black Power writings and speeches, and helped explain why black men should 
not serve in Vietnam or the American military in general.  
 Taken together, the following chapters provide a counter-story to the master 
narrative of Civil Rights and Black Power scholarship. The intersection of Black Power 
and anti-Vietnam activism shows the multi-faceted nature of activism in the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Additionally, the following chapters highlight the continuity of the 
Movement, even as organizations and their members shifted focus from citizenship rights 
to full participation in United States society. The decisions to speak out against the 
Vietnam War and to fight against the draft were not isolated events in the lives of a few 
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people. Instead, anti-Vietnam War activism was an important and overlooked part in 
Black Power’s attempts to push the United States to be a more equal and just nation. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BLACK POWER BEGINNINGS, 1919-1966 
“So when we talked about Black Power it was in a political context of building political 
institutions and social institutions in the black community, where we worked.”—
Cleveland Sellers1 
 
Like so many nascent movements, the origins of Black Power are rooted in 
circumstances that are hidden in historical narratives which tell cleaner and more easily 
understood stories.2 Without knowing the social and political developments that led to its 
emergence at the national level, Black Power’s beginnings are murky. In the mid-1960s, 
novelist John O. Killens was like many who had no clue about where the movement 
originated. Instead, he resorted to a meaningless cliché, believing Black Power was “an 
idea whose time has come.”3 What Killens overlooked was that Black Power arose out of 
a long struggle for equality for black Americans. It developed over a half century, as 
Civil Rights organizations took halting steps toward integration, political power, and 
ultimately, the chance at full participation in the American capitalist system.  The 
emotions and theories that became associated with Black Power in the 1960s were not 
new; instead, they were extended and developed into a new global arena.  
The lineage of Black Power lies in the separatism of Marcus Garvey and the 
impassioned rhetoric of A. Philip Randolph in the early 20th century, and moved toward 
full realization as World War II ended. The War created a number of opportunities for 
black Americans—particularly black industrial workers. As soldiers were deployed in 
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Asia, Northern Africa, and Europe, men and women at home were asked to fill their void 
on the factory floor.  These openings, coupled with an earlier migration of black men and 
women out of the South, introduced migrants to America’s urban centers in the North and 
West.  They brought their former lives, their labor, and most importantly, their children 
into a new cultural milieu that held the promises of the American dream, but not the 
reality. Black men and women who served on the front lines or the industrial lines during 
the War saw their wealth increase during war time, but soon found that they remained the 
last hired and first fired, as more “deserving” (i.e. white) men returned to the shop floor 
at the end of the War. The angst felt by those newly migrated, as well as those who had 
served and went unrewarded for their sacrifice, imbued their children with a sense of 
urgency, uncertainty in post-war America, and militancy.  
Twentieth-century articulations of Black Power originated in African Americans’ 
anger beginning with World War I and the lack of jobs for black workers, trained by the 
Army and drafted at disproportionate numbers to fight segregated trench battles in 
France. W.E.B. Du Bois and other African American intellectual leaders closed ranks 
around the US government and encouraged black men to enlist and serve honorably in 
the military. Workers throughout the urban North were denied opportunities and forced 
into menial labor, because of closed shops and segregated hiring processes. The Great 
War, first seen as an opportunity for black American advancement, was an experience of 
radicalization for many veterans, who were denied military benefits and basic human 
rights in the country they fought to protect. Black veterans were spit upon, forced into 
segregated transportation cars, and some even lynched upon their arrival back home after 
the war. Racial unrest also resulted in riots throughout the country, most notoriously in 
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Chicago, Detroit, and St. Louis in 1919. Black soldiers were forced to serve in Jim Crow 
Army units, barred from the Marines, and only allowed to participate in the Navy as mess 
hands.4 Sent to France as support staff, the soldiers returned to a country still deeply 
segregated, with few opportunities to use their military training to advance their 
economic and social positions. Black soldiers’ time in France, working in a less racist 
culture and with colonized French soldiers, also heightened African American awareness 
to the United States’ hypocritical democratic rhetoric.5 This same story would repeat 
itself two decades later, as World War II came to a close, finally coalescing in the Black 
Power struggle of the 1960s and 1970s.  
  The successful recruitment and retention of Communist African Americans in 
the 1920s laid the groundwork for later radical protests, as Black Power assumed the 
mantle of American anti-imperialism. Lovett Fort-Whiteman, organizer of the American 
Negro Labor Congress, a Communist labor organization, linked American imperialism to 
race based segregation, poor housing conditions for black Americans, and lack of 
opportunities in the Capitalist marketplace. He and his organization hailed the Soviet 
Union as a model for racial equality and sought to remake the American economy on 
Communistic terms. The first Red Scare in the 1920s severely undermined the 
Communist Party of America’s ability to recruit and retain African American members in 
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the South and urban North. Yet, the party’s ideological influence lasted longer than their 
physical organizing.6 
 Just as Communism was gaining a foothold in some parts of African American 
labor organizing, Marcus Garvey’s Back to Africa movement provided another outlet for 
angry, displaced blacks. Garvey came to the United States in 1916, where he settled in 
Harlem and honed his public persona through fundraising for an industrial farm in 
Jamaica.  Garvey’s belief that equality could not be found in the United States gained 
support from a number of radical and moderate blacks displeased with Jim Crow and 
forced to live a life of second-class citizenship. He argued against black participation in 
World War I because black men were “relegated to segregated quarters, cooking, 
cleaning, transporting and burying their fallen white compatriots.” He advocated fighting 
for democracy at home, instead of defending it abroad. Garvey’s followers believed that 
salvation could be found in Africa, where all blacks could be free of race-based 
discrimination in their ancestral home. Though Garvey’s movement never gained a large 
following, his radical organizing included the Little family of Chicago (parents of 
Malcolm Little, soon to be Malcolm X) and the founders of the Nation of Islam who 
sought to form a “Nation Within a Nation,” seeking independent states in the American 
South. Garveyism’s influence on the Nation of Islam cannot be overstated, as Garvey’s 
belief in self-help, racial pride, and economic independence were the core foundations of 
the Nation. While Garvey’s movement ultimately died out in the mid-1920s, and Garvey 
himself died penniless, his influence on the movements that followed was significant, as 
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his rhetoric and organizing efforts informed the work of mid-century Black Power 
advocates. 7  
Garveyites and Communists gained national prominence at the same moment A. 
Philip Randolph began to organize the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) in 
1925 Chicago. Randolph’s powerful rhetoric and loquacious speaking style propelled him 
to national prominence, as the Great Depression rocked the American economy. In the 
1920s, the nascent BSCP sought affiliation in the American Federation of Labor, 
recognition from the federal government as a viable union, and equal pay for black 
workers. Randolph was successful in getting some local chapters recognized by the AFL, 
however, his organization remained relatively ignored by the white labor movement, 
which maintained segregated locals and barred African Americans from skilled labor 
unions.8 Randolph was more than an outspoken labor leader. His leadership within the 
BSCP, the most successful black labor union by the mid-1930s, boosted his standing 
nationally as he worked with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) to secure 
admittance of black Americans into CIO sponsored unions. Randolph also helped initiate 
the “Don’t Buy where You Can’t Work” campaign in cities like Chicago and Detroit. 
Black Americans protested establishments such as Woolworth’s (the site of later 
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desegregation campaigns), asking fellow residents not to purchase products from white-
owned and white-administered companies who barred employment of blacks. Randolph, 
as a steward of the National Negro Congress and later as the head of the March on 
Washington Committee and national agitator for black labor rights, consistently 
presented the desires of African Americans for inclusion in the workforce and the 
American economy and used his connections in the White House and the federal 
government to demand action on segregation through the draft, employment 
discrimination at federal job sites, and union activities.9  
 As the Depression deepened, the Brotherhood of the Sleeping Car Porters, along 
with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), fought 
for federal assistance to African Americans hard hit by the economy’s dramatic decline. 
After the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, Randolph repeatedly gained an audience 
with the administration, demanding that federal assistance be distributed equally, that 
African Americans be integrated into federal programs throughout the country, and the 
National Recovery Act have the teeth to enforce the desegregation of labor unions.10 At 
the outset of the 1930s, most African Americans remained as agricultural workers in the 
South. The Depression and subsequent resurgence in industrial production with the 
outbreak of war in Europe changed these demographics dramatically. Depression era 
agricultural changes from the Roosevelt administration, particularly the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act’s forty percent reduction in acreage and controversial payment of 
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farmers not to grow cotton (in hopes of bolstering prices) resulted in 67,000 (4.5%) fewer 
black farmers and sharecroppers in the 1940 census. Moreover, according to Harvard 
Sitkoff, “the rare black farmer who owned the land he tilled suffered most from the 
compulsory crop reduction policy agreed upon by the large landowners because it 
lowered drastically his already minimal income.”11 This lack of access to the land they 
had farmed for years, led many rural southerners to seek employment in the urban North 
and West as industrial opportunities began to increase with the shifting focus of material 
production away from consumer products and toward military defense. In cities like 
Oakland, migrant workers sought employment in defense shipyards, while in Detroit 
newly transplanted and earlier urban migrants attempted to find work in the Ford and 
General Motors plants, building tanks, plane engines, and guns. However, industrial work 
remained heavily segregated in the late 1930s, because regardless of skill, blacks were 
believed only suited to work in entry-level, dirty, back-breaking work.  The inability to 
fully participate in the American economy, even at a time of industrial rebirth, deepened 
the distrust many working class blacks held toward the federal government and 
capitalism.12 
 The beginning of World War II and increased armament production helped spur 
economic recovery in the United States as the federal government sought to aid its allies 
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and prepare for possible American intervention into the brewing global conflict. 
American industry competed for federal contracts to build everything from bullets to 
battleships, yet it remained heavily segregated, as African Americans were forced into 
menial, unskilled positions and often barred from the training courses necessary to secure 
employment. By 1941, black Americans demanded a change in the awarding of defense 
contracts and the segregation of American industry. A letter to the Editor of the 
Minneapolis Spokesman, reprinted in The Crisis, summed up the feelings of many black 
Americans: “Our industrial tycoons who are getting huge contracts to build our defense, 
exclude our loyal workers and hire those who may any minute wreck our defense plans. It 
is the same with our government. They tax us to build battleships upon which we may 
serve only as mess attendants.”13 Lack of employment in the defense industries was 
particularly pressing to students at the Hampton Institute, who were being trained in 
metal trades as potential defense workers, but the “great question in the minds of these 
boys, their parents, their school, and the Negro race: will they get jobs or will American 
industry continue to place color prejudice ahead of national defense?” remained.14 In San 
Diego, California, the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation refused to hire black workers 
because they were not properly trained, yet the San Diego Board of Education would not 
train black workers unless they could produce a letter from Consolidated Aircraft stating 
that they would be employed after the completion of their training. This cycle of 
exclusion was repeated in industrial plants with federal contracts for defense throughout 
the nation.15 
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 The exclusion of African American labor in defense industries became a rallying 
point for A. Philip Randolph and the BSCP in 1941. On February 19, 1941 four Senators 
introduced Senate Bill 75, which demanded an end to racial discrimination in national 
defense industries. The Crisis, the monthly magazine of the NAACP, implored its readers 
to write the chairman of the Committee of Education and Labor, committee members, 
and Senators from the letter-writer’s state to demand passage of the bill.16 Randolph 
endorsed the Bill and lobbied for its passage. As the Bill stalled in the Senate committee, 
Randolph ramped up his organizing efforts. In March, he announced that on July 1, 1941 
10,000 men would march on Washington, D.C. to demand desegregation of federal 
defense industries and the military. In April, the Office of Production Management issued 
a letter stating that it could not enforce desegregation plans, but only advise industries to 
desegregate defense industries.17  Randolph met with President Roosevelt, campaigned in 
national newspapers, and recruited black workers to force the government into action. 
Randolph’s threat of 10,000 men marching on Washington grew to 100,000 as the spring 
wore on, placing pressure on the Roosevelt administration to answer Randolph’s call. 
Because Senate Bill 75 was stalled in committee, Randolph demanded that the 
administration to take a stand. In a meeting with the President and Secretary of the Navy 
Frank Knox, Randolph told the men that “it would mean a great deal to the morale of the 
Negro people if you could make some pronouncement on the role the Negro people will 
play in the Armed Forces of the nation in dealing with national defense.” Roosevelt and 
Knox spent much of their meeting lecturing Randolph on the “realities” of the American 
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military and racial policy in the United States, which made Randolph’s demand 
unpractical for the President. However, the administration was concerned with 
Randolph’s march. Roosevelt told Randolph “that he didn’t want a march on Washington 
because it would end up in violence and bloodshed and no doubt some people would get 
killed.” The President feared racialized violence and, notably, that if the event did take 
place, other groups would also begin to march on Washington and there “would be no 
end to it.” Roosevelt feared that the march would influence groups of all kinds and lead 
to him losing control of the country. The President even sent Mrs. Roosevelt and New 
York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia to dissuade Randolph from going forward with his 
march.18 
 On June 18, with the help of Eleanor Roosevelt and Mayor La Guardia, Randolph 
and NAACP Secretary Walter White had a half hour meeting with Roosevelt. In the 
meeting Randolph and White pressed the President for an executive order desegregating 
industries with federal defense contracts, ending discrimination in government agencies, 
desegregating the military, and denying labor unions that discriminated against black 
workers admittance and access to the National Labor Relations Board. Randolph told the 
President that he and White wanted concrete action from the federal government and 
noted that if the demands were not met, the March on Washington would go forward as 
planned. Randolph and White negotiated with the administration and on June 25, 
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, creating the President’s Committee on Fair 
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Employment Practice, and “for the first time since Reconstruction, the nation had a 
federal agency devoted exclusively to minority problems.” The Committee was to assess 
defense industries’ compliance with the order, which stipulated that industries could not 
allow third party contractors to discriminate and had to insure that training and vocational 
programs did not bar admittance based on race, creed, or color. The March on 
Washington was cancelled, though around a 1,000 people showed up for an open air 
meeting, where Randolph and Mayor La Guardia addressed the crowd.19  
While Executive Order 8802 was a step forward for African American labor, it 
did not meet all of Randolph’s demands. Segregation still existed in the military and 
many labor unions. Randolph, the NAACP, and other nascent civil rights organizations 
turned their attention to desegregating the military. The peacetime draft (established in 
1940) excluded many able-bodied African American males because the military was not 
prepared for Jim Crow barracks and training in the South. Local boards were instructed to 
draft only white men for their January 1941 quotas. The New York City chapter of the 
NAACP protested the action and The Crisis charged the system with discriminating 
against both black and white draftees.20  
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, pushed an already mobilizing 
United States into war in both the Pacific and Europe.21 Fighting a two front war for all 
out freedom, the U.S. required a large army. African Americans served in every 
American war, each time believing that their support and loyalty to the U.S. would be 
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rewarded with expanded equality. Yet, black soldiers remained segregated. They were 
drafted at lower rates, particularly in the South, as the segregated system of military jobs 
left few openings for black men. Black Americans were banned from serving in the 
Marines, could only serve in restricted, rear-division capacities like cooks in the Navy, 
and in segregated fighting units in the Army.22  The restrictions on service led to ironic 
outbursts by Southern legislators. Representative Charles E. McKenzie of Louisiana 
lamented the slow and uneven draft rate of African Americans in the South, asking “Has 
it come to pass…that the color of a man’s skin is the basis for his being drafted even if he 
is single and has no dependents?” To shore up his argument, McKenzie cited the 267 
black men listed as 1-A who were still undrafted because there had not been a “colored 
call” by the federal government. These men, according to McKenzie and his followers, 
were deemed inferior because of their skin color and this classification was racial 
discrimination.23 McKenzie did not want to integrate the military; instead, he wanted a 
more equitable draft rate so fewer of his married, white constituents would be sent to war.  
 The continued segregation of the American military led Randolph and the 
Pittsburgh Courier to create the Double V campaign in February of 1942. It called for 
victory over enemies from without and victory over enemies within the United States.24 
The campaign focused on securing black participation in the armed services, something 
Randolph claimed black Americans had to do to “preserve democracy and liberty such as 
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we now have in the world so that we may make it sounder and better. And Negroes must 
demand the right to fight and work alongside their fellow white Americans as full and 
equal citizens, workers, soldiers, sailors, air men and marine men.”25 Combining 
domestic integration with the battle for international democracy, the campaign demanded 
that black Americans fight two wars—to secure equal rights at home and democracy 
abroad--and to win both. The Double V campaign was the seed from which the Black 
Power movement grew—not because it was “radical” or “violent,” but because the failure 
of Double V and the legislative campaigns of the mainstream Civil Rights Movement did 
not address the structural (economic participation, food, shelter, and health care) needs of 
African Americans. 
 Double V used the rhetoric of American exceptionalism and black self-
determination to gain support from a wide variety of black organizations. It demanded 
black men and women “fight against the poll tax, against lynch law, segregation, and Jim 
Crow…for economic, political, and social equality,” as part of a “global war for 
freedom.”26 Endorsed by the NAACP, black newspapers across the country, and black 
owned businesses, the Double V campaign demanded full black participation in the war 
effort. As journalist Edgar T. Bouzeau argued, black Americans “must believe 
sufficiently in our cause at home if we are to contribute our utmost toward a successful 
war effort abroad.”27 Black Americans were empowered by the rhetoric of the war 
campaigns in Europe and Asia and some sought “the revolutionary goal of toppling one 
of the pillars of the American state: the system of racial discrimination and segregation 
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known as Jim Crow.”28 The War was seen as a watershed moment that would define the 
struggle for full political freedom for African Americans in the United States. By 
showing loyalty and willingness to participate in the American war effort, black leaders 
believed they were proving to white Americans that they deserved equal protection under 
the law. Roy Wilkins, editor of The Crisis, argued “the highest expression of patriotism 
in these war years will come in the critical analysis of our objectives in the refusal to 
ignore, now or later, these evils among us which are blood brothers of the evils against 
which we are warring.”29 By tying American racism to Nazi and Fascist hatred, Wilkins 
laid bare the NAACP’s belief that the war could be beneficial to African Americans.  
 The Double V Campaign’s main focus was on black military service. Black 
soldiers remained in segregated, underfunded, and horribly treated units led by white 
officers in the Army. In the Navy, black seamen could only serve as mess hands, and 
black men were still barred from service in the Marine Corps. The NAACP and the 
March on Washington Movement fought for black men’s admittance in the newly formed 
Army Air Corps, to become officers in the Army, and to serve in desegregated units on 
the front lines. These battles were slow going, but did result in the formation of an Air 
Corps battalion out of Tuskegee.30 The push to desegregate the military seemed logical as 
the war progressed, because black Americans were willing to serve and the United States 
needed manpower both in the Army and in industrial employment. However, the 
continued resistance by military officials to integrate the armed forces caused resentment 
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among some African American draftees and led some men to refuse their draft notices—
an action that would become more commonplace during the Vietnam War. During World 
War II, Malcolm Little (Malcolm X) used the induction process as a site of protest and to 
cultivate an image for the government. Malcolm was found mentally unfit to serve and 
was “diagnosed” with split personality, a designation he worked to create through letter 
writing and his own induction exam. Little created a person who the Army could not 
accept—someone who wanted to kill other Americans, was blood thirsty for violence, 
and was sexually promiscuous. He was “mentally disqualified for military service for the 
following reasons: psychopathic personality inadequate, sexual perversion, psychiatric 
rejection.” These assertions, coupled with his growing arrest record, earned Little his 4-F 
status.31 Because he was listed as 4-F he did not have to refuse service, but for two 
hundred men convicted for selective service violations under the Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940, this was not the case. Men were convicted for failure to register for 
the draft, refusing to submit to examinations, not appearing before draft boards and 
refusing to be inducted into the military. Malcolm’s subversion of the draft examination 
would be modeled and repeated by the Black Power generation faced with draft notices 
for Vietnam. Those men and women who did serve, some 920,000, were most often 
trained in segregated Southern states. 32 
Gary Reynolds, a black Chaplin in the Army during World War II, expressed the 
feelings of black soldiers in the pages of The Crisis. The black soldier was denied “food 
when he is hungry, dignified transportation when has to travel, a voice in choosing those 
who rule him, or just the most fundamental aspects of our proclaimed method of living,” 
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while being inundated daily with the call to become a hero in the American military. 
According to Reynolds, Secretary of War Stimson needed to know that the black soldier 
“does not want to fight—unless a second front is opened in Mississippi, Texas, Georgia, 
South Carolina, Louisiana, or just anywhere below the Mason and Dixon line—that his 
heart is not in the war.”33 By late 1944, as victory in Europe and Japan were close to 
realities, few African American victories had been realized. Forced into all black units 
and often denied respect or field promotions, black fighting men were obliged to support 
democracy without experiencing it. 
Gordon Parks, a war correspondent dispatched to a black air squadron outside 
Detroit and originally assigned to go to combat in Europe with them, experienced the 
double standard government officials applied to black soldiers.34 Parks spent time with 
the squadron, making friends with the pilots and enlisted men and writing a column on 
their heroism. He also had a number of encounters with blatant Army discrimination. In 
Detroit when the race riots of the summer of 1943 occurred, Parks dealt with the fear and 
uncertainty of living in an unwelcoming community. At the same time, his friend Tony 
was assigned to accompany bodies as they were transported back to families after their 
death. Tony wrote Parks a letter describing the treatment of the black soldiers’ bodies and 
the indignities the dead soldiers experienced.  Tony had to transfer the body of Judy, a 
pilot, to Detroit because “there are no facilities for handling Negro dead” at the base. The 
trip from the base to Detroit was 300 miles and was undertaken in an Army ambulance. 
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Tony wondered if the Army doctors even examined Judy, knowing the doctors on the 
base would not want to touch Judy’s body. Tony described the trip as “the final indignity 
of all.” Tony “felt shame and revulsion for having to wear the uniform I had on.” He 
delivered Judy’s body to his family, “but would [not] tell his folks about this trip because 
it will just hurt them more. At least to them he was a hero.”35 Tony’s experience with 
Judy’s body highlighted the mistreatment sanctioned by the federal government toward 
its black military personnel. Moreover, Tony’s shame and revulsion in participating in 
such an exercise, when white soldiers’ bodies were treated with the dignity and respect 
deserved by a hero, further strengthened his anti-government feelings.  
Parks’ own interactions with the military brass served as another example of the 
Army’s contempt with black military personnel. When the squadron Parks was assigned 
to received orders to deploy to Europe, Parks was not cleared for the mission. Confused 
by being left off the cleared list, Parks was dispatched to Washington to meet with the 
Pentagon and straighten out the perceived mishap. His trip to the nation’s capital included 
all the usual problems of traveling for African Americans in the 1940s American South. 
He was subjected to Jim Crow rail and public bus accommodations, as well as disrespect 
toward himself and other black military members, all in uniform, but none regarded with 
the same dignity as the white privates also traveling on the bus. When he finally met with 
a representative at the Pentagon, Parks was assured that his papers for deployment with 
his squadron were in order and was given directions to meet with the airmen at an 
undisclosed location outside Newport News, Virginia. His traveling experience was again 
compromised due to his skin color, as a bus driver refused his ticket order, because as a 
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military officer, Parks could write his own government order. Eventually, Parks made it 
back to the point of embarkment with his group. However, the next morning Parks was 
told by his commanding officer that he had not been cleared to depart with the rest of the 
squadron. The Pentagon had rescinded his orders, choosing not to cover the first black 
group to fight overseas, because black soldiers did not deserve the coverage Parks was 
assigned to provide. The Pentagon had not only denied Parks his profession, but had also 
deemed the airmen they had trained unworthy of the attention they had earned. Parks was 
so devastated he could not face his friends and snuck out of the barracks as the men 
readied themselves for their journey.36  
The treatment of black Army draftees and enlistees during their training at home 
underscored the importance of the Double V campaign for many participants. Those who 
served were expected to fight and protect democracy abroad, while they were treated as 
second class citizens within the American military structure. Soldiers were not afforded 
the protections of their uniforms or the honor of their service when they were on 
American soil, and often experienced the same indignities on the front lines.  As the war 
wound down aboard, the chance for the Double V at home slipped further out of reach. 
Returning black soldiers were not greeted with ticker tape parades and honor banquets. 
Instead, black servicemen were spit on, called nigger, and subjected to racial violence. 
No black soldiers were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor (though in the years 
since, the Tuskegee Airmen have been honored), and many black Americans were 
targeted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for their involvement in the Double V 
campaign and other nascent Civil Rights organizations, another precursor to the Black 
Power movement. J. Edgar Hoover’s fear of communist infiltration in the United States 
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and distrust of what he deemed “radical” individuals led to heightened surveillance on 
potential “threats.”37 Like their counterparts in World War I, black soldiers were left not 
with the glory of American victory, but the defeat of American racism.  
The reality of failure in the Double V campaign hit hard. With the return of 
American GIs, many Americans worried that without massive defense spending, the 
nation would return to a depression economy. To deal with the large number of 
demobilizing veterans, Congress instituted a New Deal for veterans. The Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, better known as the G.I. Bill, provided a number of domestic 
services for returning soldiers seeking reintegration into American society. More than 8.3 
million, or some 52 percent, received unemployment payments provided by the bill as 
‘readjustment allowances’; about 7.8 million, a little less than half of the cohort, received 
graduate, college, or subcollege-level education and training benefits; and 4 million, or 
25 percent, were granted a VA-guaranteed loan to finance a home, farm, or business.38 
These service rewards dramatically changed the American cultural landscape, as millions 
of veterans stepped permanently into the middle and upper classes because of their G.I. 
benefits. However, the Bill disproportionally benefited white male veterans, as colleges 
remained segregated, home ownership was restricted by predatory lenders and restrictive 
covenants, and job acquisition continued to be challenging for African Americans.39 
Discrimination by Veterans Administration officials and no anti-racism provisions meant 
that although the G.I. Bill was written as a color-blind document, it operated in a racist 
society and was administered by racist white officials. Moreover, the Bill, like all 
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government public services, required the action of black veterans to demand their 
benefits.  
The struggles to secure government ensured benefits, while also attempting to 
maintain full time employment and find a foothold in new communities meant that black 
veterans were often on the outside of the early Cold War economic boom. Complicating 
matters further, the continued segregation of the Armed Forces and the denial of African 
American draftees the chance to participate in World War II service kept millions of 
black men and women from receiving benefits. The G.I. Bill, for African American 
veterans, was another instance of second-class citizenship in a nation that required their 
patriotism, but did not reward them along the same lines as whites. The Bill, according to 
historian Lizabeth Cohen, “rewarded sixteen million servicemen and –women who had 
served their country in wartime by helping them restart their lives after an average of two 
and half years away,” but “…by its very structure, the bill favored some Americans over 
others, and even some veterans over others, spawning consequences not necessarily 
anticipated by its framers and supporters.”40 While the U.S. economy recovered from the 
Depression through industrial war time production and white American wealth soared 
with access to G.I. benefits and secure employment, black Americans still remained well 
below the national average in wealth. Only 20,000 black veterans gained access to 
college education, 53% of all married black veterans lived with relatives, and in the 
summer of 1947 only two black veterans received Federal Housing Authority loans of the 
3,229 issued in Texas.41 In 1950, median income for white families in the United States 
was $3,100, while nonwhite families in the United States only made, on average, $1,569 
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annually. According to the Department of Commerce, these figures reflected “the 
concentration of nonwhites in low-paying jobs and in some which do not permit 
continuous full-time employment.” The new, post-war economy was no friendlier than 
pre-war manufacturing and agriculture to black workers.42 
War time labor shortages allowed some African Americans to move up in wages 
and to take jobs with more responsibility, particularly in civil defense industries, but 
those gains did not last. The men and women, often with their families in tow, migrated 
out of the deep South and to industrial hubs like Detroit, San Francisco, and New York—
continuing a tradition of seeking higher wages and better employment opportunities. 
Family movement was slow and disjointed, as one member would often move first, and 
then send for the remaining family later. Thus, the efforts to relocate outside of the South 
happened over a number of years, often culminating after peace was declared.  
The families who followed war time production out of the South, believing that 
freedom from Jim Crow was possible in the urban North and West, were faced with the 
harsh realities of a de facto segregated society, similar to the Jim Crow world they sought 
to escape, waiting for them. Many times, the jobs promised by recruiters were not 
available for the unskilled labors who migrated to the coasts, or were reserved only for 
white workers. This dissatisfaction with the war time industry was somewhat assuaged by 
the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practices; however, the Committee was 
slow and often could not break through the barriers of individual factories, line managers, 
or hiring officials. Additionally, as the war wound down and white men began to return 
to the economy, black men and women who moved for wartime manufacturing 
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employment were faced with “last hired, first fired” mantra that generations before them 
had endured. Yet, unlike earlier migrations, migrants during World War II often moved 
with their families, taking control over their family’s destinies and believing that real 
opportunity awaited them. This full upheaval meant that war time migrants remained in 
the cities they had moved to, unlike some earlier emigrants who had sought employment 
when times were good and returned home during lean moments.43  
The uprooting of millions from the rural South to the urban North and West did 
not mean that the Southern culture was left behind. Instead, these shifts in black 
population meant that the desirable and less than desirable aspects of Southern life spread 
through the diaspora as well. Importantly for the battles of Black Power, the internal 
diaspora meant the mingling of seemingly disparate cultures into a strong sense of the 
Black community throughout the nation. While local problems in Oakland, Chicago, and 
Washington, D.C. existed, they were all part of larger structural issues heightened by the 
inequality of post-war economic boom times.44 
In smaller cities and towns in the South, similar dynamics played out as well. 
Robert F. Williams’ radicalization melded the experiences of industrial workers and 
soldiers. Sixteen at the time of the Pearl Harbor bombing, Williams post-war work with 
the Monroe, North Carolina chapter of the NAACP was motivated by his times, first in 
National Youth Administration (NYA) camp where he experience racial discrimination 
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and his employment by Detroit manufactures with war contracts. After a successful 
protest of the treatment of black men at the NYA site, Williams moved to Detroit to seek 
his fortune with his brother. Williams secured employment at the Ford Motor Plant, 
joined the local chapter of the United Auto Workers, and worked there until a Navy 
recruiter convinced him to move to Port Chicago, California in 1943. Williams continued 
to work in the war industries until he reported for duty in July of 1945. Like Gordon 
Parks, Williams’ military service proved to be the transformative experience that pushed 
him toward a lifetime fighting for civil rights. Taught to handle weapons and 
indoctrinated with the importance of democracy, Williams’ service coupled with his 
experiences in wartime Detroit and California, “instilled in [him] what a virtue it was to 
fight for democracy and that we were fighting for democracy and upholding the 
Constitution. But most of all they taught [him] to use arms.”45  The war experience was 
transformative for Williams and others who served and worked in war time industries 
because it brought into stark focus that the federal government was responsible for 
reinforcing unequal status of African Americans while it demanded those same men and 
women to fight and possibly die for democracy outside the United States. The internal 
migration of black men and women also highlighted the national nature of white 
supremacy, as Southern migrants experienced the same discrimination and job insecurity 
in the urban West and North that they believed they were escaping by leaving the South. 
The migration for jobs and subsequent lay-off of war time labor had a 
transformative effect on African American organizers for civil rights and the children of 
the migrants themselves. According to James Baldwin, “What happened in defense plants 
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and army camps had repercussions, naturally, in every Negro ghetto. The treatment 
accorded the Negro during the Second World War, marks, for me, a turning point in the 
Negro’s relation to America. To put it briefly, and somewhat too simply, a certain hope 
died, a certain respect for white Americans faded.”46 The failure to integrate the military 
coupled with the loss of secure work in the industrial sector led to the entrenchment of 
urban ghettos in American manufacturing cities, often populated by ex-pat Southerners 
who had sought their fortunes through the promises of the American defense industry. 
The children of these replanted Southerners went on to populate the Black Power 
organizations of the 1960s. The disappointment and resentment of their parents 
influenced and informed the Black Power generation’s interactions with and distrust of 
the federal government, while also feeding their sense of change and the importance of 
local organizations in the Black Power struggle.47 The challenges of the internal African 
American diaspora can be delineated from the early lives and survival processes 
experienced by a number of Black Power’s most vocal leaders. 
Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, founders of the Black Panther Party for Self-
Defense, were both the children of migrant Southern black Americans who resettled in 
Oakland during the war. Newton, the youngest of seven children, born on February 17, 
1942, in Monroe, Louisiana, was the son of a preacher and a farmer’s daughter. Newton’s 
parents had met and married in Arkansas, and moved to Louisiana during the Depression 
in search of greater opportunity. In 1945, Huey and his family moved with his father to 
Oakland, “when he came West to look for work in the wartime industries,” but “like 
countless other Black families in the forties and fifties, we fell victim to this indifference 
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and corruption when we moved to Oakland.”48 Newton’s family experienced a series of 
setbacks which mired them in poverty in Oakland’s ghetto. Though Huey’s father was 
educated and a preacher, his family struggled to remain out of poverty and moved 
frequently as rumors of jobs on Oakland’s docks and shipyards circulated through the 
community. Huey’s frequent movements and the dissatisfaction with the opportunities in 
Oakland had a profound impact on his radicalization. The failure of the Oakland schools 
to support black students and the hard life the Newton family experienced in Oakland left 
Huey “constantly feeling uncomfortable and ashamed of being Black.”49 
Bobby Seale also came to the west coast from the South during the war. Five 
years older than Huey, Seale’s journey from Texas occurred at the end of World War II. 
Before the war, Seale’s father built the family a home in Port Arthur, Texas. As a skilled 
carpenter, Mr. Seale used his skills to provide for his family, but was forced to follow 
war time employment opportunities, and moved the family to San Antonio. The Port 
Arthur home was rented out for additional income, but the Seale family was forced to 
move into a house in San Antonio that lacked indoor plumbing. Mr. Seale was 
increasingly absent from home and when he did return to the San Antonio house, he was 
violent toward his wife and children. Bobby heard stories of California from his aunts 
and cousins, and asked his mother if they would also move. The answer came soon 
enough, as his father first went to Berkeley to secure a job and housing, and when enough 
money was saved, the rest of the family joined him. Having already owned a single 
family home, Bobby and his mother expected to own property in California, but were 
forced to come to terms with reality of cramped urban living. Bobby and his siblings 
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grew up in government housing, always a pay check away from having enough money to 
get out. Like his compatriot, Seale also experienced racism in Oakland’s education 
system and from the Bay Area’s police force. In time, Seale and Newton’s experiences in 
Oakland lead them to create the Black Panther Party.50  
Another leader in the Oakland Black Panther Party, David Hilliard, was also a 
member of the Southern exodus during the Great Depression. The last son of farmers 
from Rockville, Alabama, Hilliard’s family moved from their family plot to Mobile, 
following Bud, David’s oldest brother, to work on Mobile’s docks. After a few years of 
working on the docks, the family again moved for more opportunity. Hilliard, his mother, 
and Bud’s children, left Mobile for Oakland, as Bud had secured work in the post-war 
economy delivering Buicks. California had been a dream of David’s, after seeing movies 
about the state from the segregated balconies of Mobile’s movie theaters. Unlike Newton 
and Seale, Hilliard did not travel with his entire family, but his family was mired in the 
same situations in Oakland as his future friends. Eventually, Hilliard’s father and another 
sister joined them in Oakland, after Budd convinced the family that opportunities would 
always be better in Oakland than in Mobile. Unlike Hilliard’s dreams, Oakland’s streets 
were not paved with gold and his father was unable to secure employment when he 
arrived. “Every day he goes out, dapper and dignified, looking for work, returning home 
frustrated and silent,” Hilliard recalled, as his father refused Social Security (believing it 
was a government handout, not a retirement policy) and found Oakland not to be the 
promised land, but a behemoth city, unwelcoming and harsh to migrants.51   
                                                     
50 Murch, Living for the City, 233; Bobby Seale, A Lonely Rage: The Autobiography of Bobby Seale (New 
York: New York Times Press, 1978), 7-28. 
51 David Hilliard and Lewis Cole, This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of 
the Black Panther Party (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 32-76. 
 
49 
 
Seale’s and Newton’s fathers also experienced problems securing work and spent 
much of their children’s lives moving from one job to another. George Seale opened a 
cabinet shop with the family’s savings. He convinced his wife and children that the shop 
would lead to middle class security, with a home of their own and money to spare, but 
Mr. Seale was full-hardy with his money. He convinced his son to lie for him and would 
not bring money home to his wife when she needed food, clothing, or to pay the rent. 
Seale’s business continued and he picked up side jobs including working in the California 
fields. He forced his children to work throughout the summer to earn money for their 
mother and still the Seale’s barely survived. In the end, Bobby and his siblings took to 
panhandling flowers or robbing local grocery stores and downtown department stores to 
get the basic necessities they required, as well as to provide small gifts for themselves 
and their friends at Christmas.52 
While leaving the South for the industrial centers of post-War America was 
transformative, the influence of South did not leave the migrants. The sons and daughters 
who moved with their families, seeking economic opportunity and racial inclusivity, 
remained tied to the culture of the South. As Hilliard argued, many of Black Power’s 
most persuasive leaders “were imbued with the moral and spiritual values of their 
parents; and…our dignity as an independent people, the communal ideal and practice that 
informed our programs, all stem in part from the civilization” of the black South.53 The 
experiences of urban racism, along with watching their fathers and important male 
figures, like Hilliard’s brother Budd, struggle to find a place in the post-war west coast 
economy served as moments of radicalization for the future Black Power leaders. 
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Although migrant experiences were common among Black Power leaders, the 
closed doors experienced by black families trying to find a place in the post-war 
industrial economy were not unique to Southern ex-patriots. Stokely Carmichael’s 
diasporic traveling was in and of itself a moment of radicalization. His mother, separated 
from her parents throughout her early life because of a misplaced birth certificate, had 
tried repeatedly to immigrate to the United States from Trinidad. For many years her 
efforts proved pointless. She eventually married Carmichael’s father, had three children 
(Stokely was the middle and only boy), and fled the family in 1944 for New York City. 
Unlike the families moving to Oakland from the South, Carmichael’s mother was not 
seeking the American dream when she left Trinidad. The comparisons become closer to 
internal migration experiences after Mrs. Carmichael’s unceremonious departure. In June 
1946, Carmichael’s father abandoned his children in Trinidad, signed on as a worker on a 
northbound freighter, and sought to reunite with his wife in New York. Stokely and his 
siblings remained in Trinidad and did not see their parents for seven years.54  
Raised by his paternal grandmother and aunts, Carmichael and his siblings 
remained in Trinidad until the death of his grandmother when Stokely was 11. After the 
funeral and the commencement of the summer holiday from school, Stokely and his 
sisters flew to New York City and were reunited with their parents, and two American 
born sisters, in the Bronx. Here, at 861 Stebbins Avenue, Carmichael experienced “the 
confluence of two volatile streams of recent arrivals: the ‘foreigners’ coming from the 
cane fields of the islands; the ‘Americans’ coming from the cotton fields and small 
holdings of the rural South. Nearly all of them were first-generation immigrants valiantly 
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trying to come to terms with a concrete urban vastness equally alien to both.”55 Surviving 
the initial move and acclimating himself to America, Carmichael’s family scrapped 
money together and purchased a run-down house in a Jewish enclave near Pelhman 
Parkway in the Bronx. Carmichael’s father worked tirelessly to transform the house, and 
though often without a job as a construction laborer because of racial bias among union 
members, the house moved from eyesore to the beauty of the block. Carmichael’s life 
was, on the surface, easier than some of his Black Power compatriots—he was well 
educated, integrated into an immigrant, Italian community that accepted him, and 
provided the trappings of a middle class American life: piano lessons, Christian services, 
and a family owned home. Yet, his father struggled to find and secure a job, often 
working days as a construction worker and driving a cab in the evenings. Sheltered from 
the harsher realities faced by his diasporic brothers and sisters in the urban ghettoes of 
America’s industrialized cities, Carmichael was radicalized later, at Howard University 
and through his experiences organizing Southern blacks with the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC). However, Carmichael’s childhood in the Bronx 
shaped his view of American capitalist society, as he saw his father shut out of union 
membership at first, and once accepted, passed over for jobs because of his race. 
Carmichael’s parents’ determination and precarious grasp on the American dream led 
him to SNCC and Black Power.56 
While family situations and migration played a dominant role in radicalizing the 
future participants of the Black Power movement, they were not the only influences. 
Coming of age in Cold War America, where racial integration was occurring slowly and 
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unevenly, Black Power advocates were forced to come to terms with the disconnect 
between American rhetoric and reality on a daily basis. Black baby boomers came of age 
in a world drastically different, and yet remarkably the same as their parents’ childhoods. 
Steeped in the Cold War notions of democracy and the moral superiority of America, 
Black Power’s participants were confronted daily with the recurring ironies of American 
international dreams and domestic reality. Violence and intimidation carried out by 
whites against African Americans served as reminders of their unequal status and as 
lessons for survival. Passed through word of mouth, black children learned the Southern 
code by listening to their parents talk and worry. Cleveland Sellers, a founding member 
of SNCC, recalled: “We learned things from a number of sources, the most important one 
being the grapevine: an informal black communications network connecting state to state, 
town to town, group to group and person to person.” The network recounted atrocities, 
passed on survival techniques, and created an imagined community of oppressed 
individuals, where news travelled easily and black Americans around the country had 
insight into the similarities of their positions.57 For many Black Power youth, their own 
grapevine of gossip and worry provided the first and lasting lesson on transgressing the 
color line. 
While Black Power advocates parents struggled with the failure of the Double V 
and the economic repercussions from the shift to peace-time labor, the brutal murder of a 
fourteen-year-old in Mississippi caught the attention of many young African Americans. 
Emmett Till’s murder, funeral, and subsequent place in the minds of Black Power leaders 
like Stokely Carmichael and Cleveland Sellers highlights the powerful mark Till’s short 
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life and violent death left on the United States. Emmett Till’s death, more than Brown, 
the Montgomery Bus Boycott, or Dr. King’s “I have a Dream Speech,” was the defining 
moment in many young activists lives. Till’s bloated body on the cover of Jet magazine, 
badly beaten, disfigured, with an eye gouged out, opened a conversation amongst young, 
activist minded people that eventually led to the monumental actions of the Civil Rights 
and Black Power struggles.  
  The lynching of Emmett Till on August 28, 1955 was cited by many Black 
Power advocates as the moment they realized they were not equal. Till, a black child 
from Chicago, visited family in Mississippi in the summer of 1955. A year after the 
Supreme Court’s historic Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas decision, 
America was at the precipice of radical changes in its societal caste system. Yet, the 
South remained strictly segregated in public facilities and white minds. Till, as a young 
outsider (because of his mother’s own migration to Chicago during World War II), was 
warned by his mother to mind the Southern racial customs, and was sent on his way for a 
late summer visit with family.  
Till arrived in Mississippi on August 21, 1955. On August 24, Till and his family 
shopped at Bryant’s Grocery in Money, Mississippi, where the proprietor’s wife accused 
Till of accosting her, by grabbing her arm and asking for a date over the candy counter of 
the store (sexually charged accusations were common weapons employed against black 
men by white women), and followed Till out of the store to retrieve a shotgun. As 
Carolyn Bryant-Donham walked out of the store, she alleged that Till whistled at her—a 
bold and grievous break with Southern racial order. Till and his family quickly exited the 
property. Till was abducted from his family’s home around 2:30 am August 28, and was 
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tortured and killed before being submerged in the Tallahatchie River, where he was 
discovered on August 31, 1955. His killers were arrested, charged, and tried for his 
murder, but were found innocent.58 
The lynching of Till and the subsequent acquittal of his murderers was a rallying 
point for civil rights activists. Till’s mother left his casket open so the thousands of 
mourners who filed by could see the atrocities committed against her son, while Till 
himself became a symbol of Southern white aggression and the need to direct, swift 
action to end racial discrimination and hatred. Pictures of Till’s bloated and deformed 
body, as well as his long funeral procession, were featured in Life, Jet, and Ebony 
magazines and provided tangible evidence of the white South’s racial hatred and differing 
views of justice. Satisfied that an all-white jury, with little deliberation, acquitted the 
accused murderers, the state of Mississippi deemed justice served in the Till lynching and 
moved on.  
For young black Americans, justice in Till’s death was not served and was 
especially troubling. Muhammad Ali recalled that Till’s murder planted the seed for his 
own radical awakenings, while Stokely Carmichael used Till as motivation while he 
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organized Mississippi for SNCC.59  Till’s proximity in age to Cleveland Sellers made 
identifying with Till easy. “I tried to put myself in his place and imagine what he was 
thinking when those white men took him from his home that night,” Sellers recalled. “I 
read and reread the newspapers and magazine accounts. I couldn’t get over the fact that 
the men who were accused of killing him had not been punished at all.” The Till murder 
remained in the forefront of Seller’s mind throughout the 1955 school year, where in a 
segregated school house, he and his classmates discussed the lynching.60  
Julian Bond, future SNCC organizer and Georgia State Senator, was the son of a 
black academic, and grew up in interracial communities. However, “seeing the corpse of 
this young, innocent boy, tortured and savagely beaten almost beyond recognition before 
being killed—all on account of some minor, perceived transgression of southern racial 
etiquette—we all thought: it could easily have been me.” Till’s murder forced Bond to 
grapple with the reality of white hatred and its manifestation in violence. Bond cited 
Till’s murder as an event that heightened his awareness of the dangers of being black in 
the United States, and he often returned to that insight as he became more involved in the 
Movement.61 
Anne Moody, a SNCC organizer and native Mississippian, learned about the Till 
murder from classmates and was deeply embarrassed about her ignorance. “It was then 
that I realized I really didn’t know what was going on around me,” she recalled. Moody 
spent most of her days in school or working as a domestic for a local, wealthy white 
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woman. Shielded from upsetting news by her mother, Till’s murder had a profound effect 
on Moody: “Before Emmett Till’s murder I had known the fear of hunger, hell, and the 
Devil. But now there was a new fear known to me—the fear of being killed just because I 
was black…”62 Till’s murder showcased to his peers that the color of their skin was the 
greatest factor in determining their moral character and that little could be done to change 
the way white America viewed them.  Though the murder occurred when they were 
young (many not even teenagers), movement members were aware that it was a 
transitional event, one they could recount years later and returned too often, when asked 
about their motivations for doing anti-racism work. 
Till’s murder was the first of many moments of violence, some locally and others 
that gained national attention, that radicalized the Black Power generation. While Till’s 
murder was cited by Civil Rights leaders from Martin Luther King to Malcolm X, the 
influence it had on Black Power leaders was significant. The use of violence against 
people of color and the direct, non-violent stance encouraged by Dr. King’s SCLC, the 
NAACP, and the National Urban League in response served as further impetus for 
defensive action. 
The manipulation of violence was a hallmark of the Black Power movement, only 
strengthened by the responses of King and the moderate movement in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to violent attacks. As Timothy B. Tyson has argued, violence, or at least the 
threat of violence, was necessary for the Civil Rights Movement to force action on racial 
inequality.63 When white vigilantes attacked peaceful black marchers throughout the 
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South, when four girls were murdered as they worshipped, or when SNCC workers were 
kidnapped, raped, and lynched by white mobs, the Civil Rights Movement gained moral 
ground. As the media began to follow the violent reactions of white Americans more 
closely and liberal members of the federal government gained power, leaders were able to 
manipulate the message. Dr. King’s advice to turn the other cheek and not react to white 
violence with violence directly influenced the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act, as it was easier for whites to accept and reward anti-self-
defense rhetoric than the more militant advice of Malcolm X and others.64 Yet, as Tyson 
and Peniel Joseph astutely remind readers, this manipulation of violent acts did not come 
without repercussions. It is important to remember that nonviolent direct action did not 
mean being unprotected. Dr. King and his entourage traveled with guns, while safe 
houses that provided beds and food for SNCC, SCLC and the Congress for Racial 
Equality (CORE) workers all were equipped with weapons for protection. If they did not 
carry weapons themselves, by 1965 in the South, mainstream nonviolent protesters 
accepted protection from armed self-defense groups like the Deacons of Defense.65 The 
difference in these actions and the Black Power’s use of violence was in its deployment. 
Dr. King and his followers used violence against black bodies as a foundation on which 
to build their movement, while Black Power supporters believed white violence against 
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people of color should be met with violence. Black Power organizers did not seek out 
violence, as some nonviolent organizations had been accused of doing, but instead met 
threats of violence with promises of retaliation. 
Black Power advocates did not need to experience white beatings in Montgomery 
or racist attacks in Little Rock to understand the power of violence. The violence 
experienced by Black Power advocates was local and personal. While it can be argued 
that Dr. King’s movement sought out physical violence to shame the United States into 
political, government-backed action, Black Power followers came of age with violence as 
a part of their daily lives. Although the mainstream movement believed in the power of 
federal legislation to ameliorate centuries of racial hatred, Black Power advocates knew 
that the federal government and its representatives in local communities were some of the 
greatest perpetuators of violence against black Americans.  
The repression of G.I. benefits, the indignity of welfare, and the uncertainty of 
individual jobs all played into the distrust of the federal government by lower income 
African Americans during the Cold War. The Newton family, “like countless other Black 
families in the forties and fifties…fell victim to this indifference and corruption when we 
moved to Oakland.”66 Oakland’s ghettos taught Newton to distrust the police, who 
targeted young African Americans and used excessive force in their arrests and then sent 
their victims to the Alameda County system for unfair trials. Newton had a number of 
run-ins with Oakland’s finest prior to meeting Seale and forming the Black Panther Party. 
Seale’s experiences with Berkeley police and government housing officials only 
reinforced Newton’s distrust. Seale witnessed an episode of domestic violence near his 
home. A white man pistol whipped a woman and killed her brother, and walked away 
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without witnesses stopping them. People were calling for the police, but when they 
arrived, everyone claimed not to have seen anything. Bobby attempted to speak up, but a 
friend’s mother yelled, “Shut your mouth, Bobby boy, you ain’t saw nothing, and you 
ain’t got no business saying nothing to no policeman.” The deep seeded distrust of law 
enforcement was embedded in Bobby after that experience, and only strengthened by the 
continual profiling of him and his friends as he got older.67 The Panthers coined the term 
“pig” to describe white policemen, because it “conveys the idea of someone who is 
brutal, gross and uncaring.”68 The Panthers recognized the police as men who were 
supposed to uphold the law, but who actually reinforced the violent nature of life as a 
black American during the Cold War.  
The educational system of the inner cities and rural communities was another 
place where the violent nature of society was reified for Black Power advocates. Newton 
described the Oakland school system as a “violent assault on Black people,” while David 
Hilliard recalled school yard fights with bullies who targeted him because he was a black 
migrant.69 The educational system was violent for so many black Americans because it 
reinforced a belief in the inferiority of black Americans. Although the Supreme Court had 
ruled against de jur segregation in the Brown decision, de facto segregation remained 
prevalent throughout the United States and manifested itself most clearly in the education 
system. Teachers and administrators brought their own racial animus into classrooms, 
while segregated housing patterns, postwar suburbanization, and the decisions of parents 
to remove their white children from integrated schools led to school funding issues and 
the evaporation of tax bases in some communities. Louisville, Kentucky’s attempts to 
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follow the Brown decision resulted in a nearly forty year legal battle against forced 
busing and Boston erupted in anti-busing disputes in the 1970s.70 Elaine Brown, future 
Black Panther leader, attended a prep school in Philadelphia where she was one of a few 
black students. Clearly a bright student, Brown had to balance the rigors of Girls High 
with finding food when her father refused to pay child support and her mother’s pay 
checks ran out. When a light-skinned friend was passed over for academic prizes at 
graduation that she had clearly earned, Brown viewed it “as an outrageous display of 
racial prejudice—a concept, a reality that was so profound it was not missed even by me, 
who wanted to be white.”71 Her white, upper-class high school had taught her that black 
people were inferior and instilled in her the hope of one day achieving whiteness. The 
school and its mistreatment of Brown and her friend denigrated their academic 
achievement and reinforced the shameful nature of blackness.  
The problems black children faced at school were connected “with the struggles 
their families they faced in their homes and neighborhoods.”72 The inferiority of 
blackness was visible in the distribution and neglect of welfare recipients by government 
officials in the 1950s and early 1960s. Welfare played a dominant role in a number of 
Black Power advocates lives. Most often collected by single mothers, though two parent 
families also required assistance from time to time, life on welfare was degrading and 
damaging.  Denied political and economic rights and basics of human dignities, black 
mothers struggled to maintain a modicum of privacy and pride. Because “poor black 
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women faced distinct challenges in postwar cities. They suffered not only from racial 
discrimination in housing and employment but also from sex discrimination…,” their 
children grew up with the shame of poverty and blackness over their head.73 Being on 
welfare required recipients to drain their bank accounts and remain on subsistence, 
because any money earned at a job would be deducted from the welfare benefits. 
Families could not enjoy the basic comforts of a small television or a new refrigerator 
because these were seen as privileges. Forced to live in substandard housing, the children 
of welfare recipients experienced the violence and shame of hunger daily.  
The lack of suitable housing and the denial of a living wage for welfare recipients, 
as well as the shame associated with being on the dole, would at times manifest itself in 
violent outbursts. David Hilliard described the abuse rained on his family members by 
husbands and cousins seeking a release from their hard lives.74 Newton, Seale, Hilliard, 
and Brown were all taught to defend themselves in the event of an attack, because as 
Hilliard’s father explained to Newton, a brother would not “continue to offend you.” If he 
does, “then he’s not your brother…you strike him down.”75 Turning the other cheek had 
no place in the life of the Newtons, Hilliards, and Browns because they had to fight the 
institutional violence of poverty each day. 
Family life was an escape for the institutional violence perpetuated against poor, 
migrant families throughout the country. The importance of family and particularly the 
influence of male figures—whether fathers, brothers, or uncles, present in the lives of 
Black Power leaders or not—was especially important. Elaine Brown’s father was a 
wealthy doctor who was absent for much of her life. He would not pay child support on a 
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regular basis and Brown was used as a tool by her mother to gain payments when 
possible. Brown’s mother was also forced to use the legal system to force her father into 
paying support, while also suffering the indignity of going hungry. Brown and her mother 
moved more than once, staying ahead of the rent man, as money was always a problem.  
Yet, Newton, Hilliard, Carmichael, and Sellers fathers’ work ethics and desire for 
success instilled in them a sense of pride. They were also constantly reminded that they 
were to be the breadwinners in their families and that their worth as black men required 
that they protect their families. Hilliard’s mother insisted that her son would never be on 
welfare, because he was better than her “dead-beat” nieces and nephews who could not 
make it in Oakland. This focus on the male head of household highlighted the unfair 
nature of American capitalism. While their fathers or male breadwinners worked day and 
night to keep their families off the dole and in proper housing, other families who did not 
have a male provider worked just as hard and could not remain afloat. Although Bobby 
Seale’s parents remained married, his father withheld large sums of money from the 
family coffers and refused to pay Bobby or his brother for their work at his business. 
Bobby attempted to get part-time work as a handyman, but George Seale undermined his 
son and cost him the job, calling Bobby’s employer and telling him that Bobby only 
worked for his father. The older Seale thus denied his family his own wages and the wage 
earning ability of his sons, and forced them to remain impoverished, even as he promised 
social mobility.76  
While a number of Black Power’s vocal advocates came from impoverished 
families, not all directly experienced poverty in their own homes. Cleveland Sellers 
learned about poverty when he began working in his father’s restaurant. Watching the 
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poor of Denmark, South Carolina eat meager meals and wash down the frustrations of 
poverty with alcohol opened Sellers worldview to his own middle class status. Sellers 
also saw hungry classmates fish half eaten sandwiches out of garbage bins during the 
lunch hour at his school.77 Working in his father’s restaurant made him attuned to the 
needs of economic as well as social change in the United States. Stokely Carmichael was 
also shielded from poverty for the majority of his young life in the Bronx. While his 
family worked long hours to retain their middle class status, he only experienced the pain 
of hunger once, when his father was recovering from an injury and could not work.78   
By the time Sellers and Carmichael reached early adulthood, the mainstream Civil 
Rights movement had succeeded in integrating lunch counters (often times with the help 
of these young advocates) and pushing for voting rights, but the problems of poverty still 
persisted. As SNCC workers, the men were sent into some of the poorest areas of South 
to register voters and run freedom schools. Carmichael was a particularly good organizer 
and successfully created the Lowndes County Alabama Freedom Party in 1965, 
recognizing that having the right to vote was not enough. Black people needed their own 
independent political parties to administer to the needs of the local population.79 The 
importance of the local and the familial influenced SNCC and Carmichael’s organizing, 
while also highlighting the need for more direct interaction with the problems of the local 
communities. As the mainstream movement continued to push for further political 
participation, the nascent Black Power advocates began connecting the need for social 
reform with a reevaluation of the economic principles of the United States. Witnessing 
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and living among the impoverished throughout the country sparked the memories of 
economic inequality the organizers had seen or experienced in their childhood.  
Black Power was the perception among young, black students that the mainstream 
movement was progressing too slowly in terms of improvement in the lived experiences 
of lower and middle class African Americans throughout the country. The modern Civil 
Rights movement, like Black Power, had its origins in the interwar years and the Great 
Depression. Spurred forward by small advancements in the court system and Executive 
Orders like Roosevelt’s 8802, the mainstream movement was dominated by tactics aimed 
at gaining concessions toward accommodation and integration, through legislation and 
Supreme Court decisions. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People worked tirelessly through the courts, believing that real change would only occur 
after it was codified by court decisions. The NAACP’s victory in the Brown decision was 
a watershed moment, but the lack of movement toward integration of public schools and 
the remaining segregation in all other public facilities across the South by 1960 created a 
backlash among the baby boomers. For Cleveland Sellers, the NAACP’s “practice of 
pursuing ‘test cases’ through the courts, using laws and the Constitution to fight racial 
discrimination was suited for their [parents] temperaments. We needed something more. 
As far as we were concerned, the NAACP’s approach was too slow, too courteous, too 
deferential and too ineffectual.”80 After the Greensboro sit-ins in 1960, young activists 
formed new groups like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee or worked 
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within already formed organizations to push for an escalation of tactics and actions that 
better suited their own revolutionary feelings.81 
It is common in Black Power literature to discount the work of Dr. King and the 
SCLC. However, the connections to older, more established and more conservative 
organizations was an important catalyst for Black Power thinking. The interplay between 
organizations was never stronger than the connections between SCLC, the NAACP, and 
SNCC.  Organized in 1960 by the student wing of SCLC and with the support and 
guidance of the NAACP’s Ella Baker, SNCC was often considered the radical wing of 
the mainstream movement.82 SNCC worked in the early 1960s to desegregate the South 
and register voters. At the same time, SCLC, the NAACP, and CORE supported 
desegregation campaigns and lobbied federal officials to pass sweeping legislative 
changes. The movement gained a great deal of momentum after the March on 
Washington in late August 1963, site of Dr. King’s famous “I Have a Dream” Speech. 
But the March on Washington was also the beginning of the end for cooperative action 
between SNCC and the more conservative organizations. The tension between 
government backed integration and community sovereignty was encapsulated in John 
Lewis’s speech that August afternoon. 
Lewis--the son of Alabama farmers, a stalwart supporter of nonviolence, and 
chairman of SNCC--was chosen to represent SNCC on the grandstand during the March. 
Asked to speak to the crowd, Lewis and SNCC had drawn up a fiery speech, demanding 
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“jobs and freedom,” while speaking out against the Kennedy administration’s Civil 
Rights bill. Lewis claimed the bill was “too little too late. There’s not one thing in that 
bill that will protect our people from police brutality.” Calling the Civil Rights Movement 
a “serious revolution,” Lewis’s speech dismantled the administration’s bill and demanded 
more action by the movement.83 The speech Lewis delivered was dramatically different 
than the one SNCC had prepared. Bowing to the demands of the more conservative 
leaders, like Dr. King and Whitney Young of the National Urban League, Lewis was 
forced to temper his rhetoric. Dr. King and others believed the support of the Democratic 
Party in Washington, and the Kennedy administration in particular, was the keystone 
holding legislative change together. For Julian Bond, press secretary of SNCC, Lewis 
was the victim of conservative leaders: “When I found out about it later, quite shortly 
later, it just seemed to be typical of the desire of these older and more conservative civil 
rights organizations to sugarcoat the messages that were being delivered from the 
platform.”84 While individual leaders like Dr. King tempered their public disagreements 
with the federal government (to keep access to the President and other Washington power 
brokers), the couching of the revolutionary demands of the younger generation was not 
tolerated by Bond and other members of SNCC.85   
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All of this combined in the realization--either organically, through contact with 
the revolutionary philosophies of Frantz Fanon, whose The Wretched of the Earth 
became required reading for many Black Power organizations, or the lived experience of 
Black Power participants--that African Americans were a colonized people within the 
United States. Fanon argued that decolonization was allows a violent occurrence and it 
would always be successful because it disrupted power balances. Decolonization also 
required the oppressed to reject the conditions of the oppressor, meaning that colonized 
subjects could not seek to replace the colonizer in the same capitalist system. Instead, 
Fanon called for emerging nations to embrace socialism. He critiqued nationalism and 
imperialism as forces of oppression. In order to overthrow colonial aggression, Fanon 
encouraged revolutionaries to organize the Lumpen-proletariat (peasants) and to focus on 
economic issues, because revolution would disrupt black/white binaries. The Wretched of 
the Earth became the theoretical underpinning for much of Black Power’s anti-colonial, 
anti-war, and anti-government views.86 
 Forced to live as second-class citizens in the most prosperous nation of the world, 
some black Americans came to the conclusion that federal legislation for equality would 
not lead to the leveling of playing fields. Espousing a shared identification with other 
decolonizing movements throughout the Third World, Black Power gained national 
attention in the summer of 1966, as the mainstream Civil Rights movement came to terms 
with the changing nature of protest and the assertion that political rights were necessary 
but could not be beneficial until full economic participation was earned. Viewed in 
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connection with earlier movements before and during World War II, Black Power was 
much more than a movement “whose time had come.”   
The treatment of black World War II veterans, coupled with deindustrialization at 
the war’s end, created mental, physical, and emotional space for a radical movement to 
develop. In stark contrast to the middle class led, Southern-based, mainstream Civil 
Rights movement celebrated in American classrooms and popular memory, the radical 
movement, which existed alongside and within the more celebrated, Dr. King led 
movement, found its voice in the lack of advancements for poor people and the failed 
promises of post-World War II America. 
The African American Cold War diaspora—Southern migrants, Caribbean 
immigrants, and urban dwellers—was the school yard for Black Power. Having 
experienced promise and disappointment, the diasporic spread allowed geographical 
differences to meld into a shared community of struggle, bringing the children of post-
war deindustrialization together in the mid-1960s. Though their individual experiences 
were unique, these young men and women shared the experiences of their parents’ 
struggles for economic security, their baptisms into the dangers being young and black in 
the United States with the lynching of Emmett Till, and the daily degradation of Jim 
Crow. Helped along by the philosophies of Frantz Fanon, Mao Tse-Tung, and Karl Marx, 
as well as the leadership and death of Malcolm X, the Black Power generation was forced 
to come to terms with the broken promises of the federal government, the iron curtain of 
the racial divide both within and outside the South, and the lack of opportunities for 
blacks in the United States. When Stokely Carmichael called for Black Power during the 
Meredith March Against Fear, he gave voice to the disappointments and struggles of his 
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peers.87 The chant that June evening in 1966 came from the long history of African 
Americans experiences in the United States. Black Power was not an idea whose time 
had come, but was instead the manifestation of disappointment, desire, and determinism 
embodied in the black men and women of the Vietnam generation, who came of age as 
decolonization and American Cold War anti-communism intersected in the fields and 
jungles of Vietnam.  
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CHAPTER THREE: SOUL BROTHERS: BLACK POWER, SOLDIERS, AND 
VIETNAM SERVICE 
“You are good at dying gallant black brother. Too good.”—Vincent Harding, “To the 
Gallant Black Men Now Dead”1 
 
  
Twenty-five years after the Double V campaign failed at integrating military or 
civilian life, Lyndon Johnson’s decision to send troops to Vietnam fully integrated the 
military. Black soldiers in the Vietnam War served alongside their white counterparts, but 
were not always equal.  Empowered by their experiences in war and the perceived and 
real racial threats they endured “in country” (deployed to Vietnam) and at home, Black 
Power enlistees fostered a relationship with civilian, domestic organizations while 
building their own groups within the military structure or through veteran organizations, 
to demand equal treatment and proper fulfillment of benefits.   
President Johnson’s racially desegregated military resulted from President 
Truman’s decision to force integration in all the branches, a decision motivated by the 
treatment black veterans received when they returned home from World War II. For 
example, on February 12, 1946, Isaac Woodard, a 27-year-old veteran of the South 
Pacific and recipient of the battle star for bravery, was pulled off a bus traveling from 
Camp Gorton through South Carolina.  At a stop about an hour outside Atlanta, Woodard 
asked if he had time to visit the restroom and was verbally cursed by the white bus driver, 
but was given permission to leave the bus. At a stop in Aiken, South Carolina, Woodard 
dismounted the bus and was greeted by two Aiken police officers. The bus driver told the 
officers that Woodard had created a disturbance on the bus and needed to be removed. 
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The Aiken police officers proceeded to beat him and gouge his eyes with the butts of 
their service pistols. Woodard was sent to jail with his untreated injuries, was called 
before a judge the next morning, was sentenced to pay a $50.00 fine or serve 30 days on a 
chain gang, and then, finally, was allowed to see a doctor at the veteran’s hospital in 
Columbia. The time between assault and treatment cost the Army veteran his sight.2   
 In July 1946, two Army veterans and their wives were taken from their homes in 
Monroe, Georgia and murdered. The lynchings occurred after the election of white 
supremacy candidate Eugene Talmadge as Georgia governor. Mr. Malcolm, a veteran of 
the North African campaign, had stabbed his white employer during a domestic dispute, 
while he was also accused of being “biggity” because he was able to remain outside the 
debt-peonage system of share cropping due to savings from his time in the military.3 The 
lynchings in Monroe and Woodard’s maiming were only two of the many recorded 
incidents of violence against returning black veterans in the South. The treatment of 
discharged and active duty soldiers in the United States after World War II reinvigorated 
the campaign for desegregation of American society, starting with the American Armed 
Services.  
 Pressured by Civil Rights leaders, President Truman ordered the federal 
government to investigate the viability of desegregating the military and in December 
1946 established the Presidential Committee on Civil Rights. The Committee’s report, To 
Secure These Rights, condemned segregation and recommended that Truman and the 
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United States government “end immediately all discrimination and segregation based on 
race, color, creed, or national origin in…all branches of the Armed Services.” 
Furthermore, the Commission recommended that “legislation and regulations should 
expressly ban discrimination and segregation in the recruitment, assignment, and training 
of all personnel in all types of military duty.” Reacting to the treatment of World War I 
and II veterans after they returned to the United States, the Commission also asked for 
“legislation providing that no member of the armed forces be subject to discrimination of 
any kind by any public authority or place of public accommodation, recreation, 
transportation, or other service or business.” 4 The Commission believed that the 
government had a duty to uphold the dignity of the men who served their country and that 
segregation was inherently undignified. Moreover, if the government allowed segregation 
to continue, particularly in the American military, the President risked forfeiting the 
moral high ground Americans believed they possessed in times of war.  
  Truman did not immediately act on the recommendations of the Committee, 
which led to renewed efforts by Civil Rights organizations to push the President and 
legislature to take up desegregation issues. A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds 
organized the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training, focusing 
specifically on demanding that the 1948 draft law be color-blind. Since 1948 was an 
election year, Truman faced a great deal of pressure from Civil Rights organizations and 
the black public to address the needs of African American voters. On March 27, 1948, 
twenty-two Civil Rights organizations released the “Declaration of Negro Voters,” which 
called for the immediate abolishment of “every vestige of segregation and discrimination 
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in the armed services...” including the National Guard. If any legislature or armed 
services personnel refused to work to end segregation, the Declaration demanded the 
removal of the person through voter action.5 Randolph and the committee also declared 
that African American young men would refuse to serve if the 1948 Selective Service Act 
did not include a provision for desegregation. As the spring turned to summer and the 
1948 Democratic Convention for President approached, Truman was forced to make a 
decision on desegregating the military. A strong Civil Rights plank was passed at the 
convention, garnering the support of Randolph, the NAACP, and other leading Civil 
Rights organizations and activists. However, the platform was not action and Truman still 
faced the pressure of his African American constituents. Finally, on July 26, 1948, 
Truman signed Executive Order 9981, declaring “there shall be equality of treatment and 
opportunity for all persons in the armed services with regard to race, color, religion, or 
national origin.”6  
Because the order did not require the immediate desegregation of military units, 
instead insisting that the military proceed in the quickest manner possible, Randolph did 
not believe it did enough to address segregation in the military. Randolph wrote to the 
President demanding an explicit statement on desegregation of the draft, but received no 
return correspondence.7 The Editorial staff of the Baltimore Afro-American also harbored 
doubts that Executive Order 9981 had gone far enough to address military segregation, 
publishing a cartoon featuring President Truman firing a double barreled rifle at a black 
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bird labeled Jim Crow with the caption “Scorched him, but the old bird’s still there.” The 
cartoon emphasized that Truman’s order would not kill Jim Crow as Civil Rights 
organizations wanted, but instead only managed to move it further down the line.8 There 
was reluctance among some Civil Rights leaders and black media, including A. Philip 
Randolph and editors at the Pittsburgh Courier, to believe that Truman’s order would 
effectively desegregate the military structure. The leaders remembered President 
Roosevelt’s order banning segregation in defense industries during the War, which was 
enforced haphazardly. How was Truman’s order any different, particularly if it did not 
include desegregation of the draft system? Randolph went so far as to again threaten a 
picketing of the Selective Service office in Washington in August 1948.9  
The Selective Service Act of 1948 established the second peace-time draft in 
United States history. Justified because of the growing Cold War, the Act required all 
men ages 18-26 to register for the draft. Men could be conscripted to serve 21 month 
active duty terms and 5 years reserve if called upon by their government. The 1948 law 
also established the passage number for the General Classification Test (the exam each 
draftee must complete before service) at 70. It specifically addressed A. Philip 
Randolph’s concern about discrimination, stating “the selection of persons…shall be 
made in an impartial manner…there shall be no discrimination against any person on 
account of race or color.” The determination of draft status was left to the local draft 
boards, a decision that would have damaging effects on many black neighborhoods 
during the Vietnam conflict. Furthermore, the 1948 Act created the deferment system that 
overwhelmingly benefitted middle and upper-class white Americans in the 1960s, while 
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also establishing the quota system and investing power in the local draft boards. The 
President had the final say in Selective Service requirements, troop increases, and 
eligibility and deferment requirements.10  
Though written to deny any racial, religious, or nationality discrimination, 
Executive Order 9981 and the Selective Service Act of 1948 were in effect examples of 
institutional racism. According to historian James Westheider, institutional racism, “is 
most often unintentional, subtle, and accidental and is often hard to detect for these 
reasons. The battery of tests given to every new inductee, the Armed Forces Qualification 
Test (AFQT) tests, are a good example of institutional racism.” The integration of the 
military relied on the peace-time draft and the Korean War to do its work, while the 
Selective Service Act and the commission of draftees allowed local draft boards to make 
decisions for all registered men ages 18-26. Moreover, registrants were required to take 
draft examinations, categorizing each inductee into a I-VI system. As Westheider notes, 
“once categorized, it was virtually impossible to escape one’s classification,” because the 
categorization determined the level of training and the type of work each soldier would 
perform in the field.11  
Executive Order 9981 opened all branches of the military to black Americans for 
the first time. However, implementation of the Order was slow and a fully desegregated 
military structure did not exist until after the Korean War. The Army resisted 
desegregation, but local commanders took the issue into their own hands. Faced with a 
swelling Army (it doubled in size in the first five months of 1951, as the US began 
sending troops to aid the South Koreans), and too few segregated barracks to train the 
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new draftees, Fort Jackson, South Carolina’s commander decided to train all their men 
together. The same pattern continued throughout basic training sites across the country. 
However, the stereotype of the unequipped or cowardly black soldier persisted, 
particularly tied to the record of the last segregated unit which served without distinction 
in Korea. To address this notion, Major General William B. Kean suggested closing the 
all black units. Reapproprating arguments first presented by Randolph and other 
integration activists, Kean argued “the problem was not that black soldiers could not fight 
effectively, it was that they could fight more effectively if they were not restricted to all 
black units where half the soldiers scored in Classes IV and V of the army’s aptitude 
test.”  In November 1954, the 94 Engineer Battalion, the last segregated unit, disbanded. 
Black and white men would serve together, in integrated units in all branches of the 
United States military going forward.12  
Truman’s decision to integrate the military had a profound and lasting effect on 
African Americans. First viewed as a step forward in race relations, the integration of the 
military would lead to greater dissatisfaction and uncertainty for black men as the United 
States dove deeper into the Vietnam War, relying ever more on poorer, less educated men 
to fill the quotas demanded by larger draft rolls. According to scholars Lawrence Baskir 
and William Strauss, non-white, less educated men were more likely to be inducted and 
to serve in Vietnam than white, well-educated men. Baskir and Strauss believed minority 
troops bore a much higher burden than their white counterparts in the war. Integrating the 
                                                     
12 Rawn James, Jr. The Double V: How Wars, Protest, and Harry Truman Desegregated America’s 
Military (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 236-239. 
 
77 
 
military, then, lead to more opportunities for African Americans in the service, but also 
came with a larger burden of the fighting.13    
 Where once black men were demanding a chance to serve their county equally to 
whites, by the end of the 1960s, black men were categorically demanding that white men 
be drafted at an equally proportionate number to blacks. The American military was 
forced to accepted desegregation, but had successfully inscribed institutional racism into 
the new system through the draft and military hierarchy. Some draft age black men 
refused service or found deferments, but many more were drafted or signed up for service 
hoping to avoid action in Vietnam. Much like their experiences in America’s ghettoes 
and rural backwoods, the military served as a radicalizing experience for many Black 
Power soldiers. While only a minority of black soldiers claimed they would join a 
militant group when they returned from service, by 1970 black soldiers in Vietnam were 
unlikely to support the War or American foreign policy. A survey conducted by Time 
correspondent Wallace Terry found that 64% of black officers did not believe that black 
people should fight in Vietnam, because “they have problems back home.”14 Terry had 
conducted a similar survey in 1967 and did not find such a dramatic disgust with the 
military or the War itself. While early on in American involvement in Vietnam black men 
overwhelmingly saw the military as a place for economic advancement and a proving 
ground for manhood, by 1970 many black soldiers had become disillusioned with 
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military life, and like their civilian counterparts, sought new forms of expression and 
respect.  
 The exponential growth of black soldiers in the American military can be 
attributed to a number of factors. Once the military system was fully desegregated and 
the last of the all black units was closed, armed service participation was again an 
acceptable form of economic and social mobility for many African Americans. No longer 
forced to serve in Jim Crow units, black men gained respect, economic security, and a 
marker of manhood by enlisting or accepting a draft call. Although the military, like 
civilian society, was still home to personal racism and institutional biases, peace time 
enlistment was still a viable option for many black men. Prior to his own radicalization, 
Bobby Seale enlisted in the Air Force as an adventure and a way to outwardly show his 
internal definitions of masculinity.15 Seale was not the only Black Power advocate to 
enlist and receive a discharge, whether honorable or dishonorable, before they joined the 
Freedom Movement.16 The expansion of the G.I. Bill to include peace time service also 
drew a number of African American enlistees, as 21 months of active duty military 
service was a small price to pay for the advantage of a college education upon completion 
of service. However, the institutional barriers to full military service hindered recruitment 
of a large number of black men. The perceived lack of black aptitude on the military test 
and the belief that the black ghetto was handicapping black men from full participation in 
society prompted a reevaluation of draft policy. Thus, the largest increase came from 
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Daniel P. Moynihan’s 1965 report “The Negro Family: The Case for National Action,” 
commissioned by the Labor Department.  
 The Moynihan Report found that poverty in America’s ghettos was cyclical. This 
“cycle of poverty” could be attributed to the matriarchal structure of the black community 
“which, because it is so out of line with the rest of American society, seriously retards the 
progress of the group as a whole, and imposes the crushing burden on the Negro male 
and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well.” Moynihan found that black 
men were emasculated by the ghetto experience, particularly the nature of a single parent, 
female-led household. Because “the majority” (actually 44% according to Moynihan’s 
own figures) of black families were dominated by wives or mothers, black males were in 
danger of “being caught up in the tangle of pathology that affects their world.”  Basically, 
Moynihan attributed the institutional and structural issues of the ghetto—lack of 
educational and job opportunities for men, racism, and social and economic instability—
to black women. Because black women “established a strong position for themselves in 
white collar and professional employment,” they took jobs from able-bodied and able-
minded black men. This action then inscribed on their sons a feeling of inadequacy, and 
according to Moynihan, a belief that black men did not have a chance to earn a position 
of respectable manhood in the larger society.17   
 But what did Moynihan’s report have to do with military service? According to 
Moynihan, black men’s “ultimate mark of inadequate preparation for life” was “the 
failure rate on the Armed Forces mental test.”18 Reinforcing the notion that black men 
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were emasculated and had a failure of nerves in attaining employment, Moynihan 
believed that black men had to be better represented in the American military system. In 
1964, only 8% of the Armed Forces were black, while black Americans were 11.8% of 
the population. This underrepresentation was the result of missed opportunities by the 
military and could easily be resolved, according to Moynihan. By expanding military 
service to include more African Americans, the United States would lower black 
unemployment rates by two percentage points and would allow black men to experience 
“an utterly masculine world…The Armed Forces are a dramatic and desperately needed 
change: a world away from women, a world run by strong men of unquestioned authority, 
where discipline, if harsh, is nonetheless orderly and predictable, and where rewards, if 
limited, are granted on the basis of performance.” Because Moynihan believed males 
living in the ghetto lacked role models, were forced to subsist under dominate women, 
and had little opportunity or will to find jobs outside the ghetto, he also believed the 
regimented lifestyle of the American military would create better citizens and offer black 
men the chance to finally be fully actualized men. He had a clear view of what 
constituted an American male—a man with economic and social stability, some form of 
authority over his own life, and the power to make his own decisions. Because the ghetto 
lifestyle hindered black men from garnering authority, the other attributes of manhood 
were also denied to him, according to The Negro Family. In order to correct the abuse 
inflicted on black men by strong females, Moynihan recommended that the United States 
government lower the admissions standards for military service and, in effect, solve two 
problems with a single solution. By lowering the passage score on the test, the military 
would provide a means for employment for black males and would, hopefully, allow 
 
81 
 
more ghetto residents to escape Moynihan’s cycle of poverty, thus defusing the volatility 
of the ghetto’s economically depressed population.19  
The Moynihan Report was well received by the Johnson Administration, 
particularly Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.  Shortly after publication of The 
Negro Family, McNamara introduced “Project 100,000,” a revision of the military 
entrance standards to open military service to men who had been disqualified mentally or 
medically in the past.20 Announcing the new program, McNamara posited “What these 
men badly need is a sense of personal achievement—a sense of succeeding at some 
task—a sense of their own intrinsic potential.”21 McNamara believed the easiest way to 
achieve this goal and help the federal government was to begin drafting men who had 
previously failed their Selective Service examinations. Project 100,000 rested on the 
reclassification of the passage score for the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 
The AFQT was used to divide soldiers into categories for training, job skills, and service 
areas. The highest scores were Category Is and the Lowest scores (those below 31st 
percentile) were Categories IV and V. Those men who scored in the 0-9 percentile 
remained ineligible to serve, but Category IV men, those scoring between the 10th and 
30th percentile were now draftable or able to volunteer, without further testing, if they had 
a high school diploma. Men who scored in Category IV, but were without a high school 
degree, would have to pass supplementary aptitude tests. This decrease in the passage 
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percentile increased the number of able-bodied soldiers and in the first three years of 
Project 100,000 resulted in over 240,000 “New Standards” men in the armed services.22  
Project 100,000 was particularly unfair to African Americans, because, according 
to historian Lisa Hsiao, “It exploited black Americans, using them as cannon fodder 
while cloaking their betrayal in the rhetoric of advancement. America had turned liability 
into opportunity—but not for the black man.”23  Through Project 100,000, McNamara 
attempted to strengthen the military and work within President Johnson’s War on Poverty 
model to empower poor Americans by teaching them a skill that after their military 
service was complete they could use to better their economic status within the United 
States.  In tandem with this seemingly positive ideal, McNamara also saw an untapped 
resource, which he believed could minimize national unrest.  However, McNamara’s 
Project 100,000 failed.  It disproportionately drafted soldiers from southern states, many 
of whom were black. The number of black soldiers conscripted under Project 100,000 
was large, but hard to pinpoint because race was not supposed to be identified.  However, 
sociologist Paul Starr asserted, “between 1965 and 1970, blacks compromised 9.3% of 
total active duty personnel in Vietnam, yet they suffered 12.6% of the deaths. Black death 
rates exceeded by 35.5% the rates for all servicemen, and exceeded by 30% those in 
Indochina.” Of those numbers, at least half were brought in under McNamara’s plan, 
because prior to Project 100,000 only 5.5% of U.S. blacks age 18-21 qualified for 
military service.24 The Project attempted to recruit men who were eager to participate in 
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the military but who did not qualify, previously.  However, it also reclassified American 
men who had failed their Selective Service exams without notification, and made them 
eligible to be drafted. They were often the first to be called to fill the draft roles, because 
of class disparities on the draft boards and the belief that poor men would be more willing 
to serve, to advance their class status. In effect, the Moynihan Report dramatically 
changed the course of Selective Service, providing the military with more “grunts”—
classified III or IV on the induction roles, men who were only suited for basic soldiering 
and were deployed to Vietnam in forward units (those in the field, doing most of the 
fighting). It was in these ranks of the newly drafted grunts that Black Power took root and 
the militant culture flourished.  
Prior to 1968, the majority of in country (those serving in Vietnam) black soldiers 
were enlisted men and career military personnel, including many newly minted officers 
who earned their status through field promotion. These men tended to be in integrated 
forces and, for the most part, supported President Johnson’s war policy. The enlisted men 
sometimes came from the ranks of what historian Herman Graham III has labeled 
“marginal men,” who sought military service as an expression of manhood. These men 
worked within a heteronormative notion of manhood defined by gainful employment and 
warrior mentality. Black men who enlisted in the Army and Marines were part of a 
warrior class, seeking out danger to assert a positive notion of manhood. Even those men 
who chose less dangerous positions in the Air Force or the Navy could still be included 
amongst the brave because of the status that military service gave them.25 However, with 
the increased number of black men dying in Vietnam, because their rank did not protect 
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them from forward service, a number of men enlisted in the Armed Forces not only to 
prove their masculinity, but also to avoid service on the front lines—believing that 
enlisted men were less likely to be sent to Vietnam as grunts.26  
As early as 1966, some black Americans were worried about the 
disproportionately high number of black men who were killed in battle in Vietnam. While 
draft numbers were proportionate to the population of black Americans (about 12% 
each), the number of black men serving in Vietnam was 16%.27 Department of Defense 
officials attempted to assuage the situation, arguing that “perhaps the high Negro casualty 
rate is a measure of Negro valor in combat,” while others claimed the high mortality rate 
was due to the lucrative pay of dangerous units like the paratroopers and that young black 
men concentrated their military training in combat arms where career advancement was 
more likely.28 A black captain believed that there were so many black combat soldiers 
because “we can excel in them, even if our education hasn’t been as good as it should 
have been. We can excel in airborne units for instance, because it’s physical, athletic.”29 
The focus of the men in country at the time was to find the best way possible to fulfill 
their duty to their country, earn the most money, and best prove their abilities. They 
sought out opportunities for advancement and to show their manhood. 
Yet, not all enlisted men in 1966 were sold on fighting in Vietnam, even if they 
were soldiers. Pfc. James Johnson, Pvt. Dennis Mora, and Pvt. Davis Sanas refused a 
transfer to the Second Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas before a deployment to 
Vietnam. The soldiers, Hispanic, African American, and white, were held for 
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investigation at Fort Dix, New Jersey, where they told reporters that they did not see any 
sense in fighting for freedom in Vietnam when they and other people of color did not 
have true freedom in the United States.30 The “Fort Hood Three” were an anomaly for 
1966, but their antiwar stance would become more popular among black troops as the 
war progressed.  
Having heard of some disruption, but also the overall positive experiences of 
black soldiers, Wallace Terry, one of the first black correspondents for Time, went to 
Vietnam in 1967 to see black and white troops working together first hand and to better 
understand the motivations behind black enlistment. Upon his return to the United States, 
he was asked to brief President Johnson on what he found. Terry reported: 
How the armed forces were fully integrated and that blacks were serving in a 
distinguished capacity—bravely and heroically—and that they were 
demonstrating their patriotism…and at that point it was true that not only were the 
forces integrated, not only were blacks serving as officers over everybody, black 
and white, but most of the troops were supporting the president’s policy.31 
 
Terry’s observations were supported by the correspondence soldiers in country sent back 
to “the real world.” The black officers were fair and most enlisted men did not complain 
about personal experiences of racism. Some of the positive attitudes may have been out 
of the fear of reprisal for speaking out against their commanding officers or the military 
establishment in general, and because they were published accounts through black 
popular media, they could have been sanitized or picked for their positive messages. 
Overwhelmingly, soldiers supported the war effort. They believed they were fighting to 
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stop communist aggression and did not appreciate the antiwar movements marches, 
“while the protesters are marching, men are dying,” one Lieutenant Corporal wrote.32   
However, dissent existed and was published in a number of media outlets. In July 
1966 Sepia, a monthly black entertainment and news magazine, began publishing letters 
from soldiers in a column titled, “Our Men in Vietnam” and in their Letters to the Editor 
feature. While Terry may not have seen discrimination and reported overwhelmingly 
positive attitudes from the front, the complaints from black soldiers were beginning to fill 
the pages of Sepia, the Chicago Defender, and other black media outlets. Three soldiers, 
all using aliases, wrote to the editor of Sepia expressing their experiences with racism 
within the military. A Marine at Camp Pendleton, California was sent back to Vietnam 
for a second tour, even though there were troops in his division who had not seen combat. 
Another, in the 173rd Airborne Brigade could not understand why Americans were 
fighting in Vietnam when the Vietnamese were racist toward black soldiers, while the last 
letter came from a Marine in the First Division who felt that black soldiers were passed 
over for field promotions and that only “a few ‘token’ Negro soldiers have been placed in 
administrative jobs.”33 In all, the façade of a happily integrated American military was 
pierced, just as the number of in country, drafted troop rose. 
 While Johnson increased the draft quotas in the summer of 1965 and again in 
1966, soldiers were not sent directly to Vietnam when they were inducted. First, 
inductees and recruits had to complete three months of initial boot camp. From boot 
camp, those that graduated were sent to further training (ranging from a couple of months 
to a year depending on difficulty of assignment) for the various units. These assignments 
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were based on aptitude testing, skills testing, and to a lesser degree, volunteerism.34 
Additionally, forward deployed troops would be given their assignments and then sent to 
a holding base where they would practice maneuvers and prepare for in country 
expeditions for at least a month before boarding their flights to Vietnam. Once in country, 
troops were either replacements to already deployed units or kept in less dangerous 
positions in the rear until they were needed for missions.35 Thus, integrating Johnson’s 
drafted soldiers and McNamara’s Project 100,000 men was a task that took months, but 
once completed, dramatically changed the face of American military operations in 
Vietnam. The average grunt became dramatically younger (19, as opposed to 21 in 1965), 
less educated, and was more likely to be serving because he had to, rather than because 
he chose to.36 The new soldiers also brought with them the experiences of their lives at 
home, in the ghettoes or in rural parts of the American South and West. Their upbringing 
and class status informed their views on military life, their notions of racism and 
classism, and most importantly, their courage to speak out against the wrongs they saw 
and experienced.37 
 Black men who were drafted had two choices: enlist or go to jail. Some soldiers 
did not want to go to jail, while others expressed patriotism. Racism withstanding, Private 
First Class Abraham Brown, was “proud of [his] country and what it stands for. The flag 
that flies our country is most beautiful and stands for freedom.”38 Another reason for 
accepting draft orders was to protect the soldier’s family and status. Going to jail, even 
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for a noble cause like draft resistance, was shameful to many. Moreover, if a soldier went 
to jail he was unable to remain active in the Freedom Movement. One black soldier 
enlisted because he “believe[d] one has to avoid and try to stay out of prison for as long 
as he possibly can so he can contribute to the masses.”39  Others, especially prior to 1968, 
believed that fighting communism was the right thing and that North Vietnam needed to 
be contained. HM2 Luther C. Benton III accepted his orders to report to Vietnam because 
he wanted “to see what the war was all about. And…we have to stop Communism before 
it gets to America. I was just like all the other dummies.”40 Some men chose to enlist, in 
hopes of avoiding service in Vietnam. Instead, they joined draftees in the trenches as 
replacement soldiers.  
 While the military was officially desegregated, black soldiers complained about 
the racism they experience in training, particularly at southern bases, such as Fort Hood 
(Texas), Fort Bragg (North Carolina), and Fort Jackson (South Carolina). When they 
were deployed to Vietnam, soldiers did not expect poor treatment to abate. Indeed, they 
found that, like in civilian life, blacks were concentrated in dangerous and low paying 
occupations, barred or kept from advancement in rank or earnings, and treated like 
second class citizens. Soldiers wrote home about the bias they felt from individual 
officers and the culture of contempt that often permeated the rear.41 
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 Rank and number of years of service were key factors in black soldiers’ feelings 
about the antiwar movements at home and the actions of black soldiers in the field. 
Career soldiers, like Air Force Sgt. Donald Jackson of Detroit, a 13-year veteran who 
flew combat missions from Bien Hoa, Vietnam, was unimpressed with the trajectory of 
the Freedom Movement and tried not to think about “the demonstrations at home because 
I’ve got a job to do. I’m a professional soldier. It lowers the morale when you read about 
these things.” He, along with a number of other “lifers,”42 found the replacement troops 
to be less proud of their work and less engaged in the soldiering. Major Charles E. Smith 
of Covert, Michigan, told Chicago Defender columnist Ethel Payne, “Over here, the 
Negro is a leader. He is known to have guts and is respected for it.”43 The “lifers” were 
more positive about their experiences in the Vietnam, believing that they, as black men, 
were more respected in the military and could assert their masculinity more freely 
through the military hierarchy than in their civilian lives.  
 Officers often faced harsh criticism from the troops they commanded. “Uncle 
Tom” was a common insult directed at the officers, who Black Power GIs believed had 
capitulated to the government and abandoned their fellow black soldiers. While GIs 
complained that black soldiers were overlooked for promotion, those officers who earned 
higher ranks were often viewed with derision, as black grunts believed that officers had 
gotten their new positions by subterfuge against other soldiers of color. Earning an 
officer’s title was akin to moving into the middle class, and like civilian life, the military 
structure came with the same divisions. Thus, enlisted men and non-officers were more 
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likely to espouse Black Power beliefs (like their lower class, civilian counterparts), while 
officers, non-commissioned or commissioned, were more likely to espouse the politics of 
respectability and to denounce Black Power and even Dr. King after his antiwar 
statements in 1967 (like their middle class, civilian counterparts).44 
 Much like military distinction, soldiers’ geographical position in Vietnam also 
played a role in the development and expression of their antiwar feelings. To a man, 
soldiers in forward deployed positions (soldiers actually doing the fighting) talked about 
the racial inclusivity and the lack of discriminatory language or actions. Because of the 
danger that combat imposed and the guerilla tactics employed by the Viet Cong and the 
North Vietnamese Army, soldiers of all races had to rely on each other and had no time 
for petty racism. In fact, both black and white soldiers reminisced fondly of their cross-
racial friendships formed in the field.  As Specialist 4 Richard J. Ford III recalled, “in the 
field, we had the utmost respect for each other, because when a fire fight is going on and 
everybody is facing north, you don’t want to see nobody looking around south. If you 
was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, you didn’t tell nobody.”45 Racial distinction did not 
exist because, according to one Marine fighting outside Da Nang, “up here on the line, 
you gotta be together. Charlie doesn’t know the difference between black and white. 
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Either you kill him or he kills you.”46 Survival was of the utmost concern in the field and 
anything that placed the unit or the individual in danger was not tolerated. 
The experience of fighting and dying alongside people of color helped some white 
soldiers to realize their own prejudice. Specialist 4 Donald L. Dietrich wrote to Sepia to 
apologize for believing that all black people were “niggers…Now that I’ve fought side by 
side with them, lived with them, slept with them, and understood them, I have changed 
my mind.”47 Many other white soldiers also wrote to Sepia’s “Our Men in Vietnam” 
column expressing similar respect for their fellow soldiers of color. The war provided a 
cross cultural dialogue that created spaces where black and white men could form strong 
bonds through shared fear and bravery. Moreover, because soldiering was a shared 
definition of manhood, the soldiers came together on common ground in the field. They 
had received the same training, were serving in the same units, and were faced with the 
same daily struggles.48  
 Yet without the jungle and the bullets, the friendships and respect found in the 
field did not often translate to the rear. The racial incidents described in the 
correspondence and memories of black soldiers took place in rear units, when soldiers 
were on Rest and Relaxation passes, or were pulled out of the field to wait for 
redeployment, to be sent home, or to guard administrative or hospital positions. The 
down time, easy availability of alcohol, and lack of constant danger in the rear allowed 
soldiers time to relax, but also created an atmosphere where racism and bigotry could 
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flourish.  The rear was often self-segregated, with white and black soldiers frequenting 
separate bars that catered to their differing preferences. The bars of black soldiers played 
soul, R&B, and jazz music, while white establishments focused on country and pop 
music. The hooches were not segregated by law, as was the style of earlier wars, but the 
de facto rules were clear: while soldiers were friendly in the field, but once you returned 
to the rear you fraternized with “your own.”49 The readily available alcohol lowered 
inhibitions and led to nasty fights between soldiers. The slightest provocation could turn a 
peaceful evening into a melee, as soldiers defended their honor or were drug into fights 
protecting their friends’ or their own manhood. As the war progressed and soldiers sought 
marijuana and harder drugs to turn their minds off, the bar violence grew. The Pentagon 
became so worried about racialized violence in Vietnam that they commissioned a study, 
which found that the rising drug culture and the disgust soldiers felt toward fighting a 
never ending battle led to the frayed nerves and outburst of violence in the rear. 
Moreover, the report found “that blacks and whites were moving farther and farther away 
from each other, resegregating through accelerated racial polarization.”50  
After the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1968 a number of ugly 
racial incidents occurred in Vietnam. White soldiers in Da Nang and Hoi An raised 
Confederate flags and openly celebrated the murder. Other white soldiers were 
insensitive to the loss and shouted racial slurs toward black soldiers. Violence erupted at 
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a number of the bases in Vietnam, as well as between American fighting men stationed 
on Okinawa, as black soldiers expressed their dismay at the actions of the white soldiers 
and at the loss of Dr. King.51 Race-based violence forced the U.S. Navy to prohibit the 
sale of alcohol on all Navy bases near Da Nang and restricted access to China Beach for 
most personnel in October 1968 after two nights of disturbances.52   
 One common complaint among African American soldiers was the belief that 
black soldiers were passed over for in country promotions and honors. Vietnam provided 
a fertile ground for the increase of black officers, but promotion was slow and uneven. 
Although black men were often praised for their heroism under fire, many felt that 
promotions were not given fairly or expediently. L. J. Moore, serving with the First 
Calvary Division, believed that men were moved around platoons to avoid promotion.53 
Private Joe Kelley of the 101st Airborne Division claimed that he had to fight the brass 
for the Bronze Star he received after pulling three white soldiers out of an alley during an 
ambush by the Viet Cong, while the other soldiers (all were wounded) were awarded 
their Bronze Stars without a second thought. Kelley recalled, “they didn’t want to give it 
to me, but I made a stink and they gave it to me.”54 Because recommendations for honors 
and promotions were made by superior or commanding officers, many lower level black 
GIs felt they had no recourse for addressing being overlooked. The bureaucracy of the 
military hierarchy required that soldiers follow a specific chain of command to file 
complaints. Complaints or disputes were made to the Inspector General of each unit or 
the battery commander. These positions were often filled by a white officer who listened 
                                                     
51 Westheider, Fighting on Two Fronts, 97-98.  
52 Perry Young, “Viet Flare Up Lead to Liquor Ban,” The Chicago Defender Oct. 21, 1968, 2. 
53 L. J. Moore, “Our Men in Vietnam,” Sepia 16, no. 12 (December 1967): 65. 
54 Donald Mosby, “Black Soldiers in Vietnam Getting Bad Deal, Says GI,” Chicago Defender May 25, 
1968, 2. 
 
94 
 
to the complaints but did not pursue actions to remedy situations. When Specialist 4 
Kenneth A. Haley lodged a complaint with his battery commander, he only received a 
lecture in return. His commander told him, “Haley, I am going to tell you of a few things 
I don’t like. I don’t like Black Power. I don’t like African haircuts.”55 Black soldiers 
believed that most black officers were promoted on a token basis and that racial 
antagonism with regard to promotion and battlefield honors would persist throughout the 
war.56 
In country soldiers also believed that blacks were punished for indiscretions by 
being sent out on dangerous missions or were kept in forward positions longer than their 
white counterparts. Soldiers lamented the choices of white officers when assigning 
scouting roles. Many men felt that they were being unfairly punished for speaking their 
minds or for simply espousing a Black Power or Soul Brother—the term Black Power 
soldiers used to address other soldiers who shared their beliefs--mentality. Black soldiers 
who were believed to be “trouble” were sent back out on missions. Specialist 4 Haywood 
T. Kirkland knew “a lot of brothers who had supply clerk or cook MOS when they came 
over ended up in the field.”57 One man wrote to Sepia and recounted the exploits of his 
white captain. The captain chose to send men back into the bush with only 20 days left on 
their deployment, would only choose black soldiers to run point or to be forward scouts, 
and expected black men to take up the most dangerous jobs on any mission. While this 
was one example of personal racism on the part of a single captain, the number of 
soldiers writing to Sepia, and interviewed for other sources showed a pervasive use of 
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black soldiers in fighting the war. These anecdotes coupled with the large number of 
African American deaths in Vietnam helped persuade many black soldiers that they were 
only cannon fodder for a white military structure that did not value them as soldiers or as 
men.58 
The poor treatment, racial violence, and harassment that black soldiers 
experienced was not only inflicted by their white American counterparts. Black men were 
targets of Vietnamese discrimination too. At least one soldier claimed that the 
Vietnamese learned to hate black men from white soldiers who taught their prejudice to 
those who aided American GIs or lived near American camps. Lt. Cpl. Charles Smith of 
the Marine Corps wrote that he was repeatedly called “‘blackie’ by the Vietnamese after 
coming off patrol protecting their lives. This term was put into their heads by something 
with feelings against our color—guess who?”59 Because U.S. troops employed 
Vietnamese civilians on bases as interpreters, launderers, and other menial laborers, the 
Vietnamese learned American colloquialisms and employed them as best they could. 
Vietnamese civilians would call black soldiers “nigger” or spend time “reminding” them 
that they were number 10 in the United States and in Vietnam and that the white men 
were number one (a way to degrade black soldiers, by placing white men above them—
number one—while, they were at the bottom—number 10).  It was evident to many black 
Americans that their white peers were poisoning the Vietnamese who served alongside 
them.  
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Another soldier complained that the Viet Cong were using racist propaganda to 
turn Vietnamese civilians against black soldiers. Specialist 4 King wrote, “The women 
with babies wouldn’t let colored soldiers touch them because the VC told them Negroes 
are cannibals that are hired from Africa to eat babies as their reward for fighting in Viet 
Nam. They also have been told Negroes grow tails like monkeys at night…” Men who 
experienced racism at the hands of the Vietnamese felt betrayed not only by their country 
but also by the men, women, and children they were fighting to protect. “How can you 
win a war when the people you are fighting for are against you?” Specialist David M. 
King asked. 60 This question was repeated often by soldiers serving throughout the 
combat zones of South Vietnam. The lack of a sufficient answer pushed some soldiers 
closer to open rebellion, while making others rethink the role of black men in uniform.61  
 The most segregated places in Vietnam were the brothels and bars in the rear and 
in locations that soldiers would travel to on Rest and Relaxation passes (particularly 
Saigon).  Vietnamese “Mama Sans” (Vietnamese women of child bearing age) would not 
accept black visitors in the field or in local brothels because they would lose business 
from their white clients. The segregated brothel situations sometimes led to violence, as 
patrons of the brothels and bars would come to fisticuffs after nights of drinking or 
because of lack of access to specific women or locations. Some of the establishments 
were self-segregated by African American soldiers. For instance, an area of Saigon was 
exclusively reserved for black men seeking sexual relations with Vietnamese prostitutes. 
However, groups of black soldiers together were targets for white Military Police officers 
and were often broken up, because, according to Pfc. Ronald E. McDaniel, “they don’t 
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think we’re supposed to relax and sit around in groups listening to our music, or talk 
about our women and families back home or about our problems.”62 Such privileges were 
designated solely for white soldiers.63 
The perceived and real slights, including being overlooked for promotion, having 
segregated rest and relaxation facilities, and being sent on dangerous missions, 
experienced by some black soldiers throughout their combat tours of Vietnam led them to 
rethink their status in the United States. After only a few months in country some 
soldiers’ latent anti-war and anti-United States feelings developed or boiled over. Black 
soldiers spoke of feeling used and betrayed by the United States. They complained 
bitterly about fighting another people of color in a colonial war of aggression. By late 
1968 and early 1969 men were writing on a monthly basis to Sepia that black soldiers 
should not be fighting in Vietnam. The letter writers believed that if they had to fight a 
civil war, they wanted to be at home, fighting for the rights of their own people. Often, 
soldiers did not expressly condemn the war, but felt that black men should not be used in 
the fighting. Private First Class Ron Matlock was representative of the Sepia letter 
writers. He did not believe black men should be fighting in Vietnam “because we don’t 
have freedom ourselves…Instead of spending $30 billion a year to kill a Viet Cong, they 
can spend half of that and put it into Negro slum areas.” 64 The perceived waste, along 
with the lived experiences of the racist attitudes of some Vietnamese civilians, soured 
many black soldiers on fighting.65  
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Reports of Civil Rights unrest at home also had a psychological effect on in 
country soldiers. Many wondered what they were fighting for and how they would be 
received when they returned home. Some saw their time in the military as preparing them 
from returning home to the United States. Earlier in the course of the war, soldiers wrote 
dismissively of protestors, rioters, and rabble-rousers at home, believing they were taking 
away from the war effort and their energies were misplaced. However, as the war drug on 
and different types of soldiers spent their tours in Vietnam, the thinking changed. By 
1968, men saw their time in Vietnam not as a freedom mission or to protect communism, 
but as fertile training ground for skills that could be used in fighting their own battles at 
home, in urban America. The riots in urban America following Dr. King’s assassination 
and during the hot, long summers of the late 1960s affected the thinking of black fighting 
men. Soldiers were concerned about what these riots meant for them and their families. 
Specialist 4 Robert J. Baldwin lamented, “Why should the blacks fight in Vietnam only 
to go back to combat the white aggressors in America?”66 Other soldiers felt that they 
were captives in the Army and that black soldiers should not be fighting the war, 
“because its fascism for blacks to gain for others that which we do not have ourselves.”67   
Soul Brothers believed they should be fighting their battles at home, to earn the 
rights and freedoms of American citizenship for themselves. Specialist 3 Gene Roberts 
was worried that his time in Vietnam would not matter when he returned home: “how 
will I be treated when I get home? Will I still be discriminated against? Will I still be a 
second-class citizen?” he asked.68 Roberts and others believed that their talents were 
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being used incorrectly and the United States military should reassign them to domestic 
duty.  A 1970 survey conducted by Wallace Terry found that 45% of black enlisted men 
and 15% of black officers would “join a riot at home.” A smaller percentage of enlisted 
me (31%) and officers (6%) said they would join a militant group when they returned 
home, but significantly, over 60% of black officers did not believe that black soldiers 
should be fighting in Vietnam because “they had problems back home.”69 The Black 
Panther Party openly recruited black soldiers and believed that the soldiers’ proper place 
was in the vanguard organization, fighting American imperialism, not perpetuating it. 
The Panthers and other organizations wanted black soldiers in their ranks to help train 
their members in guerrilla warfare and military discipline, and to provide the needed 
leadership in the revolution.70 
The popularity of Black Power at home and the disconnect that black soldiers felt 
to the large American war machine was further heightened when the Viet Cong and the 
North Vietnamese regular army used race and racial issues to target black soldiers. After 
the assassination of Dr. King, a Vietnamese woman called Hanoi Helen addressed black 
soldiers over the radio, “Soul Brothers, go home. Whitey raping your mothers and your 
daughters, burning down your homes. What you over here for? This is not your war,” she 
told listeners. The radio broadcast had the desired effect on Specialist 4 Richard J. Ford 
III. After hearing Hanoi Helen, he “really started believing it, because it was too many 
blacks than there should be in [the] infantry.”71 Hanoi Helen played to a number of 
concerns that black soldiers harbored, as they served their required tours: shared identity 
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as Third World subjects, manhood, and fear of white racism. Because soldiers were cut 
off from news networks and mail service was slow, Hanoi Helen and the “enemy” 
actually served to strengthen the militant feelings of some soldiers. The belief in a shared 
identity as oppressed people helped some black men to justify being friendly with 
Vietnamese civilians, while other soldiers claimed that the Viet Cong and the North 
Vietnamese Army would purposefully aim away from black soldiers, if given the chance. 
Again, the enemy was able to cultivate a respectful space to water the seeds of doubt that 
many black soldiers brought to Vietnam. Their propaganda was effective because it 
spoke a truth the soldiers wanted or needed to hear and because it played to their 
developing Black Power sentiment. By questioning why the soldiers were in Vietnam, 
while white men were supposedly raping their women at home, Hanoi Helen laid bare the 
reason men joined the military: to protect their families and their country. Black men in 
Vietnam were doing neither, according to Helen and many Black Power soldiers. They 
were biding time until they could hop the next plane back to the “real world” and become 
involved in something worthwhile again.  
Soldiers captured by the North Vietnamese were also inundated with anti-white 
messages. One prisoner of war was brought into interrogation after Dr. King’s murder, 
where he was told that the United States was rioting and black men and women were 
being killed in the streets. While this was only a half truth, the North Vietnamese 
believed they could play on the racial fears of the captured soldier. They expected the 
soldier to make a statement against the United States that they could use for further 
propaganda pieces. However, this showed the belief of the North Vietnamese that black 
soldiers were unhappy in the American military and that they were exploitable. The 
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message worked and many soldiers wrote home about deserting their bases and joining 
the Viet Cong or the North Vietnamese regular army.72 Additionally, Black Power 
organizations at home, particularly the Black Panther Party, pledged to send members to 
North and South Vietnam to join the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) and the 
regular North Vietnamese army in their fight against the Americans. Huey P. Newton 
offered “troops to the Vietnamese people in the spirit of revolutionary solidarity and 
internationalism.” The act was political, but also “a friendship gesture” to the Vietnamese 
and Newton believed that “it will be very decisive thing on the battlefield, because many 
of our buddies will come over and fight with us against the cowardly American 
aggressors…”73 Party member Ericka Huggins “would have gone,” if Huey had asked her 
to fight in Vietnam, because she “believed the Vietnamese were her brothers and they 
should be waging revolutionary war together.”74 While these “soldiers” were never used, 
their willingness to serve against the Americans further strengthened the North 
Vietnamese propaganda and forced Soul Brothers to come to terms with their own 
feelings about the United States military and their role in Vietnam as soldiers serving 
United States interests.  
Vietnam proved to be fertile space for gaining a “better understanding of 
‘blackness’” and “the ‘thought ground’ of the black revolution.” Soul Brothers taught 
each other about displaying blackness proudly and having an identity within the military, 
based on race, self-pride, and black solidarity.75 Solidarity was an important means to 
survival, as black soldiers protected each other in rear stationed divisions from aggressive 
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whites. Further, the togetherness of black soldiers was a point of pride, a trait that needed 
to be transferred home to secure freedom in the United States. Two soldiers went so far 
as to suggest that “if life was assured for every black man that came over here, we could 
truthfully say that all black people should have the opportunity to witness the 
togetherness of the black people here.”76  The solidarity ensured that black soldiers 
survived their tours and could return to the United States. Other soldiers reported that 
Vietnam was an “eye-opening experience,” that exposed the true nature of the United 
States military and white Americans or “rabbits.” Soldiers felt they were forced to join 
the military because of the structurally racist nature of American society, which provided 
them with limited options for economic advancement. When they arrived in country, they 
believed they would be treated equally by their fellow fighting men, but were forced to 
realize that the military structure, whether at home or in battle was racist and that they 
were fighting against their own best interests. This realization helped lead to the calls for 
racial solidarity and the cultural expressions that became associated with Soul Brother 
soldiers. 
Soul Brothers began expressing their attitudes about the War, race relations, and 
their own blackness and manhood more openly as the war continued and more and more 
draftees and replacements made their way into the armed services. In hair, dress, and 
decorum, black soldiers attempted to separate and celebrate their status within the 
military, demanding more respect for their personhood and their own cultural expressions 
within the rigid hierarchy of military. The rise of the “black is beautiful” campaign at 
home quickly caught on in Vietnam, with black soldiers grew out their hair into large and 
well-maintained Afros. These troops were targeted by their leaders as disobeying the 
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cropped hair style required by military brass. Soldiers also began to wear African beads 
as signs of peace and solidarity with their Third World brothers. The beads were an 
outward symbol of Soul Brother status and marked the soldiers for others to see. Another 
prevalent outward marker of solidarity was the black wristband, “constructed by braiding 
two GI-type shoe laces together.”77 The Air Force quickly banned the wristbands because 
they were not proper uniform attire.  While white soldiers also violated uniform codes 
while in country (by adding peace signs to their helmets or stitching confederate flags to 
their uniforms), black soldiers felt they were unfairly targeted for their expressions by the 
officers in many units.78  
In1969, the Marine Corps officially recognized the Afro as an acceptable haircut, 
if it was “not bushy.” The decision to loosen restrictions on hair and dress came after a 
number of complaints were filed by black Corpsmen.79 The Army, at least at Ft. Bragg, 
also allowed the wearing of Afros, but they “still forbid novel and bizzare [sic] styles.” 
This was a tacit decision that allowed Soul Brothers to express their burgeoning race 
pride and manhood, while remaining inside the authority of the Marine Corps and Army. 
Soldiers could still be reprimanded for having unkempt Afros or for not being able to 
wear their gear properly.80 The change in dress and hair codes was not accepted across 
the board in all military units and still fell to the commanding officer, meaning soldiers in 
one unit could wear their hair in Afros, while soldiers in another had to maintain crew 
cuts. 
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 This same haphazard enforcement of military protocol applied to the use of the 
Black Power salute and the dap. Some contemporary reporters argued that the Black 
Power salute originated with soldiers in Vietnam and was brought back to the States after 
Soul Brothers’ tours of duty. The Black Power fist was popularized by Tommie Smith 
and John Carlos on the medal stand at the 1968 Olympics and by domestic Black Power 
organizations, particularly the Black Panthers, during the latter half of the 1960s. An 
expression of pride and solidarity, it may have been brought home by Vietnam veterans, 
but what seems more likely is that Soul Brothers and Black Power civilian advocates both 
adopted the clinched fist as a symbol of their resistance to authority. The Black Power 
salute was used by black servicemen in place of the traditional salute soldiers used to 
great each other. It was an outward sign that each saluting person was a Soul Brother and 
a believer in black solidarity and pride. The salute was not exclusively for black soldiers, 
as Soul Brothers would raise the clinched fist toward white soldiers who shared a bond or 
were considered friends.81 
 The Black Power salute was a quick gesture to signify a person’s solidarity with 
other soldiers of color. Unlike the salute, the dap was a complicated handshake developed 
between two or more Soul Brothers and performed any time the soldiers met. The dap, 
like the salute, was used to express solidarity and revolutionary love, but each movement 
had its own ritualized meaning. The meanings and movements were not standardized and 
soldiers would develop their own daps for specific units or areas. The dap was performed 
in Vietnam and stateside. While the performance did not hurt anyone, it did back up 
chow lines and cause a great deal of disruption in rear positions. White soldiers resented 
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the length of daps and some of the more sinister gestures (for example, the slashing of a 
throat or shaping the forefinger and thumb into a makeshift gun).82  
 Not all black service personnel performed the salute or the dap. Some “lifers” 
found the dap to be nothing more than “street clowning,” or accused Soul Brothers of 
being racist against whites. Representative John R. Rarick, a Democrat from Louisiana, 
felt the dap and other Black Power expressions by military members were expressions of 
solidarity with socialism. He claimed, “For by their handshakes, their salutes and flag, 
these dupes openly identify themselves as members of an international movement whose 
allegiance is ultimately to Moscow.” In order to fix the situation and thus quell racial 
tension among the troops, Rarick suggested, “a simple, immediate solution to the 
problem would be to reassign the troops to unite according to race.” The dap and other 
Black Power symbols were such a problem, according to Rarick, that resending 
Executive Order 8891 and resegregating the military was the best idea.83  
Representative Rarick’s suggestion was not taken seriously, but a letter published 
in Sepia in the fall of 1971 set off a back and forth between soldiers about the meaning 
and use of daps. Cpl. Terry E. Harrow, a white soldier serving his second tour in 
Vietnam, complained that the men he currently served with were of lower caliber than 
those he served with earlier. Harrow singled out the Black Power salute and dap as 
reasons why black soldiers were treated poorly, because the soldiers themselves created a 
difference based on race. Harrow believed the men he was currently serving with “dress 
differently, talk differently (try to speak their own brand of corrupted English) and 
whenever two of them meet, they go through this ritual of ‘giving each other Black 
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Power’ by slapping their hands and such.” He claimed to respect men who were proud of 
their race, but “when I see those people showing their pride in such a manner as to border 
on the ridiculous, I begin to understand why some people are prejudice towards the black 
people.” Harrow presented himself as colorblind and lamented his early years in the 
Marine Corps, when he felt friendless because he did not care about a man’s color. Yet, 
his rambling letter was fueled by racism and white social insecurity. He did not like the 
way Black Power soldiers expressed themselves and felt threatened by the length and 
exclusivity of the daps. His letter provided an insight into how many non-Soul Brothers 
viewed the dap—as intrusive and hateful.84 Harrow’s feelings about the dap were echoed 
by a few black soldiers as well, who felt that they were required to give the gesture to 
every black person they encountered, whether they knew them or not. This expression of 
racial solidarity was actually restrictive according to Specialist 4 Charles Andrew, who 
saw the giving of the dap or the salute as akin to being a “mindless slave” doing “things 
because every black man does them and because I don’t want to be considered an Uncle 
Tom.”85 The push for racial inclusivity was empowering for Soul Brothers who believed 
it was “a symbol of love between bloods,” or “a means of relating to other blacks who 
have been through the same or nearly the same situations.”86 The dap was an expression 
of black pride and those servicemen who did not understand it or did not feel it was 
necessary were not Soul Brothers. Moreover, according to AB Woodrow Hunter, the dap 
was a symbol of inclusivity, because through “those few hand motions that brother has 
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told me that I’m not alone in the struggle.”87 The failure to show the dap was not only 
disrespectful to those brothers who initiated contact, but also to the soldier who refused to 
give it back, because it showed a lack of self-pride. The back and forth that spilled out 
onto Sepia’s pages for the next year indicated the divisiveness of the dap and it’s cultural 
significance to Soul Brothers. The dap was more than just an act of solidarity. It came 
home with veterans and became a symbol of black manhood and of Soul Brothers’ 
willingness to protect one another and to work for a more inclusive world both inside the 
military establishment and in civilian society.88 
While soldiers in Vietnam fought with military leadership and their comrades 
about their personal adornments and greetings, soldiers that were transferred back to the 
United States or had not yet been deployed to Vietnam fought their own battles. Troops 
refused deployment orders to Southeast Asia, as more and more servicemen sought ways 
to avoid service in Vietnam from within the military structure. Henry Mills, a black G.I 
stationed at Fort Dix, refused to be fight in Vietnam because “he could no sooner kill the 
people of Vietnam than he could kill his own Black brothers and sisters.” Mills was 
sentenced to 30 days confinement in Fort Dix’s stockade, while he waited for his next 
assignment. He vowed to continue to refuse to fight in Vietnam, until he was 
discharged.89 Mills was not the only soldier to refuse his orders. Many black men sought 
discharges or fought their deployment orders, serving time in base stockades. Pvt. Isaac 
Barr was physically forced onto a plane departing Washington’s Ft. Lewis for Vietnam, 
after he filed a Conscientious Objector status request to avoid deployment. Barr 
petitioned the American Serviceman’s Union (ASU, a national organization created in 
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1967 to support low ranking soldiers) for legal support. The ASU spokesman, Bob 
LeMay, considered “this a kidnapping by the US Army Brass.” However, ASU was 
unable to return Lewis to the United States. Instead, once in Vietnam, Lewis served in the 
90th Replacement Company at Bien Hoa.90 While the fight was often futile, it was more 
than symbolic. By standing up to their orders, anti-war soldiers expressed their own 
moral consciousness. They also asserted their freedom of choice, something many 
soldiers felt they had been denied when they were ordered to Vietnam. A number of 
soldiers were not against serving in the military, but they felt they should be serving in 
the United States, helping their own people gain rights and freedoms, instead of fighting 
the Vietnamese. Thus, the refusal to be sent to fight another man’s war was an expression 
of revolutionary solidarity, while also serving to reassert their independence and 
manhood. 
 As some men at Fort Dix and other bases refused to be sent to Vietnam, other 
soldiers went AWOL (Away without Leave). A popular destination for AWOL troops 
was Sweden. While some men went to Canada to avoid being drafted, the already 
inducted soldier had fewer options. Troops destined for Vietnam could try to escape to 
Canada, but the underground network that worked to find safe passage for troops seeking 
asylum often sent them through Moscow to Stockholm, where they were supported by a 
group of pacifists. The 80 soldiers (14 African American) who deserted to Sweden felt 
that the war was a race war which pitted two peoples of color against one another, at the 
beckoning of the white power structure. Don Williams, a 24-year-old defector, left for 
Sweden because he did not like the way black people were treated in the United States 
and he would not return to the United States until the awful conditions were fixed. As co-
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chair of the Afro-American Deserters Committee (AADC) in Stockholm, Williams 
asserted that black deserters were focused on more than just peace in Vietnam. He told 
Ebony, “The main reason—and I cannot stress this enough—for my own defection is the 
injustices committed against my people in the U.S.” Black deserters, according to 
Williams, were disillusioned with the United States and would remain abroad until 
conditions in the United States improved. The soldiers were free to stay in Sweden and 
could not be prosecuted, but when they returned to the United States they were brought 
before military courts and sentenced. One soldier was given four months in the stockade 
and a dishonorable discharge for desertion, when he returned home in 1968.91  
 Wishing to avoid orders to Vietnam was not the only reason soldiers went 
AWOL. In January 1971, two soldiers stationed in Berlin went AWOL because they 
“were forced to give up our culture and our beliefs and to suffer the intolerable conditions 
of racism and discrimination,” and were “no longer prepared to be part of this imperialist 
Army, which uses violent measures to suppress its own personnel who assert their rights 
and at the same time uses us as tools of the genocide in Vietnam and forces us to live and 
work under inhuman conditions.”92 Sgt. Ronald Bolden, one of the AWOL soldiers, was 
a Vietnam veteran who had been reassigned to Berlin to finish his time in the military. 
The soldiers returned to Berlin to undergo court martial proceedings, not because they 
believed they would receive a just trial, but to expose the racism, corruption, and violence 
that black soldiers were forced to live under as members of the United States military. 
Bolden argued that the Army, particularly in Vietnam, forced soldiers to harbor racist 
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ideas against the Vietnamese, because the Army dehumanized the Vietnamese, calling 
them gooks. Bolden told Der Spiegel, “This racism is shoved down your throat so long 
until you begin to automatically regard the Vietnamese as bastards,” and the Army 
effectively created a Third World “nigger” for all Americans to hate. Then, Bolden 
continued, “When you come back from Viet Nam you are confronted with the daily 
tyranny of your superiors in Berlin, then you just don’t play that game any longer. If you 
put your life on the line out there you’re not gonna come back here and be ordered 
around…and get punished for some petty bullshit.”93 The Army had created a mentality 
of superiority in black troops in the field, but was unwilling to accept that black troops 
were heroic and deserved to express themselves as men in the rear or in peacefully 
deployed missions. In recognizing that the military had dehumanized and racialized the 
Vietnamese enemy, black soldiers were able to better see their own mistreatment in the 
military and to begin to speak out against it. Again, combat served as moments of 
radicalization and soldiers were unwilling to accept poor treatment and the denigration of 
culture when they returned from the battle field. Going AWOL was the only way some 
soldiers could think of to bring this to the attention of the public and to get a hearing 
before a military tribunal, where they could express their grievances in open court, 
without having to rely on their superior officers to lodge a complaint or to remedy a 
situation. While going AWOL was not ideal, because it led to time in the stockade and 
the possibility of a dishonorable discharge which would follow the soldier back into 
civilian life, it was one way to draw attention to the inequity of treatment.94 
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 The use of black troops at home was also a point of contention for many returning 
veterans and active duty members. The 1968 Democratic Convention was held in 
Chicago in August and the military predicted that violence would erupt. In doing so, 
federal authorities mobilized a number of units that included veterans of Vietnam and put 
them on alert that they could be deployed to help quell riots in Chicago if needed. 
Seventy-five black soldiers from Ft. Hood refused to participate in the riot control 
mission. At a rally held to protest the orders, 43 soldiers were arrested and quarantined in 
the stockade at Ft. Hood. Pfc. Jerome Laughton of Chicago explained that he did not 
want to use his weapon against a brother or sister who was expressing their Constitutional 
rights to free speech; he continued, “…we don’t want to go home and destroy the 
freedom we fought in Vietnam for.” Though over 100 black soldiers were present, only 
43 were arrested and charged with insubordination.95 Eight of the men (those Fort Hood 
authorities deemed the leaders of the insurrection) were given general Courts Martial for 
willfully disobeying an order and the other 35 were given special Courts Martial hearings 
beginning in September, 1968. Through a series of trials, the majority of the men served 
from three to six months of hard labor or confinement in the stockades and received bad 
conduct discharges. Four of the leaders were dishonorably discharged following their 
time in the stockades. The refusal to serve as riot police was another continuity with 
revolutionaries and “militants.” More than that, the soldiers who refused duty during the 
Convention were also employing United States democratic rhetoric in their defense. By 
refusing to take away freedoms, the soldiers were forcing the United States military to 
accept their stand as moral. While the military did not view the soldiers as supporting a 
moral cause, the symbolic gesture helped troops and the civilian population to see that 
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not all soldiers were cold blooded killers or had been brainwashed to do the bidding of 
their commanding officers.96 
 The treatment of soldiers on domestic bases was often no better than the reports 
black soldier sent home from Vietnam. Black men and women served on bases 
throughout the United States and faced with many of the same challenges that their 
brethren deployed abroad and their civilian counterparts lived under.  Unlike grunts in 
Vietnam though, domestically stationed military personnel were privy to the 
developments of Black Power groups and the myriad of struggles that black Americans 
continued to face in American society. Because military life was simply a microcosm of 
the larger society, black members of the Armed Forces dealt with similar struggles on US 
bases. The racism that soldiers faced in rear positions in Vietnam were heightened at 
home. A group of fifty black soldiers met at Fort Bragg on November 22, 1969 to form a 
group “to combat racism.” The soldiers originally met at Service Club Six, but were 
asked to leave by the staff and moved to a nearby park to continue their informal 
gathering. Eventually, a team of all white MPs broke up the meeting and took the names 
of all those present.97 The military leadership at home, like those deployed in Vietnam, 
was uneasy with large groups of minority soldiers congregating and sought to discipline 
leaders and break up the meetings, as a way to maintain “law and order,” but also as a 
way to harass and punish those who stepped out of line.    
Like their civilian counterparts, black GIs formed Black Power organizations at 
domestic bases to address the violence, racism, and class struggles within the military 
structure. Through underground papers they advanced their positions and sought to 
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expose the problems of military life to both soldiers and the wider public. Of note, the 
mastheads of the publications often reminded readers that the papers were their private 
property and could not be legally removed from the reader’s possession. This banner was 
also placed over a number of Black Power and radical organizations newspapers as police 
and government authorities (like the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counter 
Intelligence Program) would take newspapers and revolutionary materials into possession 
as proof of insubordination or crimes against the state. By reminding soldiers that the 
publications were legal, the writers exposed one counter-measure and associated 
themselves with the civilian society. They also educated their readers on their rights as 
citizens and as servicemen.98 
 Many bases had underground newspapers that reported military news, analysis of 
the War, and letters from soldiers in combat in Vietnam. Many of the newspapers also 
reprinted civilian Black Power newsletter stories. The Black Brigade at Ft. Bragg became 
a model for Black Power underground organizing. The group formed in late 1969, as a 
reaction to the contentious harassment its members felt at the hands of their peers and 
superiors. The Brigade believed that black military personnel had been complacent for 
too long and needed to be challenged in the language they understood—by questioning 
black soldiers’ manhood. The Brigade believed that military men had been brainwashed 
and were controlled in body and mind by the military system. They called on black 
soldiers to free their minds and to use their moral integrity to demand better treatment for 
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black soldiers.99 The Black Brigade was established to rid the military of racism which 
stood “disloyal to the Constitution of the United States of America,” so “demands against 
racism that may be posed by the Black Brigade must be considered as being in 
accordance with, and in advocation [sic] of the Constitution.”100 By using the 
Constitution as their guiding document, the men of the Black Brigade were asserting their 
citizenship rights and the perceived moral failings of the military establishment. They 
cloaked themselves in the rhetoric of the United States’ guiding document to protect 
themselves from being considered a communist front in the military. Moreover, using the 
Constitution as the foundation of their argument gave the Brigade a patriotic 
underpinning, in line with the teaching of the military. The Brigade worried that black 
soldiers had been brainwashed by military leaders, so adjusting the rhetoric of the 
establishment to suit their goals served the purpose of both protecting themselves and 
coding their message in the language the indoctrinated soldier could grasp and reevaluate.  
 The Black Brigade, like civilian Black Power organizations created a list of 
demands that they felt would help alleviate the racial tension at Ft. Bragg and other 
military bases throughout the country. They wanted more representation of blacks in the 
military police, as clerks, and as officers. The Black Brigade also requested black 
counselors, black lawyers, and racially balanced promotion boards and investigative 
committees. Because the military was deployed domestically to control riots throughout 
the late 1960s, the Brigade requested that “black soldiers sent with a unit to contain a 
civil disorder involving black people should be on a volunteer basis.” Instead of 
demanding completely separate military tribunals and a self-segregated system, the Black 
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Brigade wanted to fully integrate the military structure, and to provide more opportunities 
for black members in the service. The demands were not an overthrow of the military 
structure, but an attempt to work within the system to provide advancement opportunities 
and equal treatment for all members of the military. The list incorporated some of the 
same principles of civilian organizations, including a request that off-base businesses be 
barred from use if they had discriminatory practices and an increased availability of black 
literature and revolutionary publications.101 
 The demands highlighted the repressive nature of some military posts, as black 
soldiers felt they did not have fair hearings and were cut off from learning about their 
own history and contemporary society. The demands were practical and fell in line with 
the civilian organizations’ programs. Their concerns were focused mainly on military 
discipline and access, a conservative approach of working within the system to achieve 
specific and attainable concessions. The Brigade was as concerned with providing a 
means to advancement for black servicemen as with eradicating discrimination. Like their 
fellow soldiers in the field, they were not necessarily against serving in the military or 
preforming their duties; instead, they sought ways to alleviate the most egregious of 
assignments and to enjoy the same honors and respect that their white peers achieved.  
 At Fort Lewis in Washington the GI Alliance was a group of servicemen and 
women “dedicated to the principles of freedom and resistance to illegitimate authority, 
thrust not only on us in the military, but on all oppressed people in the world.” It went 
further than the Black Brigade, as it hoped to integrate military personnel with the 
civilian organizations. The GI Alliance sought to build coalitions, but focused solely on 
troops of color (“blacks, browns, Indians and Asians”) and communities. They felt they 
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were pawns in an imperial game that they could no longer participate in. In order to 
assuage the situation of black soldiers, the GI Alliance, through the Fed Up Program, 
made a list of demands modeled off the Black Panther Party’s 10 Point Program.  
Freedom from harassment and the ability to control the course of a serviceperson’s duty 
were the guiding principles of the demands. To achieve the goals of the Fed Up Program, 
the GI Alliance pledged to create individual organizations in each unit to address issues 
raised by personnel, create a legal defense fund and staff it with GI Alliance troops to 
protect soldiers from harassment, and demand, through the Chain of Command or in 
public, an immediate improvement in housing and care for active duty and veteran 
servicemen and their families.102 Like their civilian brothers and sisters, the members of 
Fort Lewis’s GI Alliance were seeking basic human rights and equal treatment. Having 
experienced military life, many of them serving in Vietnam and returning to a bigoted 
society that remained separate long after de jur segregation was banned, the Black Power 
military organizations used their status as military personnel to achieve full citizenship 
rights and equality wherever and whenever they could. 
 At Fort Knox, Kentucky, black and white soldiers used their underground 
newspaper, Fun, Travel, Adventure, (FTA or, as some servicemen called it Fuck the 
Army) to recruit and educate members. In December, 1970 FTA sought to end riot 
training and to avoid forced riot control in Louisville. The soldiers did not want to 
participate in the riot control training and felt it necessary to educate white soldiers on the 
reasons that Louisvillians may riot. FTA implored, “It is important for white GI’s to 
understand that blacks in these riots are not directing their anger at the majority of white 
working people, but against a few wealthy white men who are forcing blacks to live as 
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they do.” FTA connected the black rioters to the working class whites, hoping the GIs 
would understand that in reality, the rioters were focused not on the soldiers or the 
soldiers’ families, but on the white men who controlled and exploited poor blacks and 
whites. By focusing their attention on the shared struggle of working class Americans, 
who, according to FTA, were making 10% less than a decade earlier, the soldiers sought 
to build a coalition of blacks and whites. Additionally, the focus on the income gap 
between working class and upper class whites also served as a violence deterrence 
mechanism. While FTA admitted that rioters in Louisville could be destructive, they 
hoped that white soldiers would not see their destruction of property as a reason to 
become violent against the individual.103  
 Veterans also formed organizations to secure rights and benefits from the military 
upon their return to civilian society. Like veterans of earlier wars, Vietnam veterans were 
guaranteed certain programs to help them reintegrate into civilian life and to prosper 
there. However, unlike their white predecessors, Vietnam veterans, both black and white, 
were not viewed as heroes by a thankful nation. Vietnam veterans were harassed, spit 
upon, and called “baby killers” by anti-war protesters and were often unprepared for 
returning to civilian society.104 Moreover, Vietnam veterans faced a plethora of new and 
challenging issues, including Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Agent Orange 
poisoning. Most pressing, Vietnam veterans comprised the largest number of homeless 
veterans in the United States.105 The warning signs came earlier for Soul Brothers, as they 
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returned home and found, like the men who served in America’s wars before them, their 
opportunities were limited. In 1973, 15% of black Vietnam veterans were unemployed, 
and those who did have jobs earned $11 less a week than white Vietnam veterans.106 
 Black Vietnam veterans returned home to a society that was undergoing dramatic 
changes. Many of the veterans were dishonorably discharged because of their willingness 
to speak out against armed forces bigotry. Moreover, a dishonorable discharge had to be 
filed on job applications and many times employers would disqualify an applicant 
because of it.107 A dishonorable discharge is a punitive discharge given only through 
court martial proceedings and follow serious infractions, including desertion, sexual 
assault and murder. Unlike dishonorable discharges, “Bad Paper,” or other than 
honorable discharges, are administrative decisions. An other than honorable discharge is 
typically given to service members convicted of civilian crimes that bring dishonor to a 
military unit, including adultery. Other than honorable discharges were issued to 
500,000-750,000 Vietnam veterans. Both dishonorable discharges and “Bad Paper” 
discharges resulted in the forfeiture of military benefits, including the GI Bill and VA 
healthcare.108 80,000 troops brought into the military under Project 100,000 left the 
military without benefits or job skills and Project 100,000 troops were twice as likely to 
be court martialed as other men drafted.109 The failure of Project 100,000 and the 
Moynihan Report’s recommendations was also evident in the number of unemployed and 
homeless black veterans. Because black troops were concentrated in grunt positions and 
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unskilled or semi-skilled jobs while serving, they could not use their military training to 
secure better jobs when they returned home.110 The influx of black troops, in reality, did 
little to stem the problems of the economically disadvantaged, as those troops returned 
home with few advanced skills, some suffering mental and physical disabilities. 
 To address these systemic problems, the Department of Defense created Project 
Transition for returning veterans, optionally available to all U.S. military bases beginning 
on January 1, 1968.111 A three-pronged program, Project Transition sought to reintegrate 
veterans through job training, educational opportunities, and counseling services. 
However, Project Transition was not required and many black veterans chose not to use 
the military’s program.112 Instead, black veterans created their own agencies which 
lobbied on behalf of veterans rights and served as social welfare networks for veterans 
who struggled to readjust or find a place in the civilian world. Some groups worked in 
tandem with a peace platform, demanding an end to the war in Vietnam and a shift in 
funds to help veterans. United Veterans for Freedom worked to rebuild ghetto 
communities and lobbied for convalescent homes to be built in inner cities for injured 
veterans.113 More established Civil Rights groups, like the National Urban League, added 
veterans affairs personnel and developed programs specially coordinated for dealing with 
the issues of returning black veterans. The Urban League’s program worked to find 
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civilian jobs, housing, and educational opportunities for minority veterans who were not 
being served by the Veteran Affairs Administrations in their cities.114 The returning vet 
had to navigate a confusing stream of government bureaucracy and the crumbling 
infrastructure of their home communities to even begin to profit from the Cold War GI 
Bill, which promised education, job, and housing assistance. The dissatisfaction with 
benefits and the continued belief that the system was racially stacked against black 
veterans pushed some to join urban revolts and Black Power organizations, while others 
took to petty crimes to get by.  Programs were created to aid arrested and jailed veterans. 
Having been denied respect in the military and unwilling or unable to become lifers, 
black Vietnam veterans returned to the States as victims of American imperialism.115    
 The experience of black soldiers in Vietnam and as veterans at home in the United 
States was one of conflict. Black soldiers entered the military as enlistees or draftees and 
were sent to fight and die in the jungles of Vietnam with little education on the conflict or 
their rights. After nine to 12 month tours in country, many soldiers stopped being U.S. 
fighting men and became Soul Brothers, radicalized by the racism and violence in the 
rear, by the verbal attacks and segregated facilities established by Vietnamese civilians, 
and by the perceived and real lack of promotions and honors given to black soldiers by 
white officers. The military, instead of alleviating racial disparity actually reinforced 
many of the same structural and systemic barriers to advancement as civilian society.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: HELL NO, WE WON’T GO EITHER: BLACK POWER AND THE 
DRAFT 
“We, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, have been involved in the black 
peoples' struggle for liberation and self-determination in this country for the past five 
years. Our work, particularly in the South, has taught us that the United States 
government has never guaranteed the freedom of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly 
determined to end the rule of terror and oppression within its own borders.—“On 
Vietnam: SNCC’s Antiwar Statement”1 
 
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), an outgrowth of the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the late 1950s and early 1960 sit-
in movement, has gained a venerated place within the Civil Rights Movement. A group 
of politically active and non-violent students, formed with the help of Ella Baker, 
changed the course of American history, helping millions of black southerners to register 
to vote, creating Freedom Schools, and enduring physical and mental violence to secure 
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. SNCC’s 
formidable achievements have garnered a great deal of historical attention, but the 
organization’s contribution to the Vietnam anti-war struggle has been grossly 
overlooked.2 SNCC members, working within and outside the organization, brought the 
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struggle against the Vietnam War to black communities throughout the country and paid 
the consequences for their continued activism. Many were drafted, jailed or under 
government surveillance. One member was even denied a seat in the Georgia State 
legislature. They highlighted the racist and classist nature of the Vietnam War, counseled 
men on how to circumvent the draft, and explored the disconnect between American 
international rhetoric and the lived experiences of black Americans at home. In the end, 
their experiences brought the anti-war struggle into the Civil Rights and Black Power 
mainstream. SNCC’s arguments and community based tactics made the anti-war 
movement a personal struggle for many black Americans and provided the intellectual 
underpinning for Black Power’s response to the war in Southeast Asia.  
 SNCC began as the student wing of Dr. King’s SCLC. In the fall of 1960, SNCC 
had distanced itself from SCLC and begun independent campaigns to desegregate dining 
facilities and public transportation throughout the South.  Led by young ministers and 
deeply committed students, SNCC realized the importance of creating local movements 
to bring about real change. Developing local people’s activism was a hallmark of 
SNCC’s organizing tradition and required SNCC field workers to move into the Deep 
South and begin recruiting. Throughout the early 1960s, SNCC focused on desegregation 
and voter registration, gaining support from Northerners, and begrudgingly, the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations.  While SNCC was a non-violent organization in the mold of 
Dr. King’s vision for civil disobedience, the students and staff of SNCC were not 
beholden to King or the Civil Rights mainstream leadership. Instead, they worked to push 
                                                                                                                                                              
The Children (New York: Fawcett Books, 1998) , Vanessa Murphree, The Selling of Civil Rights: The 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Use of Public Relations (New York: Routledge, 
2006). 
 
123 
 
Civil Rights organizing beyond legislative victories and to make a real and meaningful 
impact on the communities in which they worked.3  
By 1965, after successfully desegregating public transportation, holding a 
freedom vote, and helping to organize the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, as well 
as securing passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
SNCC, according to many historians, was at a crossroads. Should SNCC exclude white 
organizers? What kinds of organizing should SNCC focus on at the local level? How 
could non-violence work in an ever more violent decade? What should SNCC do about 
the war in Vietnam and how did it relate to Civil Rights organizing at home? Through a 
series of position papers, workshops, and staff meetings, SNCC’s internal debates spilled 
out.  Although historian Wesley Hogan argues “by the end of 1966 SNCC ceased, in any 
programmatic sense, to exist,” in reality SNCC’s leadership changed and their focus 
broadened to include the parts of SNCC’s organizing that has so often been ignored in the 
historical record: economic, social, and political equality through community 
empowerment and racial justice. While Clayborne Carson, Charles Payne, and Wesley 
Hogan felt that Stokely Carmichael’s exhortation of Black Power during the Meredith 
March Against Fear was the final step in the decline of SNCC, it was, instead, only 
another chapter in the organizing tradition—pushing SNCC forward and reaffirming their 
vanguard position in the Civil Rights Movement.4   
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 The United States’ role in Vietnam occupied a large part of SNCC’s internal 
thinking beginning in the summer of 1964. SNCC leaders discussed connections between 
the struggle for freedom in the South and American imperial action in Vietnam at staff 
meetings, through memos, and at public speeches throughout 1965, but remained focused 
on domestic voter registration and political party organizing. By the fall of that year, 
serious debate raged within SNCC about the war. According to John Lewis, 85 percent of 
SNCC’s male members were draft eligible and several field secretaries and local 
organizers had already received their draft notices. Most SNCC members believed the 
organization had to take a stand against the war to highlight the unfairness of draft policy. 
The debate ended on January 4, 1966 when the inequity of the war and its relationship to 
the black freedom struggle was made plain to SNCC by a senseless murder.5  
Death at the hands of whites seeking vigilante justice was not unknown to 
SNCC’s young organizers. However, the death of a SNCC volunteer, Tuskegee Institute 
student, and veteran, according to historian Clayborne Carson, “symbolized for the staff 
the racism and hypocrisy that infected the nation.”6 Twenty-one-year-old Sammy 
Younge, a student and Navy veteran, was shot for asking to use the white’s only 
bathroom at the Standard Oil station in Tuskegee. Younge was active in Tuskegee’s voter 
registration program and was threatened the day of his death in the court house for 
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organizing Tuskegee’s black citizens. On the evening of January 4, he left a party on 
Tuskegee’s campus to pick up mayonnaise for tuna fish sandwiches. When he did not 
return in a timely manner, friends assumed Younge had decided to call it an early night. 
Instead, he was told to use a bathroom outside the Standard Oil station, and when he 
refused, was chased by a shotgun-wielding clerk. Younge tried to fight back, taking a 
golf club from a bag waiting to be loaded on a Greyhound bus across the street to protect 
himself. He was shot at twice and hit in the middle of his back, as he ran for protection.7 
Younge’s murder, after the passage of Civil Rights legislation, coupled with his status as 
a veteran of the American Navy, infuriated SNCC and caused John Lewis, the 
organization’s chairman, to release a tersely worded warning to President Johnson and 
the federal government: 
If the federal government cannot provide protection for people seeking civil rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution, then people have no protection but themselves. 
We find it increasingly difficult to ask the people of the Black Belt to remain non-
violent. We have asked the President for Federal marshalls [sic] for over three 
years. If our plea is not answered, we have no choice.8 
 
SNCC’s words to the President were evocative, for sure. Here was John Lewis, a man of 
great faith in the non-violent tactics of Civil Disobedience, endorsing the notion that 
personal protection may be necessary. SNCC’s letter to Johnson cannot be separated 
from Younge’s veteran status. Younge had served his country, with honor, and was killed 
like a nuisance animal, by a citizen he vowed to protect.   
Two days later, on January 6, SNCC further clarified their stance on American 
violence, correlating the murder of Younge and other Civil Rights workers and 
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supporters, with the deaths of Vietnamese civilians.  SNCC was “in sympathy with, and 
support[ed], the men in this country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft 
which would compel them to contribute their lives to United States aggression in 
Vietnam in the name of the ‘freedom’ we find so false in this country.”9 By defining their 
position and breaking with the Johnson Administration, SNCC opened the door for 
further and more consistent scrutiny from the federal government and local authorities. 
Always on guard against saboteurs, SNCC now had to contend with the growing desire of 
J. Edgar Hoover, President Johnson, and state and local governments to, according to 
SNCC member and Tuskegee Student Body President Gwen Patton, “silence the 
struggle.”10  
SNCC’s former Press Secretary, Julian Bond, was the first to confront state 
government’s desire to silence the struggle. The Georgia State legislature found SNCC’s 
stance to be treasonous and held newly elected state Representative Bond accountable for 
his endorsement of Lewis’s words. Bond was elected to the Georgia House by an 
overwhelming majority in 1965, along with ten other African American Representatives. 
The other ten members were sworn into their seats on January 10th, 1966 as planned. 
Bond, however, was asked to remain seated during the swearing in ceremony. Bond was 
20, intellectually sound and appearing physically able, but had been classified 4-F or 
“physically, mentally, or otherwise unfit to serve” when he reported to his draft board in 
1960. When questioned about his position, Bond defended himself, stating “because of 
convictions that I have arrived at through examination of my conscience, I have decided 
that I personally cannot participate in war.” His draft status was not at issue for the 
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Georgia House, but the idea that he could have a conscientious objection to the war was 
extremely troubling for the white legislators. The Georgia House voted 184-12 to vacate 
Bond’s election and declared that he was a “traitor.”11 
By daring to speak out against American involvement in Vietnam, Bond’s elected 
position was denied.  White Republicans in the Georgia House and Senate were heard 
talking about “getting” Bond prior to the convening of the legislative term and tied his 
race to his antiwar stance. The Georgia legislature viewed Bond as a child. Bond was 25 
at the time of his election, and as a Civil Rights organizer, many whites in power saw his 
age and race as threats. Additionally, because the white Representatives knew they had to 
work within the framework of the law--meaning they could not deny Bond his seat 
because of his race, Bond’s endorsement of the SNCC’s antiwar platform provided a site 
for uncomfortable legislators to make a stand. His antiwar stance was the ramblings of a 
confused young man, who had not come fully into adulthood and who did not respect the 
state or nation that he now served.12  
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While Sammy Younge Jr.’s death served as the catalyst to launch SNCC’s public 
antiwar stance, the continued drafting of black men and the investigation of SNCC 
member’s draft statuses spurred antiwar activism among SNCC members.  Prior to his 
statement against the war, SNCC Chairman John Lewis had been granted a conscientious 
objector draft status, assuring his freedom from being drafted. After Lewis delivered 
SNCC’s statement against the war, his local draft board reinvestigated his status and 
“almost overnight I received a notice from my draft board informing me that my status... 
had now been changed from 1-O to 4-F. I was ‘morally unfit’ for service, they explained, 
because of my long record of arrests.”13 A 4-F status still meant Lewis would not be 
drafted, but it came with a stigma that denied Lewis his morality, where the conscientious 
objector status had given him a respected position of moral authority.  
Shortly after Bond’s endorsement of the SNCC statement, Muhammad Ali 
famously quipped to reporters “I ain’t got no quarrel with the Vietcong,” and threw the 
opening punch of the fight that would define Ali’s character in the minds of millions of 
Americans.14 The reclassification of Ali under the auspices of Project 100,000 spoke to 
the transient nature of army classification services and the paternalistic nature of 
government policy. While Ali was a wealthy, established boxer at this point, his 
experience with Project 100,000 and the draft was typical of many poorer, black and 
white men who were suddenly eligible to be drafted.   
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On February 17, 1966, as a direct result of Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara’s “Project 100,000,” Ali was notified he had been reclassified 1-A from 1-Y 
(mentally unfit to serve), though he had twice failed his draft board exam.15 From 
February 18, 1966 to April 27, 1967, Ali and his lawyers explored every means possible 
to avoid being drafted. He petitioned the Draft Board of Louisville, Kentucky claiming 
there were no African Americans on the Board, thus violating the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
When that petition failed, a request was placed to transfer Ali to the Houston, Texas Draft 
Board, where he was residing. After a change of venue, Ali’s legal team filed a 
conscientious objector claim, but again Ali was denied, as the Draft Board did not honor 
Ali’s claim to be a Muslim minister.  He was also approached by leaders of the Army to 
enroll in the National Guard or the reserves of any branch, and to seek deferment as an 
entertainer, as many famous men had done in World War II and Korea.  The deal would 
allow Ali to fight exhibitions for military troops throughout the world and thus avoid 
combat.  Ali refused the deal, and was summoned for induction in early April, 1967. Ali 
refused induction, claiming conscientious objector status, and spent the next four years 
fighting charges of draft evasion.16 
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Muhammad Ali’s draft battle caught the attention of the nation, particularly black 
leaders and sports stars, as they tried to come to terms with his stance. His refusal set off 
a firestorm of reactions and pulled Jackie Robinson back into the Vietnam debate. 
Robinson, integrator of baseball and supporter of Republicans such as Nelson 
Rockefeller, supported Julian Bond’s freedom of speech, but not his actions. Robinson 
said Bond’s stance was wrong, but respected Bond’s convictions. Robinson supported the 
war effort because in 1966 Jackie Robinson, Jr. was stationed in South Vietnam. 
Robinson believed “one of the things we were fighting for, I deeply hope, is the right for 
men to have freedom of opinion, freedom of thought, and freedom of speech. Julian Bond 
ought to have that right…” Again, Bond had the right to his opinion, but for Robinson, 
Bond voiced his opinion at the wrong time and in the wrong forum. Moreover, Bond was 
not refusing induction. While Bond supported SNCC’s antiwar stance, he was not forced 
to make a draft choice, and so could speak freely.17 Unlike Bond, Robinson felt Ali had 
been led astray by the leaders of the Nation of Islam: 
I admire this man as a fighting champion and a man who speaks his mind. I can’t 
help feeling he wants to have his cake and eat it too. I can’t help wondering how 
he can expect to make millions of dollars in this country and then refuse to fight 
for it. What values do you have in mind when you praise him and say he has 
given up so much? I think all he has given up is his citizenship. I think his 
advisors have given him a bum steer.18 
 
Robinson’s unwillingness to respect Ali’s conscientious objector opinion stood in stark 
contrast to his support of Julian Bond’s freedom of speech. While Ali’s actions went 
further than Bond’s, because Ali actually refused to enter military service, the principles 
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were the same—American involvement in Vietnam was an incorrect course of action and 
African American men should not be sent to fight against other people of color.  
 Although Robinson did not support Ali’s stance, other athletes quickly came to 
his defense. Boston Celtics star Bill Russell and Cleveland Browns running back Jim 
Brown met with Ali in Cleveland. Falsely reported as a meeting to convince Ali to enter 
the draft on more friendly terms, it was actually an expression of solidarity with Ali’s 
stance and a chance for his peers to understand his reasoning. Russell left the meeting 
with a deeper respect for Ali’s faith, and felt that “If I had Ali’s firm belief I would do 
what he is doing, obviously.”  But for Russell, “the war in Vietnam is not the big problem 
in this country today. The biggest problem is the country itself. Too many issues are 
being decided on the basis of hate and violence.”  The war and Ali’s stance against it 
were prime examples of what Russell saw as a communication problem in the United 
States.  The division of reactions, the inability of the government or some areas of the 
public to accept Ali’s religion and conscientious objector request were symptoms of a 
racist, morally bankrupt society. Russell was “not worried about Muhammad Ali…I’m 
worried about the rest of us.”  He respectfully sided with Ali and supported his decision, 
without questioning the reasons behind it or worrying about lost revenue or leadership 
principles. Instead, Ali was a stronger leader in his faith and his community for his 
antiwar stance, according to Russell. 19  
Brown acted as the facilitator of the group discussion and expressed the same 
sentiment as Russell.  “We heard his views and know he is sincere in his belief…his 
position is completely in accord with his religious beliefs,” Brown said at a press 
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conference. Focusing on Ali’s religious convictions allowed the athletes to distance 
themselves from their older peers like Jackie Robinson, while not tackling the issues of 
manhood and patriotism which underwrote much of the criticism of Ali.20  
Russell, Brown, and their compatriots were not the only supporters of Ali based 
on his religious conviction and perception that Ali had received a “bad deal” because of 
his beliefs and status. One Ali supporter, writing in the Chicago Defender, claimed Ali 
had received a “bad rap” and was “being used to make an example of, not because of his 
refusal to go into the Armed Forces, but for being so bold to defy the white man. So if he 
couldn’t be used to benefit Mr. Charlie, they’ll use him as an example to all who dare to 
defy the white man.”21 His boldness was connected to his faith, according to the article, 
and the Nation of Islam clearly threatened white hegemony. A black soldier serving in 
Vietnam also believed that fear of Muslims and the Nation of Islam influenced Ali’s draft 
claims. Billy Holloway, of Chicago, told Jet, “The draft board is making a big thing out 
of this. If the man (Ali) professes to be a Muslim minister then he shouldn’t have to enter 
the service. He should be deferred.”22 
Draft deferments were a popular way to avoid service in Vietnam. Deferments 
were attainable for a variety of reasons, including being a college student, being the only 
male child, being married, or having children. However, to obtain a deferment, one had to 
know that they were eligible.  Draft boards did not hand out deferment notices, nor did 
they work with individuals to see if they could earn one. Deferments were often only 
given to privileged draft-aged men who had researched ways to avoid the draft or found 
sanctuary at a local antiwar coffee house which provided deferment counseling. The 
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22 “What GIs Think About Ali’s Draft Dispute” Jet, June 15, 1967, 44. 
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deferment process was controversial, as many men would get college educations or 
continue on to graduate school to avoid being drafted. Ali’s conscientious objector claim 
was a deferment principle. If a person was a member of a religious organization that was 
pacifistic like the Quakers or Muslims, they could earn a military deferment. Yet, Ali did 
not file for a deferment; instead, he took his fight to the courts.”23 Many even equated his 
boxing talent with raw manhood and aggression, something that did not gel with his 
religious convictions.  
 Ramparts contributor Gene Marine argued that Ali was more than a victim of the 
government or religious insensitivity. Instead, Ali was denied his manhood, because he 
was denied his name. Marine identified the arguments against Ali clearly: 
Muhammad Ali’s refusal to take the one step forward that constitutes formal 
induction into the armed forces of the United States is rife with ironies, and not 
the least of them is that an athlete, representing a feared and outcast group, has 
committed the act of leadership in the ‘best educated’ nation in the world, while 
its intellectuals, far from banding together in defense of ‘treason’—if treason be 
necessary in pursuit of truth—bicker among themselves while they compete for 
government grants. But perhaps the greatest irony is the almost uniform 
castigation of Ali for being what Americans have always professed to admire: a 
man who combines courage and principle. 
 
Ali represented to Marine what was great about Americans—men and women who stood 
up for their beliefs regardless of consequences. However, Ali was not rewarded or 
praised for such action by most of the wider society. Marine continued: 
Ali is berated as a coward or a fake or both; at best, newsmen and columnists by 
the dozens have quoted, with sad, wise approval, a fellow inductee who said, ‘if I 
have to go, then he ought to have to go.’ None of them, so far as I know, has 
drawn the obvious corollary the other guy didn’t have to go either. More 
important, none has taken the time to think out loud about the meaning of 
Muhammad Ali and his act. …He is a symbol of the failure of the rest of us—but 
he is a person, a human being, before he is any kind of symbol. 
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The disapproval of Ali’s stance and the outright hatred poured on Ali by sports media, his 
peers and the general public denied Ali his manhood. As sports writers continued to call 
him Cassius Clay, they added to the derision and disrespect they heaped on Ali each 
week in their columns. Marine saw this as a great disservice to Ali and his stance.  Ali 
was abandoned by the people who supported his athletic feats—his fans, the public who 
made his life possible, and religious leaders. Ali’s stature as a celebrity and outspoken 
sports figure made him polarizing. The public’s support or at least general acceptance of 
other antiwar stances by Bayard Rustin and white intellectuals made Ali’s lack of support 
all the more egregious. Marine eloquently showed this in his closing: 
 
The principled act of Muhammad Ali is a tragic-ironic heroism. He stands out not 
only because he is right but because he is alone, in a position which might be, but 
isn’t, shared by all the intellectuals, the religious leaders, the men and women 
who by profession or position or announced dedication should today be in the 
forefront of ‘treason.’ It is time, I think, to call Muhammad Ali by his right 
name.24 
 
Ali’s response to those who denigrated his manhood was always the same—in 
boxing there were rules and a referee to enforce those rules.  In war, this was not the case; 
it was anarchy and mayhem, where soldiers killed women and children for the 
indefensible reason that they were the enemy. While older men and soldiers often 
questioned Ali’s manhood, a Philadelphia mother saw Ali as the definition of the new 
black man.  Grieving the loss of her son in Vietnam, she would rather see her surviving 
son serve the same fate as Ali, than serve in Vietnam. “I am proud of being black but we 
are not free. The war in Vietnam is a senseless one, so why should our boys have to fight 
in it?” she asked.  Ali’s stance defined a manhood based on honor and moral conviction, 
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guided by a belief in the possibility of a just world and the need for blacks to fight for 
their freedom.  This manhood was at odds with that espoused by older men and soldiers, 
but it was embraced by the nascent Black Power movement forming at the time of Ali’s 
fateful decision.            
 The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) saw Ali’s decision as one he was forced 
“to make to maintain [his] self-respect, to retain [his] dignity as a Black man.”  As a man 
of deep religious convictions, Ali’s refusal to fight in Vietnam demonstrated his manhood 
because he stood with his principles and set an example for other black American men.  
CORE’s support for Ali was unprecedented. While SNCC leader and Black Panther 
sympathizer Stokely Carmichael had voiced his support for Ali, those organizations did 
not publicly express their support.  CORE had recently adopted a resolution condemning 
the Vietnam War and pledging support “to those persons who refuse to participate in the 
armed forces of the United States during its engagement in the war in Vietnam.”  Their 
letter in support of Ali was the first step in affirming the manhood of those who chose to 
show their patriotism through refusing to fight.  CORE even demanded support from 
leaders of other Civil Rights organizations:  
We call up Mr. Whitney Young (Urban Leaguer), Mr. Roy Wilkins (NAACP), 
Mr. Jackie Robinson (Rockefeller Republicans), and Ralph Bunche…to recognize 
the little guy needs their guidance as the real life, present day deliverers of the 
‘promised land’ through self help. They must be made aware that they are helping 
no one, not even themselves, while acting as front men for the ‘establishment’s’ 
power structure.  
 
This demand fell on deaf ears, but highlights the intraracial tensions Ali’s stance created. 
Although CORE had taken a more militant stance in Civil Rights before Ali made his 
decision, their endorsement of Ali’s draft refusal provided a degree of legitimacy for 
some Ali supporters.  Additionally, their endorsement of Ali’s brand of manhood, based 
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on consistency and moral strength, showed many African Americans that refusing to 
fight required just as much patriotic fortitude as picking up a gun did.  It is not hard to see 
why other radical groups, including the Black Panther Party and SNCC soon adopted 
some of Ali’s questioning attitude in their own protest activities.25   
 CORE claimed that Ali was a role model for young blacks, telling Ali in an open 
letter, “You have shown your Black brethren your courage and have given them a new 
faith in their own destinies. You have given Black youngsters an independent Black 
hero.”26  For some young athletes and students, Ali had solidified himself as a role model. 
Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, then known as Lew Alcindor, a basketball player at UCLA, felt 
that Ali’s: 
impact on young people was very formidable. I remember when I was in high 
school the teachers didn’t like him because he was so antiestablishment and he 
kind of thumbed his nose at authority and got away with it…the fact that he was 
proud to be a black man and that he had so much talent and could enjoy it in a 
way that didn’t have the dignity they assumed that it should have… When Ali 
announced his refusal to accept the draft, I thought it was a very brave 
stand…This impact was obvious to everybody and I think this kind of heightened 
that.27    
 
Abdul-Jabbar’s sentiment was also expressed by future New York Times sports columnist 
Bill Rhoden, who saw Ali as his generation’s Jackie Robinson. Rhoden characterized Ali 
as, “my Jackie Robinson, the sports figure who transcended sport to become a true role 
model. His example gave many of us strength…for me, Ali brought home the concept of 
principle, that there was something greater in life than fame, though fame has its place. 
And he taught me that in the right hands, wealth and fame, the fruits of athletic success, 
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26 Ibid. 
27 Interview with Kareem Abdul Jabbar in Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights 
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could be used as a tool in the ongoing struggle.”28 Rhoden and Abdul-Jabbar saw Ali as 
someone who was willing to push boundaries and stand up for his personal beliefs, in 
spite of public scrutiny. The connection to Robinson made by Rhoden is all the more 
interesting considering Robinson’s own disgust with Ali.  As a symbol of the new black 
masculinity, Ali’s antiwar stance embraced the past, the struggle for more respect and 
freedom in the United States for African Americans, but also pushed those rights 
forward.    
Ali’s stances, while not endorsed by old guard Civil Rights leadership were 
appealing to the younger, more radical generation of Black Power activists. Stokely 
Carmichael, never afraid to engage the President or lawmakers and always willing to 
highlight the inequities of a given situation, took SNCC’s anti-draft stance to the House 
Committee on the Armed Services with Carl Oglesby, President of Students for a 
Democratic Society. Carmichael reasserted SNCC’s position on the draft, stating “we are 
opposed to a system under which a group of men can compel another man who has had 
no voice in their decision to renounce his liberty and risk his lifeblood for a cause which 
is not his.” He compared conscription laws to slavery and implored the “committee to 
seek testimony from those who are affected by the decision of the selective service as 
well as from those who make those decisions” so that the draft would be abolished.29  
The short address was more than a clarifying statement on SNCC’s anti-draft 
stance. In fact, it was a call to arms to the committee, as it laid out the inequalities of draft 
policy, the problems of the federal government’s inaction in addressing those problems, 
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29 “Statement of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and of the Students for a Democratic 
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and the need for open dialogue. But, coming from an already distrusted individual, 
Carmichael’s testimony served to further encourage members of Congress, President 
Johnson, and J. Edgar Hoover to follow and seek prosecution against the SNCC 
Chairman. Democratic Congressman and Chair of the House Committee on the Armed 
Services L. Mendel Rivers repeatedly wrote to the Attorney General demanding 
prosecution of Carmichael for sedition and avoidance of the Selective Service Program. 
Rivers believed Carmichael could be found guilty under Section 12 of the Universal 
Training and Service Act, which prohibited counseling evasion or avoidance of the draft. 
Rivers’ demands went unheeded, much to the chagrin of the FBI, who reported they 
provided “all the material we obtained concerning possible Selective Service violations 
but they have declined to prosecute.”30 Carmichael’s government repression went further 
than COINTELPRO investigations and constituted a multi-level directive to silence his 
protest, particularly around the draft. In short, Carmichael and SNCC were already 
considered enemies of the state by some in government for their Civil Rights organizing, 
but when they began to exhibit “anti-patriotic” responses to the draft they were eligible 
for heightened government intrusion. Their punishment for insurrection was not prison, 
but the desire to make them serve in the military they despised.  
Carmichael, Chairman of SNCC following John Lewis, often spoke out against 
the drafting of black men, and repeatedly claimed he would refuse induction if he was 
drafted. Carmichael was registered in New York City with Local Board 26. Upon his 
initial registration in 1959 he was classified 1-A, but quickly earned a student deferment. 
When he graduated Howard University in December 1964, Carmichael was reclassified 
again to 1-A. He was asked to present himself before his draft board for the pre-induction 
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physical examination. At this meeting, Carmichael spoke with the draft board 
psychiatrist, who viewed Carmichael’s arrests as “connected with CORE activities, 
disorderly conduct, resisting arrests, etc. They seem not evident of any inherent anti-
social or criminal traits, and I feel from our standpoint, he would rate a ‘waiver 
recommendation.’ However, there seems to be homo-sexual tendencies as well as hetero-
sexual relationships.”31 Carmichael was subsequently reclassified as 4-F, but was to be 
examined again in 1966. Carmichael again submitted himself to the local draft board for 
physical and mental testing in February 1966. At the point the Army assigned him a 1-Y 
status, meaning he could only be drafted for military duty in a time of war or national 
emergency. The board psychiatrist found that Carmichael had experienced nervous 
breakdowns at the deaths of two of his friends, still had questionable morals, and 
continued to be arrested. Again, his ultimate classification was pushed down the line, as 
he was to be reevaluated in 1967.32  By then, Carmichael was traveling the globe 
proclaiming Black Power, a strong anti-war message, and the liberation of colonial 
subjects worldwide. 
 Carmichael’s wavering draft status highlighted the variability of local draft boards 
and the power the government used to control such actions. As Carmichael became more 
militant in his Black Power and antiwar stances, he was targeted by the administration, 
the FBI, and his local board for repeated competency examinations. His mental 
incompetency claims were similar to Ali’s; however, Carmichael’s deferments were 
given for morality and not mental capacity. By cultivating an identity of sexual 
perversion and mental incompetency, Carmichael appeared to the federal government as 
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dangerous and unfit for military duty. However, he also protected himself from being 
drafted. Carmichael and other black men who chose to present themselves in such a 
manner created a space where they could assert their own definitions of manhood—
resistance to the federal government, anti-colonial, and peaceful—while also living with 
the certainty they would not be drafted because of their 4F status. Carmichael was able to 
criticize the Johnson administration without fear of retribution. As draft status was part of 
a person’s record, Carmichael could have felt the retributions of his actions. It is 
interesting to note, then, that while the President and J. Edgar Hoover were astutely 
aware of Carmichael’s “mental deficiencies” they did not exploit his status to undermine 
him politically. Carmichael successfully tricked the federal government but allowing 
them to classify him mentally unfit to serve, while also protecting himself from draft 
status. He was now able to proclaim that he would never wear the uniform or fight for the 
United States in colonial wars of aggression while also never having to worry about 
taking on such a task. This attitude would be adopted throughout the Vietnam War by 
draftees. It took acting, a willingness to potentially undermine the person’s character, and 
the understanding that they would have to submit their draft status to potential employers, 
but it also saved men from a war they did not support. Covert draft protest through 
construction of a mental deficiency was especially productive in fostering a group of 
black men who were willing to rewrite the rules of manhood. By expressing questionable 
sexual morals (an interest in men, usually), or accusing the government of atrocities, or as 
Malcolm X did, asserting that the potential draftee wanted to be sent to the Third World 
so he could work with the “enemy” to harm white Americans, these men played on the 
racial fears of the draft board.33 They took chances and may have reinscribed some 
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prejudices, but they also reclaimed their own masculinity and the right to define it. These 
men were now free of their draft burden and could focus on what they considered to be 
foremost—uplifting black Americans and working to circumvent United States 
aggression at home and abroad. 
By 1967, SNCC members were receiving draft notices on a constant basis. The 
FBI, under J. Edgar Hoover, used the draft as a tactic of repression and attempted to 
silence the organization and its membership by drafting them into the war they opposed. 
Hoover’s actions were supported by the Johnson Administration, as President Johnson 
requested and received a number of updates from Hoover regarding the draft status of 
“militant” black leaders. For SNCC Program Director Cleveland Sellers, the draft was an 
absurdity and he refused to participate in a number of ways. On three occasions between 
June 1965 and August 1966, Sellers refused to report for his pre-induction physical. 
Those actions led to Sellers being declared “delinquent,” but  in early February 1967, 
Sellers was notified that the Bamberg, South Carolina Draft Board had classified him 1-A 
and needed to report for induction on March 2.34 Sellers pre-induction physicals came 
after the Selma to Montgomery March in 1965, after Carmichael proclaimed “Black 
Power,” at the Meredith March Against Fear in early June, 1966, and as SNCC’s anti-war 
messages and activism become more organized in the late summer of 1966. As a Program 
Director, Sellers helped shape policy and participated in SNCC’s decision making, but 
unlike John Lewis, Sellers was less visible on the front line. When Lewis’s draft board 
decided to designate him 4-F, they sought to embarrass a man of strong morals; in fact, 
they sought to infantilize Lewis, by claiming his arrests made him unfit to serve. For 
Sellers, the draft board was not interested in arrest records or medical problems. Instead, 
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the draft notices served as warnings and reminders that the local and federal governments 
were keeping tabs on his and his organization’s actions.  
On February 24, Seller’s Atlanta based-lawyer, Howard Moore, “filed suit against 
Robert McNamara, the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina, and the entire 
Selective Service System on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, which 
include[d] all black men, men from minority groups, and poverty stricken men in 
general.”35 Again, like Ali, Sellers’ suit claimed that the draft boards in Georgia and 
South Carolina “were invalidly appointed and illegally constituted due to the systematic 
exclusion of black citizens.”  Moreover, Sellers claimed he was “ordered for induction 
out of turn,” because of his involvement in SNCC and other civil rights organizations and 
that the FBI targeted him by gaining access to his draft records and illegally wire-tapping 
his phones. Finally, Sellers had documented medical issues, electocardiomatic 
abnormalities, which made him physically unfit for service. The suit covered every 
conceivable reason why Sellers could not and would not serve, but was dismissed on 
May 1, 1967 by the Northern District of Georgia US District Court in Atlanta. He was 
ordered for induction the same day. Sellers refused to step forward, was indicted by the 
Federal Grand Jury for violating the Selective Service Act, and was released on $1,000 
bond. He was the 16th member of SNCC to be drafted following the January 1966 
statement against the war, which according to SNCC was “part of the continuing efforts 
of a racist, hysterical Johnson Administration to stifle Black Opposition and dissent to the 
murder and burning of peasants in Vietnam and his double-crossing of black people in 
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the United States.”36 The draft, as much as the war itself, allowed the federal government 
to repress and exploit people of color. 
Cleveland Sellers’ Black Power activism was not limited to refusing his draft 
notice.  On the night of February 8, 1968, Sellers was arrested for inciting a riot at South 
Carolina State University where he helped organize a student group. The students sought 
to desegregate a local bowling alley using the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as the basis for 
their protest. State troopers were engaged to dispel the protesters and shots were fired. 
Sellers was shot, three students were killed, and twenty-eight others were injured. The 
events at Orangeburg were not explicitly connected to Vietnam, but the deaths of three 
young students and the arrest of Sellers highlighted the continued government 
interference with black desegregation efforts. Sellers’ knew he was under government 
surveillance and though he was injured, was arrested immediately.37 His supposed actions 
in Orangeburg coupled with his involvement with SNCC, and his draft refusal led to a 
sentence of five years in prison and he was denied an appeal bond by U.S. District Judge 
Newell Edenfield in April 1968.38 Edenfield did not feel Sellers deserved a bond, because 
of Orangeburg and Sellers other Civil Rights work. When Sellers chose to not allow the 
federal government to draft him, he denied Hoover and Johnson the ability to silence him. 
Now another arm of the government denied Sellers his freedom, and Sellers spent months 
in various prisons throughout the South. He spent time in solitary confinement because 
prison officials believed he was a danger to the inmate population. In Tallahassee his 
                                                     
36 Ibid; “Carmichael Aide Refuses Army Induction” Chicago Defender, May 3, 1967, 8. 
37 Lester G. McKinnie report on Orangeburg, February 9, 1968. Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee Papers, 1959-1972, University Microfilms International, Reel 58; For more information on the 
Orangeburg Massacre and the continued struggle for justice, see www.orangeburgmassacre1968.com 
(January 2013), Judy Richardson and Bestor Cram, Directors, Scarred Justice: The Orangeburg Massacre 
1968, 2008; Jack Bass and Jack Nelson, The Orangeburg Massacre, (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 
1996). 
38 “5 Yr. term given Negro in Draft Case,” New York Times, April 27, 1968, 36.  
 
144 
 
Afro was cut, as an act of control. Eventually, Sellers was housed at the federal 
penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana, where he felt his life was threatened. On August 22, 
1968, Justice Hugo Black ordered Sellers to be released on an appeals bond of no more 
than $5,000. Sellers’ bond was set at $2,500 and was released, but he spent the next three 
years appealing his conviction, avoiding surveillance by local, state, and federal 
authorities, and fighting other arrests in California, Louisiana, and South Carolina.39 In 
June, 1969, the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal on Sellers’ case, but finally on 
June 22, 1971, Sellers’ case was thrown out. The three year ordeal ended after Judge 
Edenfield, who originally found him guilty of draft evasion, ruled that Sellers’ induction 
order “was not based upon the normal sequence of call, but upon Sellers delinquency 
status.”40 By 1971, the United States’ Vietnaminization plan was in effect, the draft 
system operated as a lottery (beginning in 1969), and the country was more than ready to 
move past the war.41 Moreover, Sellers’ sentence had to be lifted because the Supreme 
Court ruled in previous cases that men drafted out of turn were not guilty of draft evasion 
and lower courts could not overturn Supreme Court precedent. Sellers’ draft battle came 
to a positive end, for him, but highlighted the unfair treatment and systematic targeting 
members of the Civil Rights community faced.  
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The draft was a weapon the federal government used against men and women 
Johnson, Hoover, and their deputies did not like and men who spoke out against the war 
in Vietnam or government policy were the first to be targeted. As a tool of repression, the 
draft served multiple functions. The threat of a draft notice was very real and forced men 
to make tough choices—to abandon their rhetoric to avoid jail terms or to stand with their 
beliefs and face the wrath of the federal government and local authorities. For members 
of SNCC, these decisions had to be made often. Some, like Bob Moses changed their 
surnames or fled to Canada, Europe, or the Middle East (Moses became Parris and moved 
to Canada for a time), others like Stokely Carmichael worked to confuse their draft 
boards and cultivate a 4-F deferment. For Sellers’ the medical deferment was denied and 
a court battle was necessary. The lack of institutional privilege and protection created an 
environment where SNCC workers were easier targets than their white counterparts. 
While former Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush could find reprieve in higher 
education or the Air National Guard, Black Power participants did not have access to 
such deferments. If draft-age black leaders did, as was the case with John Lewis, one 
perceived step out of line put their draft status under new scrutiny.42 For SNCC 
leadership, then, the choices they made had to reflect not only their own best interests, 
but the interest of their organization and the black freedom movement as a whole.  
SNCC was pulled in multiple directions after they issued their antiwar statement. 
High level members including Bob Moses, John Lewis, Diane Nash, and Julian Bond left 
the group to pursue other options, the call for Black Power changed the fundraising 
                                                     
42 Institutional privilege refers to the ways race and class provide unearned protection in American systems 
of government, education, and social hierarchy. In the examples provided, Bill Clinton and George W. 
Bush had access to lines of power that provided them the protection of not having to serve or to avoid their 
draft notices through educational deferments, in the case of President Clinton, and signing up for a 
guaranteed non-combat position in the Texas Air National Guard, as President Bush did.  
 
146 
 
landscape, and internal battles raged about the direction and focus that SNCC should take 
as the 1960s wore on. Throughout, the struggle against the war remained a salient issue, 
as position papers were passed between members and the leadership continually 
referenced Vietnam and its relationship to SNCC, black Americans, and the struggle in 
speeches, interviews, and writings. The draft became the central issue around which 
SNCC’s members chose to organize. While they sought peace like other antiwar 
organizations, their focus was directed clearly at the draft and the institutional racism 
SNCC believed it supported.  Stokely Carmichael proclaimed in a speech to the Spring 
Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam on April 15, 1967, that the “draft exemplifies as 
much as racism the totalitarianism which prevails in this nation in the disguise of 
consensus democracy.”43 The inequitable nature of the draft was plain to Civil Rights 
workers who saw themselves targeted and the men they organized deeply affected by a 
lack of deferment options and knowledge of the draft process. Organizing against the 
draft became a vital part of the SNCC platform as the war expanded. 
While Julian Bond and Cleveland Sellers fought their battles against the draft 
system, SNCC and other peace groups formulated plans to bring the inequality of the 
draft and the problems with American involvement in Vietnam to the attention of the 
nation. In the summer of 1966, progressive groups began to formulate a plan of 
coordinated protests on Hiroshima Day, August 6th. Peace groups, anti-nuclear arms 
organizations, and Civil Rights leaders all pledged support for the mass demonstrations in 
major cities, including New York and Washington, D.C.  August 6, 1966 also happened 
to be Luci Johnson’s wedding day, the perfect event to stage a protest around, because 
                                                     
43 Stokely Carmichael, “Spring Mobilization to End the War in Vietnam Speech,” April 15, 1967. SNCC 
Papers, 1959-1972, University Microfilms International, Reel 52, 5. 
 
147 
 
foreign and domestic press would be covering every aspect of the wedding. As the 
summer wore on, plans became more concrete and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee signed on to participate in the march and to protest President Johnson’s 
daughter’s wedding ceremony and reception. SNCC planned a “silent protest,” at 3:00 
PM the afternoon of the 6th in front of the White House, as dozens of parades took place 
in New York City, San Francisco, and Chicago. The plans set off a firestorm of reactions, 
as a Democratic Senator from Ohio tried to block the parade permits in the District and 
the leaders of the mainstream Civil Rights Movement reprimanded SNCC for their 
actions. Dr. King, Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph, and Whitney Young sent a tersely 
worded telegram to SNCC reminding the organization of its role in the Civil Rights 
Movement and the image they needed to protect. The men believed “such a protest, 
making due allowances for the sincere anti-war beliefs of many of the participants, is in 
extremely poor taste in that it  will eject into a uniquely personal ceremony, the political 
and moral judgement [sic] of strangers.” Moreover, the telegram continued, “…The 
protest demonstration, then becomes a futile and unflattering exhibition of egos of the 
demonstrators, with no practicable effect upon the objective said to be sought, mainly the 
ending of the war.” According to the older leaders, the students choosing to protest Luci 
Johnson’s wedding were undertaking a rude action that would reflect poorly on the whole 
Civil Rights Movement, and they needed to be scolded.  They called upon Stokely 
Carmichael to withdraw support and work to end the protest out of respect for the 
President. Much like Dr. King’s reaction to Muhammad Ali, the mainstream leadership 
felt the students, the younger organizers, needed to be guided and reminded of their 
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actions. They were uncomfortable with upsetting the President and felt that the Civil 
Rights Movement as a whole would suffer. 44 
King, Wilkins, Randolph, and Young’s plan to scold and remind Carmichael and 
SNCC of the repercussions of their actions backfired. Instead, SNCC responded to the 
telegram with a straightforward rejection of their mentors’ advice.  SNCC accused the 
“so called responsible leaders of so called civil rights organizations” of caring more for 
Luci Johnson and her father than the “millions of black people being brutalized every day 
in the US…the colored peoples of Vietnam being napalmed…black solider being 
exterminated in Vietnam…[and] our black brothers engaged in acts of rebellion in our 
cities.” Referring to President Johnson as “boss-man” and claiming that the wedding was 
a diversion from remembering Hiroshima, SNCC labeled the leaders Uncle Toms and 
vowed to carry out any action they felt necessary to end the war. SNCC staked its moral 
authority on the right to protest the war and the war’s connection to African American 
oppression at home. On August 6th, members of SNCC and the peace coalition gathered 
at the church and the White House, chanting “Hey, Hey LBJ, how many kids did you kill 
today?” and carrying cardboard coffins.  While the protest was small, it garnered national 
attention, and coupled with the other marches in New York City and elsewhere, marked 
the start of the group’s national actions against the war. The protest of Luci Johnson’s 
wedding further split the Civil Rights Movement and made SNCC an even larger target 
for investigation and repression, as President Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover began to 
monitor Stokely Carmichael’s movements and investigate and draft more members of the 
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group. Johnson took a particular interest in the whereabouts of Carmichael in the fall of 
1966 and spring of 1967, while also seeking to discredit Black Power. SNCC’s anti-draft 
stance and action to support it made them a target for government repression, just as they 
gained momentum for their anti-war programming.45  
 In the fall of 1966, SNCC proposed a black anti-draft program, because, it was 
“obvious to any person in SNCC that the best way to break up the organization would be 
to draft all the young men who are of draft age and send them to Vietnam and have them 
shot.”46 The government was targeting individual members through the draft and SNCC 
leadership knew they would have to confront the situation at some point. However, a 
consensus for organizing against the war was hard to find. The 1966 proposal called for 
an appropriation of SNCC tactics to the draft problem. SNCC needed to support an anti-
draft program because their constituents did not know the loopholes, had no support or 
security in protesting, a new youthful wing was necessary for sustained support of SNCC, 
and the draft was a substantive issue around which Black Power could organize.47 The 
writer did not believe the organization was strong enough to come out against the draft in 
a “frontal” manner, even though they had already issued an anti-draft and anti-war 
statement.  The desire to tangentially organize against the draft highlighted the sensitive 
nature of the issue. Fear of repression was real, as men in SNCC saw their draft statuses 
change overnight. Moreover, by 1966, SNCC’s financials were not strong and their anti-
draft statement coupled with the call for Black Power did not win them many new 
                                                     
45 “SNCC’s telegram to King, Wilkins, Randolph, and Whitney Young,” ND, Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee Papers, 1959-1972, University Microfilms International, Reel 52; Douglas 
Robinson, “5,000 In Times Square: Thousand March to Protest War,” New York Times, August 7, 1966, 1, 
3; Carson, In Struggle, 220-221. 
46 “A Black Anti-Draft Program,” Aug. 1966, Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Papers, 1959-
1972. University Microfilms International, Reel 58, 1. 
47 “A Black Anti-Draft Program,” 2. 
 
150 
 
donations. Hugh N. Jones of Seardale, New York withdrew his support in January of 
1966, following Lewis’s statement. He believed SNCC’s foreign policy stand was 
“simplistic and not expert.” He regretted his decision, but felt “civil rights need SNCC—
foreign policy does not.”48 Jones’ letter was only one example of the reactions of 
northern whites and long-time SNCC supporters who withdrew funds and materials as 
SNCC’s anti-war stance hardened.  
To counteract the potential for a funding deficit when “a lot of rich white liberals” 
realized SNCC was working on more than voter registration and freedom schools and to 
slowly ratchet up SNCC’s plans, members proposed using the lessons of organizing in 
Mississippi and applying them to the problems of Vietnam.49 The plan called for a multi-
focal program against the draft, targeting draft age men and those men still in high school 
who would soon be drafted. One proposal was a “Freedom of Choice” plan. The plan 
called for a petition to local draft boards and the federal government, wherein black 
Americans would choose where they fought for freedom, “whether they decide to fight in 
this country or in any foreign country such as Vietnam.”50 Men of draft age would sign 
the petition and similar to the Freedom Registration Forms of the voting rights fight, their 
signature would indicate their resistance. The petition would become a vehicle for 
resistance, as draft eligible men would take it to their local boards and get signatures of 
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draft classes. The petitions would be sent to Congress and “when the Congress turns it 
down, the people become more conscious and more determined to act for themselves.”51 
The petition was an engine of organizing, as well as a tool for dissent.  
The position paper went on to develop a plan around the petition, where the 
signees would become a coalition and when a member of the coalition was drafted, the 
other signees would protest his induction. Moreover, if the inductee distributed material 
on the racist nature of the war to fellow draftees or caused a disturbance at the induction 
site, the paper posited, he would be arrested and remain in jail past his induction date. At 
that point, SNCC or a local agency would bail the draftee out and he would remain in the 
United States until a trial. Once that passed, if he was drafted again, he would repeat the 
process. SNCC was learning and adapting to the situation in front of them. Because of the 
change in draft status for John Lewis and the denial of deferments to Cleveland Sellers, 
among others, being jailed seemed like a viable option. Lewis and Carmichael’s 4-F 
status was something to be emulated and SNCC worked to make jail sentences for draft 
resistance a viable and morally upright decision. Moreover, SNCC argued, a black anti-
draft program was necessary, because “Black people don’t know the law” and “there is 
no valid alternative for a Black man of draft age.” Through their own experiences with 
the draft system and the emerging importance of the Third World solidarity, SNCC 
sought to confront the government’s draft policies head on.52   
On August 17, 1966, SNCC put their organizing idea to the test, picketing the 
Twelfth Corps Headquarters, United States Army recruitment site in Atlanta. The 
protesters distributed a pamphlet to draftees, asking why the black men must fight for 
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white men against yellow men for freedom they did not have. The pamphlets were seized 
and twelve of the protesters were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, refusing 
to obey an officer, and resisting arrest. Four men were further charged with assaulting an 
officer and one man, Johnny Wilson, was charged with insurrection (a Georgia state law 
that was punishable by death). The protesters were convicted and received three month 
sentences in the segregated facilities of the Georgia State Prison. While the original 
protesters were in jail, others continued to picket the Atlanta induction center, especially 
when members of their organization or those who had signed the Freedom of Choice 
petitions were drafted. The pickets caught the attention of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, which was “monitoring” Stokely Carmichael at the time and the federal 
government indicted seven of the protesters in March, 1967 for “injuring government 
property and with interfering with the Universal Military Training and Service Act.”53   
The arrests proved SNCC’s original hypothesis, as the protesters spent months in jail. 
Had they been drafted eligible, their induction date would have passed. Moreover, their 
federal indictments could have led to III-A deferments, because they were charged with a 
felony and could be seen as morally unfit to serve or disruptive. SNCC was no stranger to 
arrests and their influence on the public, thus it should be no surprise that they used them 
to their full advantage, using the testimonies of the accused on recruiting and fundraising 
materials.   
Johnny Wilson’s trial lasted two days in early 1967, as the State Assistant 
Solicitor General claimed Wilson was fighting in the streets of Atlanta, instead of 
fighting in Vietnam. Using the same language directed at Muhammad Ali, the Georgia 
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lawyer denigrated SNCC and Wilson’s stance against the war and constructed an image 
of the black anti-war men as violent offenders who attacked their country instead of 
serving it. SNCC used Wilson’s arrest and subsequent three year sentence to the Georgia 
Chain Gang to connect governmental repression of civil rights workers and the Vietnam 
War.  In a press release, SNCC argued “this case blatantly exemplifies the fact that the 
courts and governmental officials across the United States are engaged in conscious 
conspiracy to ‘frame-up’ and deny justice to all black men and black organizations who 
dare to stand up and fight for their human rights, and refuse to fight yellow men abroad 
while black men remain an oppressed and despised colony within the United States.”54 
 Although Wilson’s civil disobedience resulted in the arrest of twelve SNCC 
members and his own incarceration, picketing of induction centers continued to be a 
viable avenue for protest for SNCC and Black Power organizations throughout the 
country. In New York City, the New York Workshop in Nonviolence undertook a three-
day demonstration at the U.S Army Induction Center on Whitehall Street, to continually 
challenge the public through civil disobedience demonstrations.  The drafting of young 
men and the lack of funding for domestic poverty programs motivated the New York 
group, while in the South, induction centers were targeted for drafting men of color over 
white men.55  
The draft center protests and SNCC’s decision to picket Luci Johnson’s wedding 
were direct challenges to the Johnson Administration’s embrace of Project 100,000 and 
placed Black Power advocates and SNCC in particularly, in the cross hairs of the FBI’s 
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COINTELPRO.  SNCC affiliated Blacks Against the Draft (BAD) in Cleveland, Ohio 
was ransacked, “drawers and bookshelves were pulled out and overturned on the 
floor…files were rifled and anti-war leaflets were strewn on the floor.” BAD also 
reported a stolen television, typewriters, a tape recorder and tapes “which contained 
valuable information on conferences and meetings.” BAD connected their break-in with 
other violence directed at SNCC affiliated groups in Philadelphia, Detroit, and San 
Francisco, in response to anti-war activities.56 The constant threat of break-in, arrest, and 
surveillance took a toll on Black Power demonstrators and forced organizations to rethink 
their activism as they moved to protect themselves and their neighborhoods.  Yet, the 
continual drafting of poorer men of color meant that SNCC and other Black Power 
organizations could not retreat from draft protest, but instead had to find new avenues to 
reach those who needed their services.  
Another tactic SNCC pursued was filing suit against the Selective Service System 
“to expose the inconsistency between what this country says it is fight for in Vietnam—
‘freedom’—and the fact that the very institution which is mandated to bring about 
freedom in Vietnam—the military—is committed to a policy of segregation and 
discrimination.” Further, SNCC found that draft eligible men serving in the Peace Corps 
or VISTA programs were given one year deferments. Because VISTA students worked 
with SNCC to register voters in the South and educate children in Head Start and other 
programs, the SNCC organizers felt they should also receive deferments. 57  SNCC 
contacted Conrad Lynn, a black lawyer in New York City, to help them file their 
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grievances and to support SNCC members seeking to avoid their draft calls. Lynn was a 
civil rights lawyer who defended Freedom Riders and famously litigated the “Kissing 
Case,” where two black children were charged with rape for kissing a white girl while 
playing. He was the first black graduate of Syracuse Law School in 1932 and devoted his 
life to expanding legal precedents in civil rights matters.58  Throughout the late 1960s, 
Lynn shared SNCC’s vision of draft resistance and worked with the organization to 
provide materials to better educate draft aged men on their options.59 When the draft laws 
changed in 1967, Lynn published How to Stay out of the Army, a how-to guide directed at 
young black men, but applicable to any draft eligible person in the United States. The 
July 1, 1967 law barred the presence of lawyers in board hearings, so the defendants were 
on their own. Lynn used his pamphlet to educate young men on their rights and to serve 
as a primer of legal positions drafted men could take. In straight, clear, step-by-step 
processes, the book laid out the changes to the law, how it affected various groups of 
draft eligible men, and what each person, as an individual, could expect from their draft 
boards.  
Lynn highlighted SNCC’s 1966 plan to disrupt induction centers as a viable 
option for resistance:  
When a man has a record of a felony conviction, the draft board will generally 
classify him 1-Y. Certain types of misdemeanors, such as convictions for 
unlawful picketing in a demonstration against the war, may bring the same 
deferment. Right-wing columnists often call for induction of such ‘trouble-
makers’ into the armed forces, but the policy makers of the Selective Service 
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system are not that impetuous. A boy who vigorously attacks the conduct of the 
war on the picket line may well be a disruptive influence in the army.60 
 
 Lynn encouraged his readers to know their rights and to work with anti-war 
organizations to gain the needed paperwork to earn specific deferments or statuses. He 
was straightforward, admitting that certain tactics, especially those based on class status, 
would not work. For example, he noted that III-A (Hardships—dependents, sole familial 
survivor, support), would not help the most disadvantaged members of the black 
communities because “When a family is receiving any form of supplementary welfare 
aid, such as aid to dependent children, a father may not qualify. The welfare investigator 
simply reports to the board that if the father is drafted, the welfare department will 
assume the full support of the rest of the family.”61 If a draftee could not prove his family 
would suffer extreme hardship by induction, he was sent to the army without the support 
of welfare department. Thus, Lynn encouraged Civil Rights and antiwar groups to find 
alternatives to service for draft eligible, unemployed young men. Lynn believed that a 
massive jobs campaign would deprive the federal government of replacement soldiers, 
thus lessening the power of the draft and bringing an end to the war.62   
To help their members and constituents make tough decisions about the war and 
the draft, SNCC members used a number of tactics to organize against the war. Building 
on their successful desegregation and voting rights campaigns, local groups used tools 
provided by the national office to educate community members, potential draftees, and 
their families about their options and the reasons they should oppose the war. To expand 
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their reach, John Wilson argued that revolutionary education had to accompany actions.63 
He argued that “a man with a gun but with no political education is like a child with 
matches,” and pressed SNCC to develop educational materials to define their beliefs and 
make clear the connections between the lives of blacks in America and the Vietnamese. 
He implored SNCC leaders to “educate your people with good political education.” To do 
this, SNCC needed strong educational materials that were accessible to a wide variety of 
people. Political education ranged from handbills explaining the “risks” of registering for 
the draft and the possibilities for attaining a deferment to eye-catching and provocative 
posters exclaiming “Uncle Sam wants you NIGGER. HELL NO! America is the Black 
Man’s battleground.”64 Yet, the most effective tools were SNCC’s well-established 
tactics of mailers and pamphlets that organizers could use to shore up their own 
conversations with men seeking to avoid the draft, constituents of projects, and the 
public. 
The Washington, D.C. project created a pamphlet that juxtaposed Black Power 
and Vietnam Power in a series of images and paragraphs. The visual created a direct 
connection between the struggle for black political power in the United States and the 
desire for freedom in Vietnam. The text explained the situation in Vietnam and why the 
United States was involved in the country. Moreover, it connected the feelings of South 
Vietnamese citizens to black citizens who were oppressed by someone they “didn’t 
elect.” The pamphlet constructed the Black Power movement and black Americans as 
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Third World individuals living the United States. This imagery was used by SNCC in 
buttons protesting the war and on posters claiming solidarity with Third World people 
everywhere.  Black Americans and the Vietnamese suffered the same atrocities—
bombing churches and homes, killing children in villages and in Birmingham. The 
images were taken from the media and were placed next to simple paragraphs, no more 
than a few sentences on each page, in order to highlight the similarities. It ended with 
“for help avoiding the draft (legally) or for further information” contact SNCC’s D.C. 
office. The pamphlet was designed to reach possible draftees, but only mentioned the 
draft explicitly on one page. Instead, SNCC had crafted an educational tool that could 
reach a wide swatch of the black community and could rally those who were not as 
committed to protesting the draft by opening up a new avenue of dissent. If black 
Americans and Vietnamese were intimately connected by their oppression, then 
protesting the war and the draft made sense.65 
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Figure 4.1 Vietnam Comic Book Cover Page
 
Another especially effective tool organizers used was a comic book written by 
Julian Bond and designed by T.G. Lewis in 1967 and printed in SNCC’s Atlanta office 
on an old printing press. The comic book was then sent to various field sites, projects, 
and friends of SNCC groups to be used in popular education programs.66 SNCC had 
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adapted the community education programs from earlier organizers who hosted 
citizenship schools in their homes. Gwen Patton, a SNCC member, Tuskegee student, and 
life-long organizer, taught literacy and tutored community members in her paternal 
grandparents home beginning when she was eight-years-old.67 Community schools 
served as fertile recruiting ground to encourage people to register to vote and to help 
those in attendance learn skills denied them in the Jim Crow system. SNCC adopted the 
community school program with their Freedom Schools in the early 1960s. The school’s 
served as spaces to educate southern blacks about their rights, the Constitution, and the 
ways to pass the restrictive tests the South developed to deny black voting. By 1965, 
these schools had become recruiting sites for young people to join the movement and in 
some areas, freedom schools had transitioned into Head Start centers.68 Within these 
popular education programs, SNCC members looked for ways to reach their students. 
Alan Jehlen acknowledged that getting people to attend community education programs 
on the war was difficult, because if people were interested in studying the war, they 
would take a course in East Asian Studies. Instead, Jehlen believed, “In all cases the 
momentum of the organization depends on an on-going program of activities which reach 
outside of the organization.”69 The comic book served this purpose, as Gwen Patton 
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recalled using it to teach high school students about the war. She also remembered grade 
school children coloring the comic book and taking it home to their parents.70 
The comic book was simple, modeled after a similar pamphlet used by Stokely 
Carmichael to organize in Lowndes County, Alabama. Because of its small size, the book 
could be passed from person to person, in church, on street corners, or on the bus.  In 20 
pages, printed front and back, divided into four, neat quadrants the book laid out the 
problems in Vietnam, the reasons the United States was in the war, and asked the reader 
to pass judgment on the government’s choices. It spoke to the readers in terms of their 
material world—welfare benefits were compared to the cost of the war, death statistics 
were juxtaposed with poverty numbers. The creators of the comic book sought to 
influence the political through the cultural, pushing the act of protest out of the streets 
and into the minds of young, seemingly unaffected youth throughout the country. SNCC 
knew members of the community could read, but “not well,” and used the book as a 
teaching tool to expose the problems of Vietnam and American involvement in a country 
so far from home.71   
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Figure 4.2 Vietnam Comic Book—pg. 6, Cell 3
 
The Vietnam comic book is interesting on a number of levels. Its audience was 
broad—it asked readers “When you read this book how will you feel about your son or 
husband or brother or uncle—or yourself—fighting miles away from home against a 
people who only want to be left alone by everyone?”72 By targeting a larger audience 
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than just draft age men, the comic book spoke to the cultural ethos of community.  Its 
audience was any reader on the street, because any person could, and often was, affected 
by the war. Due to the large and disproportionate numbers of African American men 
drafted between 1966 and 1968, the comic book had to speak not only to draftable men 
but also to their families and neighbors, in order to spread its message of dissent wider 
and potentially reach the men most likely to be called for the draft. If a mother or sister of 
a young, draft eligible man was given the chance to critique and challenge U.S. 
involvement abroad, they could continue that discussion with the draftable male. This, in 
turn, could help the man make a more educated decision if he received a draft notice. 
Additionally, a young man who decided to refuse his draft call could use the comic book 
to present the facts of the war cogently to his detractors—be they family members or 
strangers. As an illustrated text with a clear message, the comic book would help stave 
off a more personal attack. 
While its circulation is unknown, the ubiquitous nature of comic books during the 
1960s and 1970s suggests that it had an expanded viewership, beyond SNCC projects. 
The simple question, “how do you feel,” begged the reader to come to terms with the 
hypocrisy of the war itself, particularly for people of color in the nation’s inner cities.  
While providing a context for those feelings, and approachable, understandable 
arguments against the war, it did not bash the reader over the head with ideology. Instead, 
it repeatedly asks the reader how s/he felt. The closing line, “…the war is fought in your 
name…What do you think?” begged the reader to do more than passively ingest the 
words on the page. 
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Figure 4.3 Vietnam Comic Book, pg. 19, Cell 3
 
The audience was asked to participate in the movement by forming an opinion and 
expressing it. “What do you think?” it asked, while educating the reader on the workings 
of the federal government, the spending on poverty programs compared to spending in 
Vietnam, and the motivations of the Vietnamese in fighting for their independence. While 
it asked the reader’s feelings, the purpose of the comic was to lead to the reader to a 
particular conclusion, namely that the war in Vietnam was morally and politically unjust 
and that black men should not be forced to serve for the United States’ cause.73 
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Figure 4.4 Vietnam Comic Book, Pg. 20
 
 The comic book addressed the community itself with facts and anecdotes related 
to community issues and concerns. Speaking directly to draft age men, the book asked 
“why should we fight for a country who has never fought for us” and reminded African 
Americans that they were first-class citizens on the battlefield but not on Main Street 
U.S.A.  In couching their argument in such a way, the community could rally behind a 
person who chose not to heed their draft call or sought a deferment through education or 
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the subversion of military medical examiners. Drawing even stronger connections to the 
problems in urban America in the mid-1960s, a soldier in the book lamented “We are 
worried about fighting a war against poverty in America. But we spend $499,999.96 for 
every enemy soldier we kill or capture while people starve and go without good jobs at 
home.” By placing radical anti-war arguments in a tempered, tangible medium, the comic 
book was a vehicle to recruit new protesters and acclimated readers to the tenants of 
Black Power’s anti-war stance. 
 The comic covered all facets of the Black Power antiwar debate. If a reader was 
not swayed by poverty statistics or second-class citizenship, the book appealed to their 
sense of a shared Third World identity with other people of color oppressed by American 
imperialism and greed. First it compared the Vietnamese to black Americans, “some 
people called it [the enemy] the ‘Viet Cong’ like people who don’t like Negroes call us 
‘niggers.’” The writers also illustrated the Vietnamese quest for independence in terms of 
the United States’ own revolution, arguing “the people of Vietnam are fighting their own 
war for independence. They want to run their own country and don’t want anyone—
Americans, French, Chinese or Russian—to tell them how to do it.” By expressing the 
wishes of the Vietnamese through words and pictures—the art in that space was a picture 
of Vietnamese peasants and the flag of Vietnam, picking rice in a field, not as 
belligerents, but as humans attempting to survive—the comic book opened an imagined 
space where the Vietnamese and African Americans shared the same wants and needs. 
This, coupled with an earlier demand that black Americans should be fighting for voting 
rights in Mississippi and Alabama instead of free, democratic elections in Vietnam placed 
the comic book in conversation with other radical protesters, namely the Student 
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Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Congress for Racial Equality as both Civil 
Rights organizations had embraced the call for Black Power and an end to the war in 
Vietnam in 1966. 
Figure 4.5 Vietnam Comic Book, pg. 14
 
The shared vision of peace and democratic participation at home and in Vietnam 
flowed through the comic book. The drawings themselves showed few violent images 
and any pictures with guns were clouded with a derogative air or included white soldiers 
with guns pointed at people of color. While the comic book was peaceful, it was not 
meek. By asking direct questions and challenging the readers’ beliefs about the war, 
poverty, and the place of black Americans in the United States, the book had a direct 
point of view and a purpose. Just as in the beginning, as the comic book came to a close, 
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it reminded readers that they had the right to participate in the United States’ democracy. 
“You are supposed to be a part of the government,” the book declared. “Men you vote for 
help make this war possible. Will you vote for them again? Or will the War in Vietnam—
the war that is fought in your name—keep on killing? What do you think?” By again 
asking the reader what they thought about the war, the book was in and of itself a talking 
point. It was meant to create a dialogue within the community about American politics 
and foreign policy. The comic book was both the spark for the conversation and the 
means by which the conversation could take place—meaning not only did the comic 
book force the reader to ask questions, it provided a context and facts for the reader to use 
in discussions going forward. It was the crucible through which brothers, sons, daughters, 
and sisters could speak coherently with radical protesters and question the government.74 
 The comic book served to educate people who could be drafted, the families of 
potential soldiers, and SNCC supporters. SNCC, and Gwen Patton in particular, knew 
that reaching younger men was important, but were also concerned with helping men 
who had received their draft notices. Patton felt that black students had a harder time 
acquiring II-S (student) deferments, even though they qualified, because they attended 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities, or because they did not know their options. 
Patton created a Draft Counseling Center at Tuskegee, to inform draft age men, and high 
school students who would soon enter the draft rolls, about their options. She also 
provided transport, funds, and housing for men seeking to flee the country to avoid the 
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draft, and helped organize the National Black Anti-War, Anti-Draft Union 
(NBAWADU).75  
 Draft Counseling was a popular tactic in the white peace movement, as men and 
women assisted draftees in locating doctors who would “fudge” medical records, connect 
draft dodgers to an underground network of individuals willing to move them across the 
Canadian border, and filing Conscientious Objector paperwork. Draft counselors, usually 
college students, ministers, reporters, doctors, and other community members who had 
“day-to-day contact with the people,” would provide men with the facts and options for 
how to avoid service.76 Gwen Patton’s Draft Counselor’s Training Institute (DCTI) 
served Tuskegee, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, St. Louis, Missouri, and Frogmore, 
South Carolina, and through a coalition of lawyers and SNCC workers, New York City. 
At the DCTI men were advised to avoid the draft and were provided “Freedom 
Physicals.”  There were 469 diseases listed as deferrable medical conditions, so the DCTI 
provided documentation to draft age men to give to their draft boards. Doctors and 
lawyers worked to free men from the bondage of the draft through creative means, 
though many were unsuccessful, as Cleveland Seller’s petitions highlights.77  
In Tuskegee, Gwen Patton’s maternal grandmother provided a safe house for men 
fleeing to Canada. Wealthier men would fly to New York or Detroit to cross into Canada, 
but most students took the Greyhound lines north and then found a contact who helped 
shuttle them into Canada and freedom. In many ways, the push for men to get into 
Canada was a modern underground railroad, with similar dangers for those involved. In 
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1967, Patton drove a draft dodger named Ellerbee from Tuskegee to her grandmother’s 
house in Montgomery in a rental car. Before they reached their destination, the pair was 
involved in a “strange one car accident,” where the car imploded because of a faulty axel 
rod. Patton suffered a compound fracture to her leg which left her with mobility issues 
and forced her to seek treatment in New York City and Washington, D.C. The car 
accident was never explained, and according to Patton, was proof that local authorities 
were attempting to disrupt her draft counseling and shuttle programs.78 
 The DCTI programs worked under the auspices of the NBAWADU, an outgrowth 
of SNCC and the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC). SMC was organized in 
December 1966 by Bettina Aptheker, a Civil Rights organizer and peace advocate who 
worked closely with SNCC. Aptheker recruited Gwen Patton as the National Coordinator 
of SMC, which “was formulated on the grounds that there must be a student organization 
that will deal specifically with the war and will mobilize students throughout the country 
in various forms of actions of protests against the war.”79 SMC was dominated by white 
leftists, who, Patton felt were “oblivious of racism and its relationship to the Vietnam 
War.”80 Black students were drowned out of SMC’s organizational structure and walked 
out of the meeting, but continued to work with the SMC on their protest efforts. During 
the December meeting, Patton was “amazed at the white naïve intellectualism and the 
deep-seated factionalism.” Moreover, Patton felt that black anti-war advocates and the 
white peace movement had “a superficial coalition,” full of contradictions and “black 
people [could] not afford at this point to ask for ‘peace’ because it [would] mean a return 
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to the status quo.”81  After another failed effort to gain support for a multiple part 
platform to include racial and economic issues at a May 1967 SMC conference, 
communication problems at protest sites, and local anger at SMC for bringing in 
outsiders to protests without helping or speaking with organizations in Washington, DC, 
Patton and other black students left SMC and formed the NBAWADU, as a program of 
SNCC.82  
 NBAWADU officially reconstituted itself at the end of January, 1968 and sought 
to help black men disrupt the system, because “if they go to the war or go to jail, black 
men are conforming to the rules and serving those racist institutions that perpetuate this 
racist society.”83 The group worked with local chapters and SNCC field offices 
throughout the country to organize draft resistance groups and to set up draft counseling 
centers. In their first few months, they called for a protest on March 4 in support of 
Muhammad Ali at Madison Square Garden during the Joe Frazier/Buster Mathis 
heavyweight championship and set up outdoor community meetings to discuss the war. 
NBAWADU believed that Ali was the heavyweight champion and deserved to be 
fighting in the match, though he’d been banned from boxing for over a year at that point. 
The outdoor meetings served “to teach students that they have a direct responsibility to 
the black community.” NBAWADU’s efforts created new anti-war groups and worked to 
expand SNCC’s original anti-draft position to include economic motivations and the 
impact on the local communities. Although NBAWADU was short lived, it’s organizing 
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principles helped spawn new groups and reach less identified populations including 
pulling women into anti-draft and anti-war organizing. The need for separate black 
organizing against the war did not dissipate with NBAWADU’s dissolution in the spring 
of 1969 (Patton’s injuries kept her from fully participating in the group and SNCC’s 
internal problems made funding difficult), but new tactics and targeted audiences were 
necessary. With the federal government’s shift to a lottery system in July 1969, 
organizing along draft lines was less salient and Black Power moved toward discussing a 
Third World identity and the shared experiences of American imperial oppression.84  
 SNCC’s anti-draft statement was the first public break with the Johnson 
Administration’s war effort by a Civil Rights organization. Their leadership led to further 
repression by the government, as SNCC members saw their draft statuses investigated 
and were called for induction out of order. The organization also positioned itself as the 
vanguard in education on the war, developing new materials to reach the population most 
affected by it: young, poorer men of color about to graduate from high school, who did 
not have access to college. SNCC voiced Black Power’s opposition to the Vietnam War, 
and though the group saw continually declining donations and a loss of membership, they 
fought for a more equitable system and the freeing of black men from the burdens of 
serving a country where their own rights were not respected.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: PATHOLOGICAL MATRIARCHY?: BLACK WOMEN, THE 
MOYNIHAN REPORT, AND ANTIWAR ACTIVISM 
“They’re going to be snatched off from their mothers…We raise children and send them 
off to war.”—Eartha Kitt, to Lady Bird Johnson1 
 
 
Women’s contributions to the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements have 
begun to be unpacked through recent scholarship, memoirs, and oral histories. The 
foundational and sustaining roles women played in creating, maintaining, and moving 
peace, justice, and freedom forward in the United States have long been relegated to 
tangential histories or ascribed traditional gendered stories—background support, 
nurturing, and respectability in the face of opposition. But, as Bobby Seale and others 
have noted, by 1968 women made up the majority of the Black Panther Party and similar 
demographics existed in many Civil Rights and Black Power organizations.2 From the 
radical life of Rosa Park to the role of sexual assault and violence in spurring Southern 
civil rights activism, women’s place in the Movement is slowly being restored.3   
However, black women’s role in antiwar activism remains hidden in plain sight, 
as scholars of the era focus on the activities of men who risked being drafted or jailed for 
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speaking out against involvement in Vietnam. A few historians have begun to look at the 
connections between antiwar activism and the nascent second wave feminist movement, 
but fail to include women of color in their discussion. Moreover, these histories are often 
reductionist and focus on women who fulfilled traditionally acceptable female roles 
through their activism, as secretaries, note takers, and paper stuffers for organizations 
headed by men, or focus on women who used their role as mothers to counsel soldiers. 
While any discussion of women in the organizations is a welcome respite from the male 
dominated leadership of most antiwar literature, black women’s role in articulating 
specific arguments about class, race, and gender and their relation to antiwar activism 
highlight the important intellectual, physical, and emotional work women brought to 
Black Power antiwar activism.4 
 Like their male colleagues, black women’s antiwar activism took many forms and 
occurred across a number of organizational platforms. Working within already 
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established groups and creating their own outgrowths, women brought the economic and 
social costs of the war to their activism, tying together calls to end the draft with 
expansions of welfare benefits and support for black communities in the United States.  
Facing no threat of being drafted, black women were able to forcefully use their voices 
and actions to demand change, while also highlighting the intersections of government 
policies abroad and the lived experiences of African Americans in the United States. 
Anti-Vietnam War activism proved a fertile test ground for expanded gendered 
arguments about the effects of race, class, and sex in the capitalist system and the 
exploitation of poverty to serve the government’s agenda. 
Black women’s anti-Vietnam War activism was another galvanizing force in the 
reinvigorated feminist movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. The feminist movement is 
commonly remember as a series of waves, whereby the first wave of modern organizers 
secured the vote (1840s-1920), the second wave (mid-20th century) secured acceptance of 
notions of gendered equality through education access, wages, and citizenship rights, and 
the third wave (1990s-present) continues to pursue social justice while fighting anti-
feminist backlash. In the wave theory, black women’s stories are left on the margins of 
the movement. Kimberly Springer argues that feminist activism should not be theorized 
as a series of waves, but instead, as moments on “a continuum of participants’ efforts 
from the arrival of black women on the continent to the present but also integrating black 
women in feminist history and theory, moving that experience from margins of the 
narrative of the women’s movement to its center.”5 By focusing on periods of activism 
versus monolithic waves, the work of black women in anti-war organizing can be fully 
seen as integral to black women’s articulations of a feminist future. It is also important to 
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note that many--but not all--Black Power activists would not label themselves feminists, 
even when they did gendered organizational work.  The Women’s Movement and 
feminist ideology was often viewed as white women’s work and liberal feminists were 
rightly accused of focusing on middle and upper class concerns of women’s equality, 
rather than the needs of their sisters of color and those of all races who were less 
fortunate.6  
Black Americans’ interaction with the Vietnam War was dramatically shaped by 
the 1965 Moynihan Report which argued that one of the keys to addressing poverty in 
black American communities was through providing masculine work, like military 
service, to black men. To make such an argument, Moynihan denigrated black women, 
especially female heads of households and bread winners, who, according to the report, 
were overly dominate in the black family and stripped black male youth of their 
masculinity or desire to work. The matriarchical structure of black families, according to 
Moynihan’s report, “because it is so out of line with the rest of American society, 
severely retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on 
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the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well.”7 Labeling 
the female led black family a “tangle of pathology,” Moynihan warned that a cycle of 
poverty would continue to exist in the black community until it conformed to the 
dominate society’s (i.e. white) familial mores. In his call to action, Moynihan argued:  
At this point, the present tangle of pathology is capable of perpetuating itself 
without assistance from the white world. The cycle can be broken only if these 
distortions are set right. 
In a word, a national effort towards the problems of Negro Americans 
must be directed towards the question of family structure. The object should be to 
strengthen the Negro family so as to enable it to raise and support its members as 
do other families. After that, how this group of Americans chooses to run its 
affairs, take advantage of its opportunities, or fail to do so, is none of the nation's 
business.8 
 
He blamed the “tangle of pathology” on the higher educational attainment numbers of 
black women and their ability to access white collar work at higher levels than black 
men. The survival tactics and coping strategies employed by black women—working 
outside the home as domestics, secretaries, and assistants—in order to support families at 
times when black men were denied jobs or access to advanced training were seen as 
barriers to black family mobility and success by Moynihan. Ignoring the lack of jobs for 
skilled black men throughout the country and using the words of conservative African 
American leaders like Whitney Young, President of the National Urban League, to 
defend his findings, the Moynihan Report essentially criminalized black womanhood.9 
The Moynihan Report’s focus on gender and attainment highlighted both 
government racism in dealing with institutional barriers to economic success in the 
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United States and the double-bind of being black and a woman in mid-century America. 
Historian Carol Giardina argued that the Moynihan Report was also a function of 
government backlash directed at black women like Fannie Lou Hammer, Ella Baker, and 
Rosa Parks, who angered white liberals with their militant stances, thus “a report blaming 
the ‘emasculating’ independence and strength of such women for their race’s poverty and 
unemployment might help to dampen black women’s militancy and keep them out of the 
black freedom struggle.” Moynihan’s focus on the pathology of black females served not 
to quell black women’s active participation in the economic and social advancement of 
their race, but encouraged further involvement and a desire to assert their own definitions 
of femininity and masculinity.10  
 The use of the report by the U.S. Department of Defense to justify relaxed draft 
standards and promote hegemonic, white notions of masculinity further denigrated black 
women by questioning their roles as mothers, wage earners, and community leaders and 
placing their sons, brothers, and husbands at increased risk for being drafted and sent to 
Vietnam to prove their masculinity. The Department of Defense failed to realize that 
removing black men from their community and sending them to fight a war where they 
could be injured, maimed, or killed, only served to heighten female heads of households, 
at least in the short run. Moreover, by demanding a hegemonic masculinity, the 
Moynihan report created a pathological black femininity, challenging generations of 
work in the politics of the respectability for black women.11 
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To counter Moynihan’s criminalization and express their antiwar and anticolonial 
beliefs, black women used many outlets to reach their intended audiences. Some women 
worked within the framework of already established anti-war committees in Civil Rights 
and Black Power organizations. Linking black men’s participation in the military to the 
overall quality of life for black Americans, female antiwar activists tied the war to white 
masculinity and white leaders’ desires to further subjugate black men and women in the 
mid-century capitalist and neo-colonial system.  Gwendolyn Patton of SNCC helped 
established the National Black Anti-Draft, Anti-War Union (NBADAWU) as an 
outgrowth of SNCC’s antiwar fervor in the fall of 1966. Patton’s work with the 
NBADAWU was multifaceted and relocated her to SNCC’s New York City office, where 
she joined SNCC’s women’s caucus, chaired by Frances Beal. The women’s caucus 
challenged the masculine rhetoric of SNCC and other Black Power organizations and 
highlighted what Beal labeled double jeopardy or the challenges of being black and a 
woman. SNCC’s woman’s caucus provided a space for women to explore leadership 
roles, learn gender and economic theory, and express new forms of activism. As a part of 
SNCC, women’s caucus participants were uniquely aware of the intersections of race, 
class, and gender in the lives of black women in the Movement. Moreover, women like 
Beal and Gwen Patton knew the Vietnam War exacerbated gender and economic 
discrimination in the Black Power and antiwar movements, as men focused on the draft 
and military service, while downplaying the plight of women and welfare recipients. 
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Writing in the Liberator, a monthly magazine which coined itself, “the voice of 
the African-American,”12 Patton identified the economic arguments against the war: 
 Black people saw that the Vietnam war was the reason why the war on poverty 
had diminished…Black people saw Black militants forced into the army because 
of inequities in the draft. Black people saw Black students forced into the army to 
become Black mercenaries because this country does not allow them enough 
economic stability to continue their college education.13 
 
Patton presented a strong economic argument, expanding the lack of funding for War on 
Poverty programs to include the inability for black men to stay in college, which, 
according to Patton, led directly to black men being drafted, because they could not earn 
education deferments.14 Reduced War on Poverty spending coupled with the 
criminalization of black womanhood meant that black men were shamed into mercenary 
action—being hired soldiers—in order to conform to a white definition of masculinity.  
 Patton continued her article by dissecting the arguments of “white capitalists” 
who said that black people should support the War because black men were earning 
money for their families and black people were given jobs in military factories. She 
refuted these claims by drawing attention to the racist treatment black Americans 
received, arguing: 
a black mercenary was killed in the Special Forces in Vietnam supposedly 
fighting for freedom for the Vietnamese people, and he could not get buried in 
Wetumpka, Alabama, because there were no plots left in the Black portion of the 
cemetery. A Black mercenary returns to this country from Vietnam, and he cannot 
get served in a local bar in Illinois. The Black people in factories know that they 
will be the first ones fired and will suffer greater ordeals when the depression 
comes.15 
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The supposed benefits of black men’s participation in the war effort and community 
support for American internationalism did not play out in reality, according to Patton. 
She saw all American wars of the twentieth century as the United States “building a 
world empire through exploitation and capitalism” and claimed that the United States was 
a racist and imperial nation, which saw all people of color as “cannon fodder” for the 
white establishment’s ever expanding colonial interests.16 The military was not concerned 
with the actual economic and social issues affecting black Americans, but instead needed 
cheap, hired hands to conduct their business.  
In order to curb American colonial wars and to end the exploitation of people of 
color by the capitalist U.S. government, Patton believed, “the course of action to take is 
not to simply stop the war in Vietnam, but to radically change this country so that no 
more horrors and atrocities will exist in this country and abroad.”  Radically changing the 
country also meant changing the attitudes of the leadership of progressive organizations, 
a position Patton articulated in her 1970 essay “Black People and the Victorian Ethos,” 
published in Toni Cade’s Black Woman anthology. Having spent most of her life in civil 
rights organizing, elected as class president of Tuskegee Institute, and almost killed in a 
single car accident in Birmingham while shuttling a draft dodger to a bus station, Patton 
wrote with the authority of a veteran. She called for black men and women to abandon 
the white community’s notion of Victorian ideals and the politics of respectability. 
Victorian ethos allowed black men to dominate black women and for black men to be 
dominated by white men and women, thus it was a mentality of sacrifice, defeat, and 
desperation. The Victorian ethos created a subservient culture within black homes and 
communities, denying black women a chance at real political freedom and allowed for 
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government officials to continue to belittle and ignore the needs of women and men of 
color.17  
The politics of respectability or the Victorian ethos ability to hold black 
communities back was clearly visible in the failure of the Johnson administration to fund 
the War on Poverty and the Vietnam War as a “racist-colonialist” policy, where “For 
many, Vietnam [wa]s their graveyard.”18 Feminist author and activist Anita Cornwell 
accused the government of manipulating the Victorian ethos of respectability to convince 
people that black American’s participation in Vietnam was something to celebrate. She 
wrote:  
 Still another of our leaders tries to justify the Black man’s participation in the 
nation’s horrendous intervention in Vietnam by declaring with pride that Black 
men have fought in all of America’s wars from the Revolution up until the 
present moment. And that is true, but what this leader knows and does not choose 
to emphasize is that before, during, and after each of those wars the Black man 
and his family have been enslaved, lynched, robbed, raped, and totally excluded 
by the society he has risked his life to protect. Therefore, I declare that only an 
Uncle Tom would brag about serving Old Marse faithfully when Old Marse has 
always repaid that service with more and more oppression.19 
 
Cornwell saw the issue as more of a problem in the black community itself. If black 
leaders would have stopped supporting black military service or trumpeting black 
military achievements in previous wars, Cornwell insinuated, black men would not be 
assisting in “America’s grotesque attempt to turn the world into another Mississippi.”20 
Cornwell’s protest also called into question the masculinity and race pride of black 
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leaders who encouraged or supported black men’s service.  By labeling these leaders 
“Uncle Toms,” she evoked a deferential black masculinity that was nonthreatening, and 
thankful for any handout provided by whites. An Uncle Tom was an emasculated man in 
the black community, fearful of upsetting his white oppressor, thus, unsupportive of 
radical politics and protests for change.21 Moreover, an Uncle Tom, according to those 
who used the epitaph, was a man who had no pride in his race, and wished to assimilate 
to oppression.  Cornwell could not accept the premise that whites wanted to help blacks, 
often postulated by the “Uncle Tom” black leaders she despised, “for we, as Black, 
unwanted Americans, are never going to get anywhere in this country as long as we 
continue to delude ourselves with the myth that the white man means well toward us and 
all those other Black folk he has sent to an untimely, blood-soaked grave.”22 The 
nefarious motives of white American leaders was a prominent theme in black women’s 
antiwar organizing, as they sought to remind their constituents, targets, and readers of the 
broken promises and emasculating actions taken by government and local officials in the 
past.  
The role of women in creating and defining anticolonial and antiracist activism 
expanded greatly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Frances Beal’s Women’s Caucus 
officially broke from SNCC in 1969 and by 1971 was renamed the Third World 
Women’s Alliance, reflecting an expansion of the membership to include Puerto Rican, 
Asian, Chicano, and American Indian women. The Third World Women’s Alliance goals 
included: “creating sisterhood through Third World solidarity; promoting Third World 
unity around economic, social, educational, and political issues; collecting, interpreting, 
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and disseminating information about the Third World; establishing solid relationships 
with Third World men based on ‘human love and respect’; and training Third World 
women for leadership in the revolutionary struggle.” Their work was not explicitly anti-
Vietnam War, as by 1971 American involvement in Vietnam was slowly winding down, 
but reflected the desire to work collectively with other colonized women to end imperial 
wars and create independent nations with full equality.23 The organization’s international 
perspective also reflected the globalization inherent in Black Power rhetoric and the 
belief that women throughout the colonized world shared similar experiences of 
oppression. However, the women did use the war in Vietnam and Vietnamese women as 
examples of revolutionary solidarity. In their newsletter, Triple Jeopardy, the group 
published antiwar speeches and reprinted articles commending Third World women’s 
gains through revolution. In one such article, the Third World Women’s Alliance used 
Vietnamese women to explore the role of women of color in the revolution. Creating an 
image of shared oppression, the unsigned article drew parallels between the treatment of 
Vietnamese women by American imperialists and the struggles of women of color in the 
United States. The author wrote, “We see, then that no matter where are people are 
geographically located, our struggle against colonialism is akin to other struggles. …Our 
enemies are the same; our oppression is one; our similarities are greater than our 
differences.” The organization felt that the Vietnamese women had set the tone for their 
role in revolutionary struggle, thus “as Third World women we have a job to do. We must 
recognize our power and potential in the struggle.” The job included exposing the ways 
that American imperialism and capitalism entrenched racism, sexism, and class 
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discrimination adversely affected people of color from the Third World.24 The 
organization used Triple Jeopardy to highlight the contributions of women of color to the 
struggle and in multiple issues used the center pages to celebrate women’s work in the 
Cuban Army, the Filipino independence movement, Puerto Rican women’s travel to 
China, and as educators, activists, and community leaders in the United States. 
The Third World Women’s Alliance took their mission beyond print activism, 
sponsoring and participating in a November 4th antiwar march in New York City. At the 
march, they called for support of the South Vietnam Peace Plan, ending national and 
racial discrimination, and ending attacks on working people. By linking peace in Vietnam 
with antidiscrimination action, the women were able to dissect and articulate the 
intersections of American war policy and the consequences of capitalist imperialism, as 
experienced by people of color in the United States and abroad. The Third World 
Women’s Alliance and their allies sought to overthrow American capitalism and establish 
a “socialist society free of class, race and sexual exploitation,” and worked to develop 
coalitions with groups including Black Workers Congress, Third World Youth 
Movement, and the Black Panther Party to advance their agenda.25 
A partnership between the Third World Women’s Alliance and the Black Panther 
Party could seem surprising. The Black Panthers were known for the masculine rhetoric, 
especially from Minister of Information Eldridge Cleaver who famously bragged about 
raping white women in his autobiography Soul on Ice. He believed “rape was an 
insurrectionary act.” Sexual violence against white women “delighted” him because he 
“was defying and trampling upon the white man’s law, upon his system of values, 
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and…defiling his women.” Through the rapes, Cleaver believed he “was getting 
revenge.” Cleaver was well aware of the long history of sexual violence that black 
women endured at the hands of white men. Cleaver’s glib defense of his crimes informed 
the image of the Panthers to the public, as the essay from his autobiography was first 
published in Ramparts. Although Cleaver had a leading role in the Panthers early on, by 
1971 Cleaver was living in exile in Algeria and had been expelled from the Black Panther 
Party by Huey Newton. Moreover, as the Panthers matured in their revolutionary 
rhetoric, they promoted female empowerment and were eventually led by Elaine Brown. 
Panther women were at the forefront of much of their organizing and sustained the group 
throughout the late 1960s and 1970s.26  
 The Panthers also believed strongly in the shared oppression of Third World 
people of color by American imperialism and sough to overthrow American capitalism in 
order to form a more just and free society. Moreover, by the early 1970s, the Party had 
gone through a series of reformations and had begun to focus their energies on 
community betterment programs like their Free Breakfast for Children campaigns, as 
well as cultivating relationships with other revolutionary groups. Much like the Third 
World Women’s Alliance, the Black Panther Party looked to anticolonial activists 
abroad, especially in Vietnam, as models for women’s behavior and place in the 
revolution. The only female chair of the Party, Elaine Brown, wrote of her introduction to 
the Panthers by Ericka Huggins, the young captain of women of the Southern California 
chapter: 
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 as women, our role was not very different from that of men, except in certain 
particulars. Ericka told us point-blank that as women we might have to have a 
sexual encounter with “the enemy” at night and slit his throat in the morning—at 
which we all groaned. She reminded us of the Vietnamese guerrilla women, who 
were not only carrying guns but using their very bodies against American 
forces…Our gender was but another weapon, another tool of the revolution. We 
also had the task of producing children, progeny of revolution who would carry 
the flame when we fell, knowing that generations after us would prevail.27     
 
Huggins was candid with new women members of the Panthers that they would be 
exploited sexually, that their bodies were a tool in the revolution, which they should 
willingly employ when necessary.  Huggins drew a connection between Panther women’s 
struggles in the United States and the much acclaimed women guerilla fighters in 
Vietnam. If the Vietnamese guerilla fighters are not ashamed of their bodies and sexual 
exploitation, why are you, she asked in response to the groan of her newly initiated 
members. A paternalistic notion of the Vietnamese seeped into Huggins’ rhetoric, as 
though to make her point, she had to show that the Vietnamese women were also 
fighting, dying, and using their bodies. Huggins shamed the women for their reactions to 
her warnings by illustrating the sacrifices of the Vietnamese, but why would the women 
be ashamed if they did not already feel superior to the Vietnamese? Huggins tactic could 
also be seen as another way for women of diverse backgrounds to be connected, to use 
their gender in a powerful statement against U.S. imperialism. The Panther women 
should take their clues from the Vietnamese women who were not fearful or timid, 
Huggins intoned. The use of a gendered argument to organize Panther women is 
interesting, especially considering the well documented abuse and sexist treatment of 
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Panther men toward female members.28 Was Huggins buying into the treatment? Was 
this a way to circumvent rapes and beatings, by encouraging the women to seek out 
Panther men to procreate with, or was Huggins just too young to truly understand the 
implications of her remarks? Panther women saw themselves united with other 
revolutionary women and their willingness to use their bodies deepened this connection. 
Their sex was one step in a series to create drastic social change in the United States and 
abroad.  It would be easy to blame Huggins’ rhetoric on her youth and the influence of 
her husband, John Huggins.  However, Ericka Huggins was a strong and determined 
member of the Panthers, who served two years in a New Haven, Connecticut jail, never 
losing her passion for the Panthers or their antiwar campaign.29  
In February 1971, Huggins and Bobby Seale sent messages in support of the 
“People’s Peace Treaty,” a collaborative document developed by the Vietnamese and US 
students against the war.  The peace treaty outlined terms for a negotiated peace, 
including the immediate and total withdraw of American troops from North Vietnam, 
discussion to secure the release of prisoners of war, and the respect of the sovereignty of 
Laos and Cambodia. Huggins message equated her situation with Prisoners of War in 
Vietnam: “educating the people about all the political prisoners of our war against 
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oppression. No heroes, no rhetoric, but massive educational rallies and street politicizing, 
show how POW’s are examples of the situation every one of us face.”  Huggins also 
encouraged participation of all Americans, “young, old, black, brown, red, yellow, beige, 
whatever. Male, female, gay—everybody. Because everybody is faced with Amerikan 
[sic] oppression and all of us are the America that will be, you dig it?”30 Huggins 
rhetoric, while no doubt influenced by the male members of the Panthers, was one of true 
belief and determination that a Panther woman’s body was another weapon in the “grand 
revolution” and should be used whenever necessary to help win the war against American 
imperialism, like the body of the Vietnamese guerilla woman. Her experience in jail 
correlated with the experience of political prisoners and prisoners of war globally, 
because the captives were fighting American imperialism and aggression, in various 
ways. 
The focus on black men’s masculinity could appear to undermine the role of 
women in Black Power organizations or further subjugate them to background positions. 
Yet, historian Stephen Ward posits, “as a symbolic call to arms, a declaration of  militant 
political commitment, or a metaphor for collective dignity, the struggle to reclaim ‘black 
manhood’ galvanized black women as well as men within the emerging political 
communities of the early Black Power Movement.”31 Ward’s argument helps explain the 
work of women in Black Power organizations. In New York City a group originally 
formed to provide support for Malcolm X’s widow took up anti-Vietnam war protests by 
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directly challenging the manhood of black men.32 The women, working under the title 
“Black Women Enraged,” (BWE) provided counseling advice, created leaflets and 
posters, and directly engaged with black men seeking to avoid the draft, as well as those 
men who wanted to join the military. Adopting New York lawyer Conrad Lynn’s How to 
Stay out of the Army, the women broke down the process of earning a military deferment 
and the expected outcome of various techniques.33 BWE used simple, direct language and 
addressed their fliers to Young Black Men, especially those who had already received 
notification of their 1-A status. Unlike Lynn’s handbook, BWE encouraged young men to 
“write an entirely different letter insisting that as a black youth, you to [sic] do not want 
to fight in a war that seeks to perpetuate white supremacy. State that your war is in the 
black ghetto at home.” The women continued with their advice, “if you have appealed on 
racial grounds, the draft board will write to you saying that the reasons you have given 
are not legal. Now understand this! They are saying it is illegal for you a black man, to 
refuse to fight whitey’s war.” The group did not sugar coat the process of attempting to 
get a draft deferment based on a racial argument. Instead, they provided step-by-step 
instructions on how to deal with the draft boards, including the possibility of arrest, 
insisting on men visiting Conrad Lynn, paying a $100.00 retainer fee, and fighting their 
draft notices.  Politely, they told men to “be sure to pay him a consultation fee. It is a 
felony to advise any person to avoid the draft, but if a lawyer is paid a fee, it is then 
legally correct for him to advise you.” By insisting that men pay Lynn a fee, BWE 
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attempted to protect Lynn and the draftees from government prosecution and provided 
Lynn with a potential stream of clients.  
 Another tactic BWE employed was to use jive and slang in their posters to draw 
the attention of the young black men they sought to protect. In one such poster, the 
women sought to undermine black youth’s arguments for not worrying about the draft. 
On the handwritten poster, BWE told young black men in Harlem: “We-l-l, they’re 
drafting black men with police records. You’re not going because you think you can get 
out of it since you’re so co-o-ol. So what about your brother baby? Or don’t you care 
about your brother?” The women mimicked street slang in order to undermine the nature 
of street corner bravado.34 Moreover, they played to the notion of the collective, 
reminding potential draftees that even if they were able to avoid service, their brothers 
may not be so lucky. They also addressed the issue of patriotism head on, arguing: “Oh, 
you’re an American? And you want to fight for your government? Well Malcolm told 
you, you ain’t Americans, you’re ex-slaves and you have no government. The 
government is of the whites, by the whites and for the whites.”  In doing so, the 
organization promoted a black manhood wherein black men refused service inductions, 
took responsibility for their actions, and helped their brothers to avoid service as well.35  
 BWE encouraged men to choose jail over the armed forces, because the war in 
Vietnam was the white man’s war, and black men needed to be at home. They told black 
men that Vietnam only held death for them and that they should “stay here and fight for 
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your manhood. Black women will not allow you to stand alone in your decision.”36 
Fighting for black manhood was not a task for only black men. Women were important 
players in defining how and when black men expressed their manhood and what it meant. 
Black women also needed men to refuse to serve in Vietnam because “black women are 
murdered when you [black men] are murdered. Black women have decided we shall no 
longer be victims!”37 Black women needed black men at home, caring for their children 
and living in their homes, so that black women could be protected.  
The language of protection ran throughout BWE’s posters and leaflets. If black 
men were drafted, they could not protect the lives of their women and children, the 
organization argued. Because black women and children needed protection from “the 
murder and rape of the white racist,” black women “must have the courage to back our 
men when they choose jail rather than die in Vietnam!!!” The choice of jail seems 
counterintuitive to the need to protect black women and children, however, serving a jail 
sentence meant that at some point, the man would return to his family, whereas serving in 
Vietnam came with the real possibility of death. However, refusing to serve in Vietnam 
was not the only action black men needed to take against the white power structure to 
show their manhood. 38 
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In the fall of 1966, BWE wondered where black men were as members of the 
New York Police Department’s 32nd precinct in Harlem “stripped a Black Woman and 
hauled her to the station house.” The action took place in front of people and BWE felt 
“the police showed in that instant how weak-kneed and white-livered he considered 
Black manhood!” Black men were raised to protect white wives, mothers, sisters, and 
daughters, but not black womanhood, according to BWE, and black men needed to begin 
to defend their women from the police and assaults on their bodies. They asked “when 
are you Black Men going to stop being faggots of the world?” Using a degrading slang 
term from homosexual males, BWE themselves questioned black manhood and black 
men’s position in their communities. If they could not or would not protect black women, 
why were they there? Black men needed to assert their power: “We need not only Black 
Power, but also physical power to deal with this beast white man.”  Black men could no 
longer stand ideally by as black womanhood was assaulted by police, or as black women 
and children were threatened, intimidated, and sexually assaulted by white men. Instead, 
black men needed to meet force with force, proving that they were just as or more 
powerful than white men and would protect their families in similar fashion. Thus, Black 
Women Enraged’s definition of black manhood required black men to protect black 
womanhood and to fight “here for their dignity as black men.”39  
Black Women Enraged also presented black womanhood as something that 
needed to be protected, but acknowledged and celebrated the importance of black women 
in supporting black men’s desire to avoid service in Vietnam and to express their 
manhood at home, presenting black women in opposition to the Moynihan Report. They 
                                                     
39 “Black People of Harlem,” Fall 1966, Social Movement Vertical File, Wisconsin State Historical 
Society, Madison, Wisconsin and “Black Women!,” n.d., Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
Files, 1954-1972, University Microfilms International, Reel 52. 
 
194 
 
were not the root of black pathology and the reason black Americans were in poverty; 
instead, black women were victims of white racial resentment, of sexual violence, and of 
emasculated black manhood. Black women did not emasculate black men, as Moynihan 
believed. Black men were emasculated by “whitey,” who “pushes our children out of 
school after failing to teach them, then labels them ‘drop-outs,’ ‘hoodlums,’ ‘criminals,’ 
and the like…these are just part of whitey’s plan to keep us children from cradle to the 
grave!” By labeling black men deviant or criminal, Black Women Enraged argued, black 
men were denied the chance to attain standing as a respected man. White men protected 
their own definitions of manhood by infantilizing black men and controlling black men’s 
actions in public. When Moynihan suggested that black men needed discipline and order 
to restore their manhood, thus pushing for an increased number of black men in the 
military, he attempted to force black men into the white man’s definition of manhood. 
BWE attempted to counteract that thinking by bringing nuance to the discussion and 
showing that black men’s manhood needed to be tied to their ability to protect their 
families at home, not by dying for a racist war in a foreign country.40 
Black Women Enraged’s leadership included Patricia Robinson, author of “Poor 
Black Women,” a psychotherapist and a Planned Parenthood volunteer who advocated 
for expanded access to birth control and family planning services for black women in 
New York City. Her family published the Afro-American in Baltimore and were ardent 
defenders of Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois against McCarthy era attacks. 
Robinson’s father was a reproductive rights activist and “president of the Social Services 
Advisory Board of Maryland, where he blazed a trail of policies that stopped nighttime 
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searches of welfare recipients homes and ensured that they not be excluded from family 
planning because they were single.”41 Robinson’s work to better the lives of black 
women in the inner cities and to end black men’s participation in the war in Vietnam 
highlighted the connection between the war and the welfare state. Subject to nighttime 
raids, denied benefits if married, and now subject to their fathers, brothers, husbands, and 
sons being drafted, poor black women had little choice but to fight the war machine. 
On the West coast, the Black Women’s Organization Against the War and Racism 
also sought to redefine black manhood through avoiding the draft. In a flier, the women 
argued that “It takes a man to say ‘hell no’ to McNamara and a slave to blindly and 
silently refuse to make the decision as to who or when he should kill innocent people that 
never called him nigger.” The women demonstrated in Berkeley and sought monetary 
donations to help keep black men out of the war. They sought to tie up the courts with 
citizenship and colonization arguments if men were charged with avoiding the draft. Like 
Black Women Enraged, the San Francisco based Black Women’s Organization against 
Racism and the War knew that black men who refused the draft would be prosecuted, but 
felt real black men would make the moral and political stand. However, unlike their East 
coast counterparts, the Black Women’s Organization against War and Racism and the 
War did not employ jive, slang, or plain language. They presented their arguments in 
theoretical and political terms, most likely because of their proximity to many bay area 
college campuses, whose students made up the core of the Black Power and civil rights 
activism in California in the late 1960s.42  
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Outside of antiwar groups and nascent feminist organizations, welfare activists 
continually linked the egregious costs—monetary and human—of fighting in Vietnam to 
the ineffectiveness of War on Poverty programs, strapped by dwindling funds. In 
Mississippi, Mrs. Anne Rankin, a black woman freedom fighter and follower of Stokely 
Carmichael, spent the month of April, 1967 “trying to get young Negro boys who was 
call [sic] to be sent to the war a later date to sign a petition to send to the Secretary of war 
stating that they would not serve in Viet-nam because this war is the rich man’s war and 
the poor man[‘s] fight meaning 80% Negroes and 20% white gets killed.”43 Rankin used 
class based language to make her argument, claiming that Vietnam was the white (rich) 
man’s war, but the black (poor) man’s fight. She saw that the white establishment was 
using poor people to fight their war. She went further, citing “statistics” to back up her 
argument, claiming that 80% of those killed were black men. These statistics were 
overblown, as in the entirety of the war, blacks made up only 12.5% of those killed in 
Vietnam.44 Nonetheless, as historian George Herring noted, “African Americans correctly 
saw themselves as the primary victims of an inequitable selective service system that 
drafted their sons in disproportionate numbers and used them as cannon fodder.”45 
Rankin was one African American woman who clearly saw this inequality in the draft 
system and worked to rectify it, by removing black men from the draft rolls.  
Rankin, writing to her “freedom friends,” Mr. and Mrs. Frank Stewart, expressed 
great discontent with the war in Vietnam, stating, “they are somewhere trying to clean up 
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some body else [sic] house and they so filthy until it hard to live here. Do you understand 
I mean they need to clean up here.”46  Mrs. Rankin did not stop her political action 
against the Vietnam War with her petition work.  She also gave an undated speech to a 
group of Civil Rights demonstrators in Mississippi. She used her position as a mother to 
call people to action, asking: 
 how does the president and Government feel sending mothers sons to war now 
just look I go thru the process of carrying the Child and Birthing him and then 
they go call Uncle Sam stop in snatch him up to go do his dirty work and all the 
while he was unable to be of any service to me or his self. I couldn’t get Even a 
desent [sic] education nor Health Care. Now what is this raising 2 legged pigs for 
the market?47 
 
Rankin felt that the government owed her an education and health care, at least, for 
taking her son away from her. Interestingly, she felt Uncle Sam was responsible for 
causing her to lose a vital income, when she stated, “he was unable to be of any service to 
me or his self.”  Rankin worked hard to raise her child, but was not able to give him 
health care or an education. Now, he was also not given the chance to work to benefit his 
mother or his own family because the government had taken him from his community. 
By comparing male children raised in the black community to two legged pigs sent to the 
market, Rankin highlighted the feeling among many antiwar supporters that black men 
were simply expendable goods.  They were raised to be sold on the market to the highest 
bidder, one who could use them in any way they saw fit. The image of the two legged pig 
also allowed Rankin to analogize black men to pigs, who added to the American diet, 
allowing for a more diversified lifestyle for those who could afford it. Thus, the black 
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male, sent to war to do the bidding of white (rich) men, were not only sold on the market, 
they were also nourishing the white establishment who “bought” their services. 
 Rankin did not stop at attacking the government for stealing the black 
communities’ men, who were now unable to provide for their families. She continued, 
“now we are talking about how much we are needed in Vietnam and we are needed here 
at home worst [sic]. The problems are here at home we are having unnecessary killings 
here. May I say you can’t put out fire with fire. Somebody has got to listen. Don’t just sit 
there and give orders for dirty jobs to be did and place the responsibility on the one you 
gave the orders to. Blame yourself.”48 In this section of the speech, Rankin spoke directly 
to her audience. She called them to action, imploring them to not only work to end the 
war in Vietnam, but to see the problems that were currently affecting black communities 
in the United States.   
Unlike Gwen Patton, who formed the National Black Antiwar Antidraft Union in 
1967 to focus solely on ending the war in Vietnam and preventing the black antiwar 
organizations from being absorbed into white organizations, Rankin worked to develop 
integrated antiwar groups. Rankin also attempted to draw stronger connections between 
America’s foreign policy and failed welfare programs. She viewed American foreign 
policy as a distraction from the problems at home, and saw the U.S. government as a 
racist regime whose sole goal was to spread capitalism and oppression throughout the 
world.  While Patton and Patricia Cornwell believed the lack of funding for poverty 
programs and the cost of the Vietnam War were directly related, as did middle class 
activists, Rankin’s words were spoken from someone who had direct knowledge of 
welfare. They were not filtered through a veil of sympathy or the drive to lift all black 
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people into the middle class confines of “respectability” that characterized much of the 
middle class activism against the war and for poverty programs. For Rankin the cost of 
the war was felt in her pocket book.  “The welfare it is rotten with the cost of living going 
up,” she wrote.  “Everyday taxes going up. Still a family on welfare has to live on what 
they give…why is this? Welfare is just a help out not enough to live…this is slavery and 
this only on the poor, both black and white.”49  
Rankin identified with the hundreds of black welfare mothers in Mississippi and 
throughout the country who refused “to send their sons to Vietnam to kill and die for a 
State which kept them on the edge of starvation.”50 These women connected welfare and 
peace in a similar fashion as Rankin, arguing that their sons were not the property of the 
state, to be taken at the whim of a man in Washington who would not send his own 
progeny.  Mrs. Anne Henderson of Milwaukee articulated this position in 1972, stating: 
If you think I’m gonna have a baby—and what that child grow up with no food or 
clothing; and then watch him go to school where teachers don’t teach him 
anything; and worry that he’s gonna become a pimp or start shooting up dope; 
and finally, when he’s raised, see him go into the army and get really shot up in 
there—if you think I’m gonna go through all that pain and suffering for an extra 
$50 or $100 or even $500 a month, why you must be crazy.51 
 
Mrs. Henderson was reacting to the racist assumption that welfare mothers had 
children in order to get larger welfare payments. Her assertion that she would not raise a 
child, worry about his behavior, and watch him be drafted, illustrates a link that welfare 
recipients felt between the war in Vietnam and their welfare funding.  While the draft had 
ended by 1972, Mrs. Henderson recognized that working class men were more likely to 
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be drafted if another war occurred, and believed that draftees from poor areas were more 
likely to be killed in action. She echoed actress Eartha Kitt’s earlier denouncements of 
the war to First Lady Johnson, at a White House luncheon in January 1968.  Kitt said: 
the young people are angry and the parents are angry because they are being so 
highly taxed and there is a war going on, and Americans don’t know why…The 
youth is not rebelling for no reason at all, they are rebelling against something and 
we can’t camouflage what it is…Truthfully, no self respecting, concerned, 
involved and discriminated American, be they Negro or Caucasian could be 
expected to do any less.52 
 
Kitt spoke for a group of Americans who did not have access to the Johnsons or even 
their elected officials. Her words stung, and created a backlash among some Americans, 
while others embraced her. Mrs. Lee Stahl found Kitt’s argument compelling, writing in 
The Louisville Defender: 
I agree with Eartha Kitt. We would not have the unrest in our cities if it were not 
for the knowledge that the war in Vietnam is draining away our resources so that 
there is no money for improving conditions in the ghetto. In some way the 
bombing of North Vietnam must be stopped and American Policy should be to let 
people of other countries choose their own form of government. All that the 
average citizen can do is make his opinion known. This, Miss Kitt has done for 
many, many Americans. May she continue to be blessed with wisdom and 
courage.53 
 
Mrs. Stahl did not have a particular remedy for ending the war, though she tied the 
problems in the ghettos to the bombings of North Vietnam.  She, like Kitt and others, 
understood that young Americans of color were confused and isolated from politics. 
Kentucky State Representative Mae Street Kidd also voiced this opinion, stating:  
Blacks, in my opinion – and my opinion may not be worth anything…blacks were 
of no consequence in politics other than the fact that blacks worked and got up 
here and worked for the election of candidates but usually if you let me run a dive 
or place of business or you have a whiskey store or something of this kind…I 
never got the feeling that it was, if I assist you or help you in your election, would 
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you help me? Whites, in my opinion…never felt that blacks had any place in 
politics or any power structure.54 
 
Representative Kidd’s words echoed leaders of the antiwar and Civil Rights Movements. 
Kidd’s words described the emotions of many African Americans, who felt they were 
being placated by the Johnson administration through rhetoric but not action on issues 
like Vietnam and poverty. This led some to more violent protest and overt action, while 
many older, middle class women remained behind the scenes, including Kidd. She 
sympathized with the movement, but was not one to protest in the streets. She understood 
that overt protest could lead to changes at the local and even the national level, but did 
not feel that she should be a part of the action.55 
  Welfare workers, antiwar protesters, and Movement insiders found a common ally 
in Shirley Chisholm, the first black woman to serve in Congress. Chisholm, a 
Representative from Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn (she defeated former CORE 
President James Farmerin the November 1968 election for the newly created seat), 
embraced the intersectionality of her identity, insisting “upon the equal salience of her 
racial and gender identities.”56  Her work through formal party politics, as a member of 
the House of Representatives and a candidate for the Democratic nomination for 
president in 1972, brought Black Power antiwar and economic discourse into mainstream 
channels of power. Chisholm won her seat by building a multi-ethnic coalition, speaking 
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Spanish with Puerto Rican immigrants, and addressing the shared struggles of poor 
people of color in her district.57 
 Chisholm arrived in Washington promising to speak frankly and passionately 
about issues that affected her district and her own intersectional identity. In her first 
speech on the House floor, she denounced the War in Vietnam and newly-inaugurated 
President Richard M. Nixon’s backtracking of campaign promises to speedily end the 
war. Her speech, delivered on March 28, 1969, came as hundreds of women protested 
outside the Capital, carrying black balloons and demanding limitations on government 
appropriations to the Defense Department in order to better fund poverty, education, and 
city revitalization programs. Chisholm echoed the demands of her anti-war sisters, 
insisting on an explanation for Nixon’s desire to build a missile defense system while at 
the same time he cut founding for Head Start programs in Washington, D.C. She was 
incredulous at Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s Senate testimony, in which he told 
legislators to expect to be in Vietnam for at least two more years. Calling the Defense 
Department’s budget a “cancerous growth,” Chisholm lamented, “Two more years of 
hunger for Americans, of death for our best young men, of children here at home 
suffering the life-long handicap of not having a good education when they are young.” If 
the Nixon administration was unwilling to curb spending in Vietnam, Chisholm warned 
that poverty in the United States would continue to grow, robbing young people of the 
chance to contribute to society and grow into full citizens. Instead of spending “2/3 of 
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federal income,” on the Defense Department and oversees imperial adventures, Chisholm 
implored the House of Representatives, and by extension the Nixon Administration, to 
“respond to the mandate the American people have clearly expressed. They have said, 
‘End the War. Stop the waste. Stop the killing. Do something for our people first.’…We 
must force the administration to rethink its distorted, unreal scale of priorities. Our 
children, our jobless men, our deprived, rejected, and starving fellow citizens must come 
first.” Chisholm promised to vote no on any bill in the House that provided funding for 
the Defense Department and cemented herself as a strong antiwar and antipoverty 
advocate.58  
 Chisholm’s denouncement of Nixon’s Vietnam policies and domestic economic 
spending continued throughout her time in the House of Representatives and made her a 
favorite of Black Power and antiwar organizers. In June of 1969 she called for amnesty 
for all men who resisted the war, and in October joined House members and protesters 
around the country to call for a Moratorium on the fighting. Speaking again on the House 
floor, she drew parallels between the lack of funding for poverty programs and the 
bloated budget of the Defense Department.59 Chisholm’s passionate antiwar stances 
continued into her second term and set into motion her unsuccessful, but historic, run for 
the 1972 Democratic Presidential Nomination. Although never a front runner, Chisholm 
brought her antiwar, antipoverty, and black feminist identity to the campaign trail. At an 
Oakland, California voter registration event, Chisholm asked, “Do we need more military 
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spending or guaranteed income, education, housing, and health care?” She encouraged 
black people to register and vote for progressive black and white candidates and to 
become part of the system “because there is no other place to fight.” Chisholm believed 
black Americans could not be “silently accepting” of gross government spending on the 
military and space exploration. She linked the lack of funding for the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to overspending by the military in Vietnam.60 
Chisholm’s historic run for the presidential nomination in 1972 brought together a 
coalition of students, feminist activist, Black Power advocates, and antiwar protesters. 
Her candidacy embodied the intersectional lives of activists, especially women, who 
worked to end oppression in many forms as American involvement in Vietnam waxed 
and waned. Though she failed to win the nomination for the Democratic candidate for 
President in 1972, she won 152 delegates (5.04%), the fourth most among candidates.61 
Black women’s antiwar protests were an integral part in the development of the 
black and Third World women’s movements of the mid and late 1970s and beyond. 
Gwen Patton, Shirley Chisholm, and others used their experiences in antiwar, Black 
Power, and Civil Rights organizing to launch the Third World Women’s Alliance, the 
Combahee River Collective, and many other local, national, and international feminist 
organizations which sought to address social, economic, and political issues facing 
women of color throughout the world. Black women’s contributions to antiwar and 
feminist organizing has often been ignored, as white, middle class activists of both 
genders were projected as the vanguard forces in social change. The work of black 
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women to redefine black manhood and womanhood in a light of the Moynihan Report 
and the Vietnam War were refutations of hegemonic masculinity and femininity based on 
white standards. By connecting welfare, war spending, and the plight of black Americans 
women challenged the economic arguments presented as reasons for black men to enlist 
in the military. Most importantly, black women’s strong stances against the war and 
encouraging black men to refuse service presented black womanhood not as pathological, 
but as uplifting and supportive of families, communities, and themselves. Instead of 
being reduced and degraded by the Moynihan Report and its various implementations 
across governmental policies, black women showed that black womanhood was made up 
of “matriarchs, but we have been forced to live in abandonment and been used and 
abused…Let it be clearly understood that Black women’s liberation is not anti-male; any 
such sentiment or interpretationa [sic] as such cannot be tolerated. It must be taken 
clearly for what it is—pro-human for all peoples.” By removing black men from their 
homes and communities, the draft and the War forced black women to continue to live 
without men in their lives. Thus, black women’s focus on keeping black men out of 
military service served to undermine matriarchical dogma, while also reinforcing the 
humanistic arguments of a shared Third World mentality and imagined community of 
colonial subjects.62 
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CHAPTER SIX: DISRUPTING IMPERAILISM: BLACK POWER GOES 
INTERNATIONAL 
“Is it not conceivable, then, that that the Negro people, who understand the white man’s 
hypocrisy better than that of any one else and who are already applying an enema to the 
rot which has for so long contaminated America’s domestic social organization, may 
spark an international purification as well?”—Robert Span Browne1 
 
 
Calling for the end of the draft, burning draft cards, and demanding expanded 
antipoverty programs were not the only actions radical black Americans took against the 
war in Vietnam.  Just as important as keeping black men from being drafted to fight in 
Vietnam, the need to disrupt American imperialism in the Third World occupied Black 
Power’s rhetoric and actions.2 For Black Power advocates, a Third World mentality 
pervaded the language of their organizations and provided a clear connection between 
black Americans at home and people of color abroad suffering under American neo-
colonial warfare. In order to disrupt American diplomacy, Black Power advocates 
traveled to North Vietnam, to China, to Cuba, to the African continent, and to 
sympathetic Western nations like Switzerland to orate against American diplomatic 
choices, investigate and testify on war crimes committed by the United States against the 
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, and to cultivate relationships and establish homes for 
Black Power throughout the world.3 
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 African Americans traveling abroad and finding support for their domestic causes 
was not new in the mid-1960s. The Soviet Union, even before the ramping up of the Cold 
War following World War II, supported black American’s bids for freedom through the 
Communist Party USA and their effort to integrate labor unions, end racial segregation in 
the South, and defend the Scottsboro Boys. Glenda Gilmore, Thomas Borstelmman, and 
Mary Dudziak traced the ways Civil Rights organizations used American diplomacy to 
gain rights at home. Their foundational works highlight the efforts of domestic organizers 
to connect American rhetoric to action.  Gilmore argues, “African Americans always 
used geopolitics to fight domestic racism. They exposed U.S. imperialism and Jim Crow 
as two sides of the same coin…”4 As Jim Crow was dismantled, the desire to expose U.S. 
imperialism as exploitative, dangerous, and colonial did not abate. In fact, communism 
and socialism were tools radical leaning black Americans employed in their fight to rid 
the United States of colonial tendencies and expand Third World independence. The 
Soviet Union had provided support and money to campaigns for equal rights, integration, 
and economic mobility in the United States and supported newly formed independent 
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nations that Black Power advocates admired, like Cuba and North Vietnam. It only made 
sense to exploit the connections to further the anti-draft, anti-war fight in the 1960s and to 
create a Third World people’s movement against American imperialism and oppression. 
To do this, however, required exporting Black Power thoughts and leaders to the 
emerging world—a thoroughly American practice if there ever was one. Thus, while 
Black Power sought to disrupt American diplomacy through fostering an imagined 
community of independent Third World nations, they still fought their own American-
made demons of the capitalist system, privilege, and inequality.5  
 The United States has never been a truly isolated country, but the end of World 
War II catapulted the US onto a world stage, as the only developed nation who did not 
suffer major infrastructure and civilian destruction during the conflict. The Cold War 
heightened the United States’ desire to contain communism, which required worldwide 
engagement in economic and political issues of independent and newly decolonized 
nations. As tension between the United States and the Soviet Union deepened, the world 
became, at least to the United States, permanently divided between” us” and “them,” or 
First, Second, and Third World nations. The First World was comprised of the United 
States and its allies, the Second World, the Soviet Union and its allies, and the Third 
World as unaligned nations. The unaligned nations were the most dangerous and those 
that needed the most supervision, according to US foreign policy, because if the Soviet 
Union was able to influence one of these nations to establish a communist government, 
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others would follow.6 Thus, the US sent diplomatic missions throughout the world to 
establish contacts with US institutions and to attempt to foster pro-American and pro-
democracy feelings in the nascent nations. Robert S. Browne was one such diplomat.  A 
University of Chicago educated economist, Browne worked for a US foreign aid program 
in Cambodia and Vietnam from 1955-1961. Upon his return to the United States, he 
undertook a campaign to educate Americans about the problems of being involved in 
Vietnam and the mistakes of the government. His activism intensified as American 
involvement grew deeper and as the Black Power movement took off. Browne used his 
knowledge of Vietnam to frame his arguments in terms of economic and racial self-
determination, helping to articulate much of Black Power’s arguments against the war. 
While concerned with black Americans being used to fight in Vietnam and remaining 
anti-draft, Browne expanded the early arguments against the war to include economic 
determinism and the problems of the American imperial agenda.7  
Beginning in 1962, Browne wrote opinion pieces and cultivated a lecture circuit 
in the hopes of providing “the American public with a view of what was taking place in 
Vietnam,” a view which conflicted with national media coverage at the time. Browne was 
an early participant in the Teach-Ins and helped create talking points and consciousness 
raising activities for students and “concerned community people.” He also used W.E.B. 
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Du Bois’ progressive journal Freedomways to advance his arguments for intertwining 
Civil Rights and antiwar activism. Writing in the fall of 1965, Browne highlighted the 
reasons why Civil Rights and peace organizations did not currently work closely together 
and the benefits that could be reaped from building a partnership. After laying out the 
potential partnership of peace and Civil Rights activism, Browne used his experiences in 
Vietnam earlier in 1965 to connect American atrocities there with racist nature of the 
war. He wrote, “I was further appalled by what seemed to be a disproportionately large 
number of Negro faces among the United States troops and I could only wonder if this 
were the Pentagon’s way of attempting to deflect the accusations of whites killing non-
whites—and at the same time a way of driving a wedge between American Negroes and 
the colored people of Asia.”  Browne claimed to have never experienced racism in 
Vietnam and recounted that in May, 1964 Saigon taxi drivers “called for a one week 
boycott of all foreign passengers except American Negroes,” to illustrate the 
commonalities between African Americans and Asians in the struggle against American 
imperialism. Although he cautioned against being “overly suspicious,” he warned black 
Americans to not become tools of American internationalism. Instead, “Afro-Americans 
can perform no greater service to their country and to humanity than to use their unique 
position to encourage international racial amity and to prevent international racial 
conflict.” Browne’s article was a foundational text in Black Power organizing against the 
war, providing the intellectual links between decolonization and freedom struggles in the 
US and the Third World and laying out the problems and possibilities of black antiwar 
activism. His international perspective and firsthand accounts of American exploitation in 
Vietnam strengthened his words and highlighted the importance of international travel 
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and interaction in shaping the burgeoning Third World thinking in the peace and freedom 
struggles.8 
 Using his popularity on the lecture circuit and his position as a leading 
economist, Browne was persuaded to enter the 1966 New Jersey Senate race as a 
Democratic candidate, by the “deterioration of the proper functioning of our 
constitutional system.” He hoped “that by focusing my campaign on the issues which 
underlie our involvement in Vietnam, some of the emotion can be removed from the 
Vietnam debate and the American people offered an opportunity to view dispassionately 
just where our present policies are carrying the nation and the world.” Browne used 
America’s involvement in Vietnam as a foil to domestic issues which he hoped to address 
if he won the Senate seat. While his candidacy for political office was not the route many 
Black Power anti-war advocates pursued, his speeches highlighted the shared aspects of 
struggle that black Americans and Vietnamese citizens faced from U.S. imperialism.9  
Browne relied on an economic and social narrative to connect problems in the 
United States to the War in Vietnam. He argued, “it seems unconceivable that at a time 
when our newspapers are daily bombarding us with grave and disheartening statistics 
concerning conditions in our own country, at a time when the ghettos of our ugly urban 
conglomerations are seething with unrest and deprivation, that our government should be 
choosing to embark on foreign adventures of the most dubious kind.”   Browne saw the 
current elected officials, particularly Johnson and the Senate Foreign Relations 
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Committee as suspect and connected his candidacy to bringing about the end of the war 
and reasserting the need to help people, especially poor people of color in America’s 
inner cities, at home. Browne saw the Vietnam War affecting black Americans and 
Vietnamese similarly—through economic and moral injustices. In the United States, 
black Americans and urban, ghetto dwellers were “hustled” by the American economic 
system that kept them disadvantaged and failed to deal with the violence of the inner 
cities. Moreover, as the government waged a racist war against the Vietnamese, they used 
African American soldiers as cannon fodder, exerting more violence on the black 
communities of the United States and joining Vietnamese and African Africans in a 
shared struggle against the government’s violence and exploitation. Browne became 
discouraged by the number of people who attempted to provide counter arguments to his 
commentary, especially by focusing on the supposed atrocities of the North Vietnamese 
Army against United States and South Vietnamese fighters. In response, Browne 
reminded his critics, “we have neither access to nor responsibility for the crimes of other 
nations, only for our own.” The United States’ crimes were multifold and could not be 
addressed solely by ending the war in Vietnam, because people of color worldwide 
suffered under the imperial agenda of the Johnson Administration. Browne quit the 
Senate race in September 1966 because he “did not have enough time,” and by 1967 “had 
pretty much dropped [his] efforts to bring some sanity into our Southeast Asia policy,” 
choosing to focus on the needs of African Americans in the urban northeast.10  
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Browne’s burnout on Vietnam came after five years of bringing attention to 
American involvement in Southeast Asia and the role of African Americans in the United 
States imperialist struggle. Even as Browne bowed out of the fight, Black Power leaders 
were turning their attention more and more to international issues and a shared 
commitment to self-determination. Using some of Browne’s own talking points, Black 
Power leaders sought friendships in the Third World and to make political and social 
connections across continents. However, Black Power’s decision to seek international 
coalitions and to foster a Third World support network wase not without problems. 
Because such work required international travel, government scrutiny was inevitable. 
While advocates did not seek visas or tickets to travel directly to Hanoi, Moscow, or 
Beijing, they still had to apply for passports to leave the country. Most travelers took a 
route out of the country through Paris and found ways to get from one communist nation 
to another through circumvented custom agents or false papers. For Conrad Lynn, an 
investigator for the Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal, the trip to North Vietnam 
required stops in Paris, Rome, Tel Aviv, Tehran, New Dehli, and Bangkok. Once he 
arrived in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Lynn still had to find a way into North Vietnam. 
While Cambodia was not listed as a belligerent country, if he crossed the border into 
North Vietnam with his American passport, he risked losing it upon his return to the 
United States. Instead, Lynn was able to procure papers which identified him as a 
diplomatic aide to the Cambodian government.11 The federal government saw the travel 
as potentially traitorous and sought to deny passport applications to Black Power 
advocates or to seize passports of men and women who had travelled or been outspoken 
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against American foreign policy. For example, Stokely Carmichael’s passport situation 
was investigated a number of times by the FBI, but never seized. The desire to repress 
Black Power’s internationalism coincided with the government’s use of the draft as a 
silencing tactic. Moreover, it highlighted the perceived threat Black Power advocates 
aligned with Third World independence movements posed to the federal government and 
their foreign policy aims.12  
International travel was used as a tool in expanding the worldview of some Black 
Power advocates, especially those connected to the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee. A few SNCC leaders had the opportunity to travel to Guinea in the fall of 
1964, funded by their friend and fundraiser Harry Belafonte. SNCC’s leaders had already 
tied their struggle for Civil Rights in the South with African nation’s independence from 
colonial powers. The trip served to strengthen SNCC’s resolve to better create 
international connections while also highlighting their limited knowledge and the ways 
the United States government controlled information available to international outlets. 
SNCC’s steps into the international arena were slow and followed American diplomatic 
channels at first. In April, 1966 Chairman John Lewis embarked on a “world tour” with 
Stanley Wise. The pair stopped in London, Rome, Scandinavia, Paris, and Oslo, where 
Lewis spoke to a group of supporters. Lewis’s tour of Europe was sponsored by a student 
organization and provided SNCC with a fundraising outlet. Lewis’s successful European 
travel led SNCC to develop a new international education program, which included 
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“considerable travel abroad by SNCC staffers as guests of youth groups in Africa, Latin 
America, Europe, and Asia.” Lewis was placed in charge of the new program, but 
resigned from SNCC before it even began. SNCC’s desire for an international presence 
strengthened as their activism turned to issues of American diplomacy and linking 
economic, social, and political issues in the black communities to American military and 
diplomatic missions.13 
While the desire to internationalize the struggle was only beginning in early 1966, 
by that fall, as the organization followed the leadership of Carmichael and heightened its 
anti-draft activism, SNCC also developed a strong Third World mentality and distrust of 
the federal government’s international reports highlighted by the inclusion of Julius 
Lester and Charlie Cobb on the Bertrand Russell International War Crimes Tribunal 
investigating the war in Vietnam. The Tribunal, convened in Stockholm, Sweden, 
sponsored investigative teams to travel to North Vietnam, and sought to prove that the 
United States committed war crimes under the Geneva Codes of War. Chaired by John-
Paul Sartre, but without authority to charge or try American leaders, the Tribunal was a 
symbolic move to express disgust with the American war machine and to embarrass the 
United States on a global stage. Cobb and Lester were selected as part of a team sent to 
North Vietnam to investigate American bombings and to report to the Russell committee.  
Julius Lester joined SNCC in 1966 following the election of Stokely Carmichael 
as Chairman. He was outspoken and, according to his 1976 book All is Well, “determined 
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to be a revolutionary.”14 Charlie Cobb, on the other hand, was a longtime SNCC member, 
who joined the movement at its earliest stage, after being arrested in Baltimore in 1961.15 
Lester believed participation in the Tribunal was SNCC’s “first big move into the 
international arena,” and knew that sending two field secretaries was a political move 
with potential disastrous repercussions, but one that was necessary to further SNCC’s 
goals.16   
For Lester and Cobb, travelling to North Vietnam required circumvention of U.S. 
travel restrictions, by way of France, Greece, Egypt, Pakistan and, finally, Cambodia. 
Interactions with the French and Cambodian locals left Lester and Cobb struggling to 
come to terms with their American identities. While poor and black in the United States, 
the pair were considered relatively wealthy and exotic in Cambodia and to be ignored and 
ridiculed in France. Lester attempted to speak with French Africans at a bar, to reach out 
in solidarity, but was rebuffed by the revelers, who were, according to Lester, “totally 
inhabited to being French, while talking black.” When the SNCC representatives arrived 
in Phoum Penh, they were overwhelmed with neo-colonialism, as French officers 
guarded the airport and Cambodian women adorned in high heels, Western clothes, and 
straight hair-dos offered their bodies for pleasure. For Lester, the sights were unsettling 
and reinforced the notion that de-Americanization throughout the world would be a long 
process. As they travelled through the countryside, however, Cobb felt he was in 
Mississippi, “It looks like the Mississippi Delta—it really does, only wetter; but I knew I 
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had travelled the roads and paths and fields I saw.”  The intersections of their lives, 
Western economic exploitation, and the shared experiences of poverty converged in 
Cambodia.17   
 By the time the pair reached Vietnam, they were aware of their unique position in 
the Tribunal investigative group and, according to Conrad Lynn who was also on the 
team, were very distrustful of the white members of the commission. Lester explained 
this distrust as being aware of his surroundings and realizing the presence of“at least one 
agent keeping tabs on us….No longer are we watched by cracker cops in the South alone. 
Cracker cops the world over now watch.” The suspicion and unease came not only from 
the presence of white people, but the uncertainty of how Lester and Cobb were being 
used by the Tribunal. The pair realized their vanguard position as the only Civil Rights 
organization sending representatives to the tribunal (Lynn was invited without an 
affiliated group), and believed their actions would lead to greater repression of SNCC and 
their allies at home. The distrust dissipated over the course of the month long 
investigation, but Lester and Cobb remained on edge and were only truly comfortable 
when investigating the bombings in the countryside. The hyper-vigilance was with due 
reason, though, as J. Edgar Hoover issued a memo to the Atlanta and New York bureau 
offices to investigate if SNCC, and especially Carmichael, planned “to attempt to go to 
North Vietnam and/or attend the ‘war crimes tribunal.’ All pertinent information relative 
to the participation of Carmichael and SNCC concerning the matter should be 
immediately submitted to the Bureau.” The memo went on to lay out the illegality of 
unauthorized travel to Vietnam and the importance of “competent evidence” to prove a 
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violation of State Department regulation, if a member of SNCC travelled without proper 
documentation or in violation of their passport records.18 
 Once in country, Lester and Cobb used established contacts to collect information 
about American bombings, particularly of hospitals, schools, and other non-combatant 
areas that would result in war crimes under the Geneva Accords. The field work, as Cobb 
described it, actually served to reinforce the imagined community of colonial subjects. 
According to political scientist Benedict Anderson, nationalist movements drew together 
disparate people who probably had never met, under the common “image” of a nation, 
united in a struggle for freedom. While Anderson’s discussion was wide, it was also 
nation based, relying on defined borders to describe the community. Subsequently, 
scholars have expanded the definition of an “imagined community” to include cross-
national support for decolonization movements.19  The North Vietnamese were not all 
that different from black Americans, their struggles were parallel and against the same 
enemy. The interactions with North Vietnamese civilians taught Cobb and Lester that 
SNCC was not well known in Vietnam, though their contacts knew Carmichael’s name, 
but were restricted to only the information available in the US press. Thus, Cobb and 
Lester worked in North Vietnam much like they did in the American South, using SNCC 
tactics of education, local leadership, and dialogue to establish new avenues for protest 
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and alliance. The pair found that the shared struggle against US imperialism was real, and 
that people of color had to band together to fight for justice.20 
Yet, overall, the War Crimes Tribunal was a disappointment for Lester. The 
Tribunal heard his and Cobb’s report on the bombings in North Vietnam along with 
seven days of testimony from world peace leaders and investigative teams, and found the 
Johnson Administration guilty of aggression and bombing civilians in North Vietnam. 
However, the tribunal had no punitive power and could not change the reality of the war. 
The symbolic gesture was not enough for Lester, because the tribunal was less interested 
in expanding the critiques of the war to include issues of race. Lester was appalled by the 
lack of engagement in the issues of race and the global stage, especially because Sartre 
chaired the meeting. Still, as Lester argued, “the fact remains that at the present time the 
world is polarizing into West (white) versus everybody else (colored, black, and yellow) 
and that the war in Vietnam is only a rehearsal for what the U.S. must do if it is to protect 
its interests in Latin America, other parts of Asia, Africa, and at home.” Viewing 
American action in Vietnam in a vacuum undermined the work of Third World 
individuals and disassociated shared experiences of oppression between people of color 
globally, in Lester’s view. Thus, the Tribunal only served to help Western intellectuals 
assuage their guilt and record their disdain for American aggression. It reinforced for 
Lester and other people of color that the Western world, even those progressives who had 
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shared interests in ending US imperialism, were not interested in the much less 
glamorous work of ending oppression.21  
Former SNCC organizer Diane Nash Bevel, who in 1960 as a student at Fisk 
University helped desegregate Nashville lunch counters, also traveled to Vietnam in 
December 1966 with three white antiwar women. The group, as Bevel stated, “were four 
individuals. Each of us had her own particular opinions about the issues and each had her 
own reasons for going. In fact, I might say we disagreed on particularly every subject 
from child care and men, to politics and nonviolence. The only issue that I can remember 
all of us agreeing upon during the entire month we were together was that we were all 
against the war.”22 Bevel and her companions were not sponsored by any antiwar groups 
in the United States, though all four women belonged to various organizations.  The 
women toured North Vietnam, spoke with political leaders and Catholic priests, and 
visited victims of American bombings.  Bevel was against the war because, “I am against 
using murder as a solution to human problems.”23 Her children were too young to serve 
in Vietnam, but she saw the destruction the United States incurred on the country and was 
not supportive of such tactics. Historian Heather Stur claimed that Nash travelled out of a 
“maternal sense of duty to protect young men” and that she was motivated to travel to 
North Vietnam after she saw a Vietnamese mother holding her wounded child, “I saw 
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myself in this mother’s place.”24 Yet, Bevel’s focus was not on the Americans killed or 
on the black men who were drafted or enlisted to serve, but on the ravages of the War 
that the Vietnamese had to live with daily. She did however, question why black men 
were serving, challenging them to “decide whether or not they want to help murder other 
non-white people,” in Vietnam.25 Thus, while Bevel travelled with white women 
protesters, she framed her argument separately, as one of human cost and a shared 
suffering of all human beings at the hands of an unjust war.  
SNCC’s offshoot organization, the National Black Anti-War, Anti-Draft Union  
(NBAWADU) also used internationalism to gain support for their efforts. They 
designated April 26th as a day of international protest, bringing black and Third World 
students together as “an act of solidarity against the racist oppression of Black America, 
racist United States aggression against the Vietnamese people and the violation of the 
right of self-determination of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America.”26  Lead by 
John Wilson, the NBAWADU struggled to remain funded and relevant in an increasingly 
cluttered anti-war and anti-draft field. Wilson had served time for “disrupting the 
Selective Service” in Atlanta in 1966, but by 1967 had risen to the top of SNCC’s antiwar 
activism leading to him addressing a joint conference of SNCC workers and Vietnamese 
antiwar activists in Czechoslovakia. There he told the delegates that black Americans had 
to view their own struggles as related to the liberation struggles of the Third World 
because “the goals of our struggles are the same and we have the same enemy. We 
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believe that it is a necessary to meet with representatives of the liberation struggles in 
order to share experiences and ideas.”27 Using SNCC’s techniques of local leadership and 
learning through dialogue, the conference served to strengthen ties between the National 
Liberation Front, the North Vietnamese, and SNCC activists. It also presented Americans 
in a differing light than the government projected throughout the world. Black Americans 
meetings with the Vietnamese espoused anti-imperialist attitudes and unseated the 
dominant American cultural ethos of conquer and colonize. Instead, their very presence 
showed that the federal government’s foreign policy was not accepted by large parts of 
the American population. By traveling abroad and meeting with other members of their 
imagined Third World communities, SNCC and Black Power advocates undertook 
citizen’s diplomacy. In doing so, they created coalitions and helped to undermine 
government policies at home and aboard by partaking in open dialogue.   
  The disappointment with Bertrand Russell’s War Crime’s Tribunal and the desire 
to continue to forge Third World contacts led Stokely Carmichael and SNCC 
representatives to “accept an invitation from Ralph Schoenman of the Betrand Russell 
Peace Foundation” to attend a conference in Havana, Cuba.28 Coinciding with John 
Wilson’s testimony at the SNCC/Vietnam conference and the expansion of Black Power 
rhetoric at home, Carmichael’s travels led to heightened scrutiny of SNCC (though he 
was no longer Chairman) and to a deepening connection between Black Power and Third 
World nationalism.29 Carmichael’s first major Third World event came in Cuba, where 
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he, Julius Lester, and George Ware participated in the Organization of Latin American 
Solidarity (OLAS) meeting in Havana to discuss the future of revolution in Latin 
America and what tactics the countries should use (legal or armed resistance). While the 
conference was focused on armed resistance in neo-colonial Latin America, 
representatives from the National Liberation Front in Vietnam, as well as the widow of 
Franz Fanon were present, expanding Latin America to include Third World people 
throughout Asia as well.  
 Carmichael used his platform at the OLAS meeting to continue to construct the 
Third World alliances against American imperialism, telling the press that the only action 
to overthrow colonial oppression was armed resistance and guerrilla warfare. The 
National Liberation Front’s anti-US aggression in South Vietnam would be replicated in 
the United States, according to Carmichael, because “it is crystal clear to us that we are 
fighting an international structure that enslaves us all. The only way we can beat it is to 
internationalize our struggle so you’ll have an international power fighting an 
international power.” For the revolutionaries to be an international power, they had to 
work together against their shared oppressors, with similar tactics and constant support. If 
the imagined community of revolutionaries became a thriving group, even if they did not 
have the same individual goals or political ideologies, they would “create two, three, 
many Vietnams,” and “have them fighting on all fronts at the same time and they can’t 
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win.” Subterfuge and spreading valuable resources would lead to the destruction of 
Western imperialism and a more just world.30  
Addressing the OLAS activists, Carmichael made an impassioned plea for Third 
World solidarity and put the black struggle in the United States in conjunction with the 
fight for freedom from colonialism worldwide. “We are moving to control our African 
American communities as you are moving to wrest control of your countries—of the 
entire Latin continent—from the hand of foreign imperialist powers,” Carmichael 
explained. To guarantee self-determination and control, “we must change North America 
so that the economy and politics of the country will be in the hands of people.” To drive 
the point home, Carmichael turned his attention to Vietnam, “the struggle we are engaged 
in is international. We well know what happens in Vietnam affects our struggle here and 
what we do affects the struggle of the Vietnamese people. This is even more apparent 
when we look at ourselves not as African-Americans of the United States, but as African-
Americans of the Americas.” If revolutionaries saw themselves as brothers in arms, their 
struggle would be more apparent and more easily solved. By turning attention to 
Vietnam, Carmichael highlighted the possibilities of armed struggle. He also again 
reinforced the shared nature of struggle and the importance of the National Liberation 
Front, a non-government entity, in creating change in a colonial situation. After all, it was 
the war in Vietnam that made the Third World mentality possible in the United States; 
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only when Black Power began to see itself as connected to the Vietnamese, did the wider 
connections to worldwide anti-colonialism come to fruition.31 
Carmichael’s address to the OLAS in Cuba was the first stop on a tour of the 
Third World, expanding upon his August speech and doing the work of alliance building, 
at least through national media and speaking engagements.32 His travel was closely 
monitored by the Johnson administration, as it posed a threat to diplomatic missions in 
the developing world, where alliance with the United States or the Soviet Union laid the 
terrain of the Cold War. After leaving Havana, Carmichael made his way to Hanoi where, 
according to new SNCC Chairman H. Rap Brown, he would “see for himself the 
atrocities being perpetrated against the people of Vietnam, a people who are heroically 
defending their right to self-determination.” Carmichael’s trips were as much about 
spreading the Black Power message of Third World collectivity, as about creating 
contacts with revolutionary governments and investigating war crimes. Carmichael met 
with North Vietnamese leaders and discussed revolutionary tactics including guerrilla 
warfare, as a means to bringing about the end of United States imperialism around the 
world. Because many Black Power advocates used a highly theorized notion of 
empowerment, based on the works of Che Gueverra, Frantz Fanon, Mao Tse-Tung, 
Kwame Nkrumah, and others, the chance for Carmichael to see revolution in action was 
important. Moreover, the appearance of Carmichael, an American freedom fighter, next 
to and among other revolutionaries added credence and power to his message. No longer 
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was Carmichael simply reciting theories of colonial power, he, even for a short time, 
lived revolution abroad. This physical connection made the intellectual linking of anti-
colonial struggles more powerful. 
While his physical presence in Cuba and other decolonizing nations was 
important, Carmichael’s most effective tactic, however, was a series of radio broadcasts 
directed at black American soldiers fighting in Vietnam. He again articulated the 
imagined community of Third World people, imploring black soldiers not to fight in 
Vietnam, because “no Vietnamese ever called me Nigger,” and reminded the soldiers that 
their fight in the United States, because black people had no country. By speaking 
directly to the men he called black mercenaries, Carmichael’s words served multiple 
purposes—potentially gaining new supporters of Black Power, undermining American 
imperial pursuits by using an international platform to criticize US diplomacy, and 
gaining allies in the fight to free the Third World. His message was only made more 
powerful by his use of personal experiences in North Vietnam and the international 
connections he continued to cultivate. Circumventing the United States media and 
government, Carmichael was able to educate and be educated, much like Cobb and 
Lester, though on a larger stage. Thus, though the choices to go to the Third World were 
politically motivated, Carmichael was able to spread citizen diplomacy through his 
contacts and manipulation of media. While the effectiveness of Carmichael’s radio 
broadcasts to US soldiers is unclear, his willingness to challenge military and government 
authority, particularly around knowledge acquisition and community building, were 
important steps in challenging hegemonic notions of American imperialism.33   
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Carmichael took that same message to Cairo, Algiers, Paris, and Copenhagen over 
the course of the fall months of 1967. At each stop, he addressed the media and made 
speeches further enforcing the shared experiences of oppression created by American and 
Western capitalism. Moreover, he used the international media to express the dangers he 
faced in speaking out against the United States, repeatedly saying he expected to be 
arrested when he returned home and that he expected to meet a bloody end. These 
rhetorical flourishes may have been the result of Carmichael’s real fears—he had faced 
multiple arrests and seen friends die at the hands of American whites—however, they 
also served another purpose.  By expressing his fears of US repression, even if they never 
came to be, Carmichael again undermined the image of the United States as a democracy 
where all were free. His words created a shared experience of oppression, where white 
America, especially President Lyndon Johnson, was morally corrupt. The US, according 
to Carmichael’s rhetoric, was not a protector of freedom rather, it was a denier of rights. 
This was evident, according to Carmichael, in the treatment of black Americans at home, 
where their very existence in the United States resulted in “lynching, burning, and the 
bombing of our houses, schools, and churches.” To end American aggression, 
Carmichael pledged that black revolutionaries “will change America or destroy it.”34  
Repeatedly, for six months, Carmichael spoke in the terms of Third World 
solidarity, pushing back against American hegemonic notions of democracy.  Yet, he was 
still a product of a capitalist system and could not escape his own paternalistic notions of 
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the Third World. When describing Vietnam, he was impressed by the Vietnamese 
persistence in the face of the war, going about their business as usual, as well as their 
lives close to the land. Carmichael told the Havana Democratic Service, “…wherever one 
goes and one sees people with their trousers rolled up working in the mud very close to 
the land,” and was impressed with the Vietnamese knowledge of the African American 
struggle in the United States. Carmichael went on, saying, “they held solidarity meetings 
with the African-Americans, and I thought, ‘here is a little country being bombed by the 
United States—and I mean their hands were certainly full—but they can take time out to 
be concerned about other oppressed people.’” Carmichael’s words were meant as 
compliments to the Vietnamese, but were also reminders of his own privilege. While he 
could claim Third World solidarity and espouse a Third World mentality, he could not 
help but frame those struggles in paternalistic and neo-colonial words. By focusing on 
living “close to the land,” he created images of incivility or pre-industrial worlds. 
Moreover, his “little country” remark, while true in comparison to the United States’ 
landmass, also served to show the pervasive nature of stereotyping the “enemy” in the 
United States as undersized. Again, Carmichael was complimentary to the actions of the 
Vietnamese and seemed even shocked that they “took time out to be concerned” his 
words had a paternalistic tone—one directed not at the Vietnamese, but at Carmichael’s 
countrymen and friends, who hands were not as full and seemed less interested in the 
struggles of the Vietnamese than their own issues.35  
Carmichael’s world tour brought him international notoriety, as the intellectual 
and political leader of Black Power. His earlier work organizing the Lowndes County 
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Freedom Party (Alabama), and the SNCC pamphlet “How the people in Lowndes County 
Armed Themselves,” inspired the organizers of the Black Panther Party, founded in 
Oakland, California in October, 1966 by Bobby Seale and Huey Newton.36 The two men 
were greatly influenced by the 1965 Watts rebellion, the rejection of nonviolence by the 
black community, and the writings of Mao Tse-Tung, Malcolm X, and Frantz Fanon. The 
two men recruited a number of followers, including Newton’s appointment of Carmichael 
to “serve as the party’s field marshal with authority ‘to establish revolutionary law, order 
and justice,’ in the Eastern United States,”   and installed over forty chapters throughout 
the United States over the next decade. The Panthers worked to establish themselves into 
the mainstream of Black Power early. The Black Panthers in October 1966 released their 
ten point party platform and program. The platform included: 
 
1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black 
Community… 3. We want an end to the robbery by the capitalists of our Black 
community… 6. We want all Black men exempt from military service…10. We 
want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, and peace. And as our 
major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held 
throughout the Black colony in which only Black colonial subjects will be 
allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of Black people as 
to their national destiny.37 
 
The Black Panther platform laid the foundation for the groups Civil Rights and antiwar 
activity for the next decade. The Panthers’ explicit inclusion of military exemption for 
black men and the request for a United Nations plebiscite indicated a strong aversion to 
American colonial policies, one which allowed Black Panther members to identify with 
other people of color in colonial settings throughout the world. This identification 
                                                     
36 Jefferies, Bloody Lowndes, 103-104. 
37 Huey P. Newton, “Patrolling,” in The Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and 
First Hand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle, 1954-1990, Clayborne Carson and others (eds.), 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 346-347; Carson, In Struggle, 278-279. 
 
230 
 
become more and more pronounced as the 1960s faded into the early 1970s and the 
American confrontation in Vietnam winded down, only to draw African American 
attention to other oppressive situations, including Apartheid in South Africa and the 
decolonization efforts of many African nations. The Panther platform was guided by 
nationalist and socialist rhetoric, demanding a drastic change in American society, one 
which would, if properly implemented, recast the position of all poor people in the United 
States. While the platform included black separatism statements, the Panthers were an 
inclusive group, who would “fight for all working people,” and included white organizers 
in their Free Huey demonstrations in 1969 and in their antiwar protests. According to 
Elaine Brown, the only woman chairperson of the Black Panther Party, “We set the 
agenda and the goal and the vision, it was truly inclusive, not multicultural, it had to 
come with the liberation of all human beings. Capitalism really had to go. We wanted to 
change the paradigm.” 38 The idea of changing a paradigm, particularly moving America 
away from a capitalist society that exploited its citizens for the benefit of a few chosen, 
privileged white men, guided much of Black Panther and radical organizing.39 
                                                     
38 “Mayday,” What We Want, What We Believe: The Black Panther Party Library, DVD, Directed by Roz 
Payne (2006; Oakland, CA: AK Press).  Elaine Brown, “New Age Racism,” delivered at the University of 
California Santa Barbara, May 1, 2001. Voices Series #5720, 116min, 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=80YtzBf3z6g>.   
39 Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, Jr. Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black 
Panther Party, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 309-322.  The Panthers are one of the 
most written about Black Power organizations, so much so that when one speaks of Black Power there is a 
presumption that the Black Panther Party is the topic of discussion. Panther members have also been 
prolific autobiographers and many of those who are still alive continue to work on anti-racism, prison 
reform, and anti-poverty programs. Ericka Huggins, telephone interview with the author, Aug. 2012; Paul 
Alkebulan, Survival Pending Revolution: The History of the Black Panther Party (Tuscaloosa: University 
of Alabama Press, 2007); Curtis Austin, Up Against the Wall: Violence in the Making and Unmaking of the 
Black Panther Party (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2006; Ruth-Marion Baruch, Black 
Panthers 1968 (Los Angeles: Greybull Press, 2002); Elaine Brown, A Taste of Power: A Black Woman’s 
Story (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992); Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Fire (Waco: Wood Books, 1978); 
Kathleen Neal Cleaver and George Katsiaficas, eds., Liberation, Imagination, and the Black Panther Party: 
A New Look at the Panthers and their Legacy (New York: Routledge, 2001); Angela Y. Davis, Angela 
Davis: An Autobiography (New York: Random House, 1974) and If They Come in the Morning: Voices of 
Resistance (New York: The Third Press, 1971); Emory Douglas, Black Panther: The Revolutionary Art of 
 
231 
 
The connection to revolutionary governments and socialism was the hallmark of 
Panther discourse. The Panther’s critique of American foreign policy and their open 
support of a Socialist revolution in the United States allowed them to visit Communist 
countries and speak with representatives of Socialist governments not recognized by the 
United States. In the summer of 1970, Elaine Brown was given the task of traveling to 
Pyongyang, North Korea with Eldridge Cleaver and other Party members.  Brown left 
Los Angeles and flew to Paris, then to Moscow and finally to Pyongyang, again 
circumventing the United States State Department by first visiting an allied country 
                                                                                                                                                              
Emory Douglas (New York: Rizzoli, 2007); Philip G. Foner, ed., The Black Panthers Speak (Philadelphia: 
Lippincott, 1970); G. Louis Heath, Off the Pigs: The History and Literature of the Black Panther Party 
(Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 1976); David Hillard and Lewis Cole, This Side of Glory: The 
Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of the Black Panther Party (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1993); Elbert Howard, Panther on the Prowl (Oakland, CA: BCP Digital Printing, 2002); 
Judson L. Jeffries, “An Unexamined Chapter of Black Panther History,” in Black Power in the Belly of the 
Beast, Judson L. Jeffries, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 185-223; Charles E. Jones, The 
Black Panther Party (Reconsidered) (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1998); Jim Kaskins, Power to the 
People: The Rise and Fall of the Black Panther Party (New York: Simon and Schuester, 1997); Peniel E. 
Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 2006), especially 200-297; Jama Lazerow and Yohuru Williams, In Search of 
the Black Panther Party: New Perspectives on a Revolutionary Movement (Durham, Duke University 
Press, 2006) and Liberated Territories: Untold Local Perspectives on the Black Panther Party (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2008); Gene Marine, The Black Panthers (New York: New American Library, 
1969); Steve D. McCutchen, We Were Free for a While: Back to Back in the Black Panther Party 
(Baltimore: Publish America, 2008); Donna Murch, Living for the City: Migration, Education, and the Rise 
of the Black Panther Party in Oakland, CA (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); Huey 
Newton, Revolutionary Suicide (New York:  Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1973); Michael Newton, Bitter 
Grain: The Story of the Black Panther Party (Los Angeles: Holloway House, 1980); Akua Njeri (Deborah 
Johnson), My Life with the Black Panther Party (Oakland, CA: Burning Spear, 1991); Jack Olsen, Last 
Man Standing: The Tragedy and Triumph of Geronimo Pratt (New York: Anchor Books, 2000); Akinyele 
O. Umoja, “The Black Liberation Army and the Radical Legacy of the Black Panther Party,” Black Power 
in the Belly of the Beast, 224-251; Hugh Pearson, The Shadow of the Panther: Huey Newton and the Price 
of Black Power in America (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1994); Jane Rhodes, Framing the Black 
Panthers: The Spectacular Rise of a Black Power Icon (New York: New Press, 2007); Katherine Rout, 
Eldridge Cleaver (Twayne’s United States Authors Series Boston: Twayne, 1991); Bobby Seale, A Lonely 
Rage: The Autobiography of Bobby Seale (New York: New York Times Books, 1978) and Seize the Time: 
The Story of the Black Panther Party and Huey Newton (New York: Random House, 1970); Assata Shakur 
and Angela Davis, Assata: An Autobiography (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 2001); Jennifer B. Smith, 
An International History of the Black Panther Party (New York: Garland, 1999); Roy Wilkins, Search and 
Destroy: A Report by the Commission of Inquiry into the Black Panthers and the Police (New York: 
Metropolitan Applied Research Center, 1973); Jakobi Williams, From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois 
Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago  (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2013); Yohuru Williams, Black Politics/White Power: Civil Rights, Black Power, 
and the Black Panthers in New Haven (New York: Brandywine Press, 2000).  
 
232 
 
(France). The Panthers, because of their own socialist beliefs, were treated with respect 
and as honored guests. They enjoyed stately dinners, toured the Northern partition of the 
Demilitarized Zone, and eventually, after a month in the capital, visited the North 
Vietnamese embassy. This meeting led to an invitation to spend two weeks in Hanoi with 
a group of sympathetic Western journalists. Cleaver accepted the invitation, and the 
Panther delegation continued their tour of America’s enemy lands.  The Vietnamese, 
according to Brown, “offered us their best, when they had so little. They were passionate, 
unabashedly weeping as they spoke of the horrors of the war, and able to laugh with 
equal vigor—even about the war.”40  Brown found great strength from the Vietnamese 
and decided, from her time in Vietnam, that the Panthers, like the North Vietnamese 
Army and the National Liberation Front fighting in the South were, “truly a vanguard 
organization, a small unit in a big endeavor, whose purpose was to trigger a step-by-step 
revolutionary process, to clarify the issues, develop the mass mind, solidify the base of 
struggle, prepare our people to achieve freedom as nonantagonistically as possible—or to 
prevail in a conflict decided by bloodshed.”41  Brown’s commitment to socialist 
revolution was reenergized in Vietnam, where she found camaraderie with the 
Vietnamese women who struggled for freedom. She observed: 
 there were young guerilla girls we met on the beach at the Gulf of Tonkin, 
thirteen- and fourteen-year-olds, up from Saigon for a rest, girls who should have 
been giggling about boys or lipstick or hairstyles. There were the children we met 
whose bodies had been maimed by napalm, and those who had only on arm or 
one leg, missing limbs destroyed by U.S. bombs. There were the stalwart old 
women who had lost everyone in their families in U.S. troop destructions of their 
villages.42    
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The girls Brown saw at the Gulf of Tonkin could have easily been her childhood friends 
from the Philadelphia projects, forced to grow up earlier than most. Brown saw part of 
herself in the guerilla fighters and the old women in the villages who persevered despite 
terrible loss.  The Panthers were like the fighters. They put their lives on the line every 
day for a cause; they continued to organize for that cause, even when their brothers and 
sisters were targeted by the same U.S. government who dropped bombs in Vietnam.   
While their fights were in distant locations from one another, Brown’s words, like 
Carmichael’s radio addresses, evoked the idea of an imagined community, where women 
of color, oppressed by the United States government for wanting a better life for their 
families, for wanting to be free, saw each other as comrades in arms. She, and her Panther 
compatriots throughout the United States, saw their efforts as joined with the 
decolonization and independence movements occurring throughout the world at the time. 
While fighting in different locations and with varying goals, the Vietnamese and the 
Panthers were both attempting to end white, colonial domination by the United States. 
They sought sovereignty, for their country or their neighborhoods, and respect.  Brown’s 
connections with the Vietnamese women and children she saw on her two week stay in 
Vietnam strengthened her feelings of community and commitment to socialist revolution. 
It also reinvigorated her understanding of the American imperial agenda, one which had 
to be stopped.  Thus, protesting the Vietnam War, though not always explicitly 
acknowledged in Panther literature and platform speeches, was an important part of 
Panther organizing. 
 While disrupting American imperialism through travel and exile were important 
ways Black Power spread their message and articulated Third World mentalities, other 
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forms of resistance also served to heighten that identification. When addressing white 
anti-war organizations in the United States, Black Power leaders consistently referred to 
the connections between anti-Vietnam protests and the need to end colonialism at all 
fronts, including in the United States. SNCC International Relations Director James 
Forman, in a letter to the Fifth Avenue Vietnam Peace Parade Committee, reminded 
activists that “all efforts against the United States genocidal war in Vietnam must be seen 
as efforts to help oppressed people around the world to obtain self-determination—
including black people in the United States, a people of African descent.”43 Forman went 
on to connect the Vietnamese struggle for independence with the American Revolution 
and the black struggle for self-determination in the United States with the recolonization 
of the United States following independence from the British, as the US expanded its 
borders and pushed Native American tribes westward and kept African American 
enslaved. Forman’s speech again highlighted the imagined community of oppressed 
people of color around the world and the ways United States foreign policy served to 
keep them oppressed. 
 Although the draft often occupied the themes of Black Power advocates’ anti-war 
speeches, the Third World mentality and desire to end American colonialism was also 
present. On November 12, 1969 in Oakland, California, Angela Davis, delivered a speech 
titled, “The Liberation of our People.” Davis, a child of middle class upbringing, 
discovered radicalism in college and had been an early opponent of the Vietnam War. 
She spent time in East Germany, while studying at the Sorbonne in Paris and was 
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dedicated to Socialist revolution in the United States.44 In her speech, Davis articulated 
Black Power’s position on Vietnam, exclaiming, “we have to talk about what’s 
happening in Vietnam as a symptom of something that’s happening all over the world, of 
something that’s happening in this country.” She implored her listeners to make 
connections between the antiwar movement, the liberation movement, and an 
international struggle to escape white, racist imperialism.  Davis continued, “…we’re 
seeing as this country is being defeated in Vietnam, more and more acts of repression are 
occurring here on the domestic scene.”45 Connecting American oppression of anti-war 
and Black Power advocates to the losses sustained in Vietnam was not ground breaking 
rhetoric; however, it did serve to reinforce the shared experiences of those fighting 
against the American imperial agenda. 
Davis used both class and race rhetoric to implore her listeners to take a stand 
against the war and to see the connections between the fighting in Vietnam and their 
situation at home. She dissected the economy, arguing:  
This whole economy in this country is a war economy. It’s based on the fact that 
more and more weapons are being produced. What happens if the war in Vietnam 
ceases? How is the economy going to stand unless another Vietnam is created, 
and who is going to determine where that Vietnam is gonna be? It can be abroad, 
or it can right here at home, and I think it’s becoming evident that Vietnam is 
entering the streets of this country. It’s becoming evident in all the brutal forms 
of repression, which we can see every day of our lives here.    
 
Davis appeared to echo Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning against a military industrial 
complex, and saw that the American capitalist economy had become dependent on 
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military action to keep working.46 Unlike some of her brethren, Davis was not explicitly 
concerned with the funds Vietnam was diverting from poverty programs; instead, she 
worried that ending the war in Vietnam could lead to a further economic downturn in the 
United States. Nonetheless, she was opposed to a military presence in Vietnam, yet she 
feared that ending the war would lead to a new battle on U.S. streets.  
Davis’s reading of the military economy in the United States was a departure 
from the basic economic arguments of the antiwar and Civil Rights movements. She 
asked tough questions about the reality of ending the war and how it would affect 
working class people in the United States, implying that when the United States left 
Vietnam, they would redeploy troops somewhere else, maybe in the United States, to 
continue their racist, repressive legacy. In order to prevent this from happening, Davis 
believed, “we can’t talk about protesting the genocide of the Vietnamese people without 
at the same time doing something to stop the genocide that is—that freedom fighters in 
this country are being subjected too.” Davis saw the murder of the Vietnamese in war as 
analogous to the murder of men and women in the United States, as both were fighting 
for freedom from oppression by a white overlord. More importantly, Davis articulated the 
Panther belief in an international movement for peace and freedom. It is in this moment 
that Davis voiced a Third World consciousness, which could be appropriated in the 
United States. All oppressed people in the world were Panther brothers and sisters: 
 within the whole liberation struggle in this country, the black liberation struggle 
and the brown liberation struggle there has continually been the sentiment against 
the American Imperialist aggressive policies throughout this world because we 
have been forced to see that the enemy is American imperialism and although we 
feel it at home it’s being felt perhaps much more brutally in Vietnam, it’s being 
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felt in Latin America, it’s being felt in Africa, we have to make these 
connections. 
 
Davis saw the connections between foreign imperialism and domestic repression, though 
she was unwilling to admit that the brutality was equal.  Instead, foreign repression was 
worse, and it was the responsibility of repressed Americans to challenge their status, so 
that colonial subjects in Vietnam, Latin America, and Africa could also be inspired.47 
Davis continued, “what we have to talk about now is a united force, which sees 
the liberation of the Vietnamese people as intricately linked up with the liberation of 
black and brown and exploited white people in this society, and only this kind of a 
unified front, only this kind of united force can be victorious.”  The connection between 
black, brown, oppressed white, and the Vietnamese was both paternalistic and unifying.  
Davis claimed that the only way to overthrow the colonial power was for all oppressed 
groups to unify, yet she also claimed that those groups in the United States needed to set 
an example for the rest of the world. By elevating the status of U.S. protesters against 
their own government, over that of colonial subjects abroad, Davis betrayed herself as a 
product of American imperial thought. It is an important point to make, because it shows 
that working against a power paradigm, like the idea of American superiority, was 
difficult, even for those who were oppressed by the United States. Davis ended her 
speech with a rousing call for the release of all political prisoners in the United States and 
in Vietnam.  
The ending exhortation made the strongest connection between incidents in 
Vietnam and the United States.  Davis relied on the example of Bobby Seale48, arguing 
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that his prison term was no different from men being sent to Vietnam to fight “a dirty war 
in Vietnam. They are victims too and they have to be shown that their true loyalties 
should be with us in our liberation struggle here and with the Vietnamese people in their 
liberation struggle there.” She did not overtly demand that men stop serving in the 
military; instead she relied on a subtle argument of education.  Servicemen had to be 
shown the connections between Vietnamese freedom and their own. Again, Davis’s 
rhetoric seems to reek of a bit of class antagonism, as she seems to think that most 
American servicemen would need to be educated about the dual struggles and their 
similarities. However, Davis’s words were more likely a part of her radical rhetoric and 
training, which attempted to educate the public to socialist principles and assumed that 
most people were unaware of the teachings of Malcolm X, Mao, and Marx. Moreover, 
Davis delivered this speech to an integrated group of anti-war protesters, therefore 
articulating the connections explicitly served to potentially bring more people into the 
imagined community of the oppressed.  Nevertheless, Davis and the Panthers felt it was 
their responsibility to educate the masses, to make the connections between the war in 
Vietnam and repression in the United States clear and accessible to their followers. This 
effort is laudable and should not be deluded because Black Power, like the men and 
women they often criticized, still used paternalistic rhetoric to make their points.49 
 While speeches provided listeners and readers with the theoretical underpinnings 
of Black Power’s antiwar and Third World rhetoric, they were only one tactic for 
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showing support of the imagined community of Third World victims. At a May 1972 
Anti-War, African Liberation, Voter Registration and Survival Conference sponsored by 
the Oakland Chapter of the Black Panther Party, the following petition was circulated: 
We, the undersigned are the poor and oppressed people of the world. WE have 
long suffered hunger, indecent living standards and murder at the hands of 
warmongers who have run rampant through our various communities laying waste 
to our territories and enslaving our people. 
The most flagrant violations of our humanity have been and are daily 
committed by the U.S. ruling circle and the U.S. government. We poor and 
oppressed people, therefore, petition the U.S. government, in the name of 
Humanity, to stop its war of aggression in Vietnam, in Southern Africa, in Latin 
America and its brutality and exploitation in all our communities, so that we 
world’s peoples may begin to live together in harmonic peace and freedom.  
The struggles being currently waged in Vietnam, in Southern Africa, in the Black 
and poor communities in the U.S. itself, as well as elsewhere, are all our struggles 
and we are uniting and pledge ourselves to unite ever stronger together as one for 
our common survival and complete liberation. This is what we want. This is what 
we believe.50  
 
The petition, directed at the United States government and ruling class, connected the 
struggle of African Americans and colonial subjects waging wars of independence in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, through their shared experiences of poverty. Like the 
speeches and position papers delivered in the 1960s, the petition connected Black 
Power’s domestic and international aims for peace in struggling communities by ending 
American imperial pursuits. The circulated petition also used the language of the Black 
Panther Party—“This is what we want. This is what we believe.”—as the ending, 
signifying the power of the Party and the changing direction of their revolution. The 
petition was most likely not signed by many non-Americans, as it was circulated at a 
Black Panther conference in Oakland. The conference’s marketing material boasted 
10,000 free, full bags of groceries, speeches from Bobby Seale, Elaine Brown, and 
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Congressman Ron Dellums of California’s 7th District, voter registration, and 10,000 
Sickle Cell Anemia tests.51 The conference directly benefited Oakland’s poor, the men 
and women the Panther’s worked with on a daily basis. Yet, the internationalism present 
in the petition and the conference’s title highlight the Panther’s imagined community of 
shared struggle. Using food and medicine to garner interest in and support for 
international ties also served to reinforce the shared experiences of oppression. Like the 
Vietnamese, Oakland’s impoverished suffered from a lack of medical care and food 
insecurity brought on by, according to the Panthers, the U.S. government’s neo-
imperialism abroad and neglect at home. 
The rhetorical and symbolic efforts of Black Power to connect their struggle to 
that of oppressed people throughout the world resulted in the establishment of 
international channels of discussion and an expanded network of support. The Third 
World rhetoric passed through these associations, whereby anti-American leaders in 
Vietnam provided intellectual support to Black Power’s internationalism, while also 
highlighting the importance of anti-colonial struggles within the United States. Tran Van 
Tu, the head of the National Liberation Front’s delegation to a 1968 meeting in 
Stockholm hand delivered a letter to Jim Harvey, NBAWADU’s representative at the 
meeting. Tran’s letter expressed solidarity with black Americans, stating, “The Vietnam 
war waged by the U.S. Government has caused so much sufferings not only to the 
Vietnamese people, but also to the Afro-Americans; therefore your struggle against the 
draft and for liberation is ours.” Tran also reinforced the reciprocal nature of the alliance, 
telling his “Afro-American Friends! We salute you and congratulate every victory you 
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have won. Your brave acts constitute a great encouragement to our freedom fighters.” 
Using similar language as Carmichael, Brown, and Davis, Tran’s letter was an example 
of the power of citizen’s diplomacy and highlighted the shared nature of the struggle. It 
also signified the cross-cultural exchanges that occurred during Americans trips to the 
Third World and through international tribunals to discuss peace and freedom.52  
Beyond the semi-governmental representation of the National Liberation Front, a 
Vietnamese citizens group based in Hanoi, the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with 
the American People, reached out to organizations fighting for racial and economic 
justice in the United States. James Haughton, Director of New York’s Fight Back which 
organized Harlem for better housing and job opportunities was contacted by Tran-trong-
Quat of the Vietnam Committee in July, 1971. Tran expressed his organization’s support 
of Haughton’s efforts and admitted that though Fight Back was fighting racism, 
oppression and exploitation, Harlem faced “the same enemies who are waging a war of 
aggression against our people.” The Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the 
American People saw a shared experience of oppression and although Fight Back did not 
explicitly organize against the war in Vietnam, their literature did connect the American 
imperialism to Harlem’s issues. Unlike other correspondence, however, the Vietnamese 
Committee for Solidarity reached out to Haughton, highlighting the shared commitment 
to cross-cultural exchange and Third World alliances, as well as the genuine belief in a 
shared struggle against American imperialism. While the meetings most often occurred 
between non-governmental actors, the pledges of support and the continued 
correspondence helped to facilitate the imagined community of Black Power advocates 
and led to further expansion into internationalism, with the Black Panther Party 
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establishing an international wing in Algiers after Black Panther Minister of Information 
Eldridge Cleaver’s self-imposed exile. Moreover, by the end of 1969, Stokely Carmichael 
had decided his life was better abroad, and made Guinea his home for the remainder of 
his life.53  
 The Panthers were particularly effective in garnering support from both non-
government representatives and the leaders of countries aligned against American 
interests. To do this, the Panthers sent telegrams and letters of interest to leaders in 
Cambodia, North Vietnam, North Korea, and China, with birthday wishes, 
congratulations on military victories, and offers of support for independence or requests 
for information. In return, the Panthers received endorsements of their ideals, intellectual 
backing, and the ability to claim the support of Third World revolutionaries. Further, the 
Panther’s communication allowed leaders like North Korea’s Kim Il Sung an American 
audience to denounce American imperialism. In one such telegram, Kim wrote “I avail 
myself of this opportunity to strongly denounce the fascist suppression of the US 
imperialists against your party and reiterate the firm solidarity with your just struggle for 
freedom and liberation though you are fighting in an arduous circumstance…” Kim’s 
correspondence proved the link the Party often presented the Black Panther, the 
Panther’s newspaper, which printed international news and commentary, including the 
telegrams from world leaders the party received. The Panther newspaper was circulated 
nationally by its 40 chapters and mailing list, meaning it reached a wide audience beyond 
Oakland.  Kim’s telegram was one in a series of Asian countries representatives, 
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including Cambodia and North Vietnam, expressing support for revolutionary actions in 
the United States and shared experiences of capitalist oppression.54   
 Through international travel, correspondence, speeches, and conferences, Black 
Power used an imagined community of Third World oppression to express antiwar and 
anti-imperial rhetoric. The Vietnam War and its continued atrocities provided Black 
Power advocates with fertile ground on which to connect their own struggles in the 
United States to those of the neo-colonial subjects of U.S. military aggression. By 
highlighting shared experiences, especially around treatment by government officials, 
food insecurity, medical needs, and living conditions, Black Power’s Third World 
imaginations were easily accessible to colonial subjects in the United States and abroad. 
Moreover, the rhetoric allowed Black Power advocates to open dialogues about shared 
experiences of oppression and to provide a counter narrative to the U.S. government’s 
exceptionalist rhetoric, which sought to prove American superiority and the virtues of 
democracy over self-determination for South Vietnam and the world. In so doing, Black 
Power internationalists became the instruments of righteousness exiled leader Robert F. 
Williams described to Mao Tse-Tong during his time in China.55 Black Power’s 
internationalism served to open China before Nixon and Kissinger’s Ping Pong 
diplomacy of the 1970s and disrupted American imperial goals by providing people 
suffering under American neo-imperialism with a connection to non-white, non-
democratic individuals within the United States who shared similar objectives and fears. 
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This Third World mentality and imagined community created intellectual arguments to 
further Black Power’s struggle and provided the opportunity for different types of 
activists, particularly women, to enter into Black Power’s antiwar and anti-colonial 
struggles.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
“Because they marched, city councils changed and state legislatures changed and 
Congress changed and, yes, eventually the White House changed.”-President Barack 
Obama, on the 50th Anniversary of the March on Washington1 
  
Fifty years after John Lewis stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, defiant 
but respectful in addressing the hundreds of thousands of marchers who came to 
Washington to demand jobs and freedom, he was again in the shadow of Lincoln as the 
only remaining living speaker from the 1963 program. While John Lewis continues to 
proclaim the “fierce urgency of now,” the fiftieth anniversary of the March on 
Washington was a celebration of a whitewashed, watered down version of Civil Rights, 
with Black Power completely absent from the proceedings. Even Lewis, who has 
remained unwavering in his pursuit of equal rights, celebrated a past that his twenty-
three-year-old self would not recognize. The speeches on August 28, 2013 focused on Dr. 
King’s Dream and the problems that still remain in America—joblessness, 
underemployment, health care access, voting rights—but they also comfortably fell into 
the master narrative of the Movement. Both Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama 
spoke of Civil Rights victories and defeats: Rosa Parks and the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, the bombing of the 16th Street Baptist Church that killed four young girls in 
1963, and the beatings of SNCC, SCLC, and CORE workers on the Edmond Pettus 
Bridge on Bloody Sunday in 1965. President Clinton told the crowd, quoting King 
biographer Taylor Branch, “The movement here gained the force to open, quote, ‘the 
stubborn gates of freedom,’ and out flowed the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, 
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immigration reform, Medicare, Medicaid, open housing.”2 In Clinton’s story, King’s 
words were enough to dramatically reshape the United States. 
President Obama reminded the crowd that the United States has witnessed great 
progress since those dark days, and “to dismiss the magnitude of this progress, to suggest, 
as some sometimes do, that little has changed--that dishonors the courage and the 
sacrifice of those who paid the price to march in those years. Medgar Evers, James 
Chaney, Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, Martin Luther King Jr., they did not die 
in vain.”3 By jumping from the Mississippi Burning murders in the summer of 1964 to 
the assassination of Dr. King in April 1968, President Obama parroted the comfortable 
narrative of an integrationist-minded, peaceful Movement who saw tragedy but remained 
triumphant. By forgetting the murder of Sammy Younge, the militancy of African 
American anti-war activists, and the rhetoric of Dr. King after 1967, the President and 
those listening in the crowd were fed a sanitized and far less truthful version of our 
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nation’s past. While Barack Obama has acknowledged that the nation is not post-racial, 
that his presidency has not ended the racial problems the United States continues to deal 
with, he remains a trumpet of triumph, celebrating a Civil Rights Movement that further 
elevates the master narrative, ignoring the Long Movement thesis and important work of 
his fellow citizens.  
Historian Timothy B. Tyson tells this same narrative another way:  
In this story and in popular memory, a respectable and eloquent black preacher 
came to the pulpit to confront white America. A handful of us welcomed him, 
most of us feared him, and some of us hated him. But when this elegant man of 
the cloth arrived, he was not so threatening after all. Instead, his sonorous voice 
evoked our best selves and reminded us just how good we really were. Prodded 
by the simple sense of decency we learned as children, we listened nervously as 
the black minister promised to make the rough places smooth and the crooked 
places straight, and asked only our tolerance.4 
 
Tyson does not claim that the story is completely without merit; however, he argues the 
problem with it is “why we cherish that kind of story: because we want to transcend our 
history without actually confronting it.”5 The master narrative that ignores African 
Americans’ anti-war activism and downplays the contributions of Black Power to change 
in America allows us to celebrate our past without critically investigating it. 
 When we stop looking for triumph and are willing to get messy and complicated, 
a truer account of the era is possible. Moreover, as this dissertation argues, by looking at 
the places where movements intersect, we see the ways diverse people worked to change 
the nation, sometimes together, sometimes not, but with the goal of a more perfect union 
in mind. Black Power’s anti-Vietnam war activism was different than the popularly 
remembered white, student-led movement. It focused on ending or curbing the draft and 
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the war itself. Black Power advocates created a shared identity as Third World colonial 
subjects and expressed their anti-war notions in solidarity with the colonized Vietnamese. 
Black Americans and the Vietnamese were victims of American imperialism, according 
to Black Power’s anti-war messages. Moreover, black troops were mercenaries and bore 
a larger burden in the fighting in Vietnam, drafted into the Army as members of 
McNamara’s Project 100,000.  
 For too long, the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements have been presented 
as a narrative of declension after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. By 
elevating Black Power’s anti-war activism from the footnotes of historiography, a more 
nuanced understanding of the way American citizens engaged with their government and 
voiced their opposition to policy becomes clearer. It also highlights the multifaceted 
nature of protest in the latter half of the 1960s and early 1970s. If we only look at anti-
racism activism or the work of local branches of national organizations like SNCC and 
the Black Panthers it is easy to miss the varying and intersecting lives activists led. The 
War was ever present in Black Power advocates lives. Men faced draft notices and jail 
time; women helped to organize coffee houses and helped men avoid the draft in semi-
legal ways. Organizations won and lost support from individuals and the government for 
their anti-war and anti-draft statements.   
 As historians continue to try to come to terms with the monumental changes the 
activists of the 1960s and 1970s brought to the United States, more work on the 
intersection of movements is necessary. While the local stories provide rich, illuminating 
texts, focusing the lens a little wider—on more than one organization or a more national 
picture—will help to bring the era into a less blurry frame. We have only skimmed the 
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surface of the ways the Movement worked to change the United States. Much more of the 
story is hidden in plain sight, behind the master narrative and popular memory. We only 
need to look. 
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Appendix: SNCC’s Vietnam Comic Book 
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